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## ART. I.—THE DISCOVERY OF THE DELUGE

**L**AST spring the Joint Expedition of the British Museum and the Museum of the University of Pennsylvania uncovered at Ur a stratum which, we think, represents the deposit of the traditional Deluge.

The predynastic graves of Ur, in which so many remarkable discoveries have been made during the last three seasons, were dug in a talus of stratified rubbish thrown down from a primitive settlement nearby. Shafts sunk by Mr. Woolley beneath the level of the cemetery through the lower part of this town-refuse reached a layer or bank (it lies in part on the lower slopes of a mound) of clean water-laid clay, wholly free from cultural remains and containing nothing but one fossilized fragment of animal bone. This alluvial stratum is at its deepest quite eight feet thick. Beneath it the excavators came again to the relics of primitive town-life: flint chips and cores, three kinds of potsherds, and a baked brick of a type hitherto unknown. Pits sunk to higher points of the mound against which lies the diluvial deposit revealed more bricks and sherds of the same type. A few feet above sea-level the relics of human occupation cease and we come to the virgin-soil of river alluvium, the primitive floor of the Mesopotamian delta. About the same time another member of our Expedition, Mr. Mallowan, was sinking a shaft to virgin-soil in connexion with work on the courtyard of the Moon-god some 200 yards distant: this shaft gave similar results. We have, therefore, found evidence of a flood of extraordinary depth which overwhelmed, to all appearance, the primitive civilization of the Euphrates valley. It is obvious to identify this with the Great Flood of the native tradition.

The primary sources of our knowledge of this native tradition are four forms of the same story preserved in cuneiform: three Semitic and one (known since 1916)

Sumerian. There are also allusions in other cuneiform documents: of special interest is the notice concerning the catastrophe that is entered at a certain point in the Sumerian chronological list of kings (known since 1923), which professes to enumerate the sovereign dynasties of the Land from the beginning of kingship to the Isin dynasty, twenty-first century.

The written tradition—as in the Dynastic List, so in the Legends—is not older than about this twenty-first century. The origin of cuneiform writing may indeed be as old as the Deluge: a neo-Babylonian tradition implies that it is older; documents from Jemdet-Nasr published last year are now ascribed by the editor to a date quite as early as that to which we should assign the Deluge at Ur; and yet older tablets exist. This may seem to suggest the possibility in the future of the most wonderful discoveries of historical documents—for instance, contemporary records of the Deluge. Unfortunately, however, it is becoming clear that writing was used almost wholly for business and trade and (later) monumental and dedicational inscriptions until nearly the end of the third millennium: not till then did the Sumerians begin to write down their history, legends, and the like. Perhaps it was for the benefit of the Semites who were beginning to dominate Sumer at this time that the Sumerian traditions were first edited. Anyhow, the traditions are indefinitely older than their rather sudden appearance in writing. Of the historicity of the tradition we have had evidence at Ur, where the Expedition has discovered contemporary inscriptions of kings otherwise only known from the Sumerian dynastic lists composed a thousand years after the reigns in question.

It is worth while, then, to test by some comparisons the identification of the Deluge discovered at Ur with that of the tradition.

Firstly, as to the causes and extension of the Flood. It is perhaps probable—though there is no clear statement—that the tradition as we have it supposes a world-wide cataclysm. However this may be, a few topographical indications are preserved from which to obtain a more

exact notion of what occurred. The tradition locates the catastrophe especially at Shuruppak, a city of Sumer on the Euphrates, some sixty miles north of Ur. Here lived the Noah of the Sumerians, and here apparently the gods planned the Deluge. An Assyrian text uses the expression "the Flood that was in Shuruppak." It was supposed, perhaps, that the storm burst there—both the Sumerian and the principal Semitic accounts attribute the Flood to a mighty storm. There is no hint of earthquake or tidal wave. Nor is the overflow of rivers mentioned; but late forms of the tradition putting the Deluge in spring, the season of river-floods due to the melting of the Armenian snows, suggest the concurrence of this cause. Such a flood would have a definite place or places of entrance, which tradition would presumably have located in the neighbourhood of Shuruppak. But whether or not the Deluge was supposed in some way to have *originated* at this spot, tradition is constant that Shuruppak was notably involved in the catastrophe.

Notoriously the Flood extended far and wide. The survivors are said to have been conveyed by it to Mount Nisir, more than 200 miles northwards. It is debatable that this is an exaggeration, though to me the substance of the tradition seems credible enough—Nisir, probably between the 'Adheim and the lower Zab, being taken to represent the first hills reached by the refugees from Shuruppak going north. However this may be, there is no difficulty about an extension of the Flood to the south—down-stream—towards the Persian Gulf, a lesser distance than from Shuruppak to Mount Nisir. Further, according to the Dynastic List, kingship was reinaugurated after the Deluge first at Kish, in Akkad, north of the Sumerian land, which may imply that the catastrophe, while affecting all Sumer and Akkad, had especially devastated the southern land, Sumer. Thus all the indications suggest that the territory overwhelmed by the Great Flood of the native tradition included at least the lower Euphrates plain below Shuruppak. It is here that Ur is situated.

Of the date in time the Dynastic List gives the only



indication. Two dynasties, or thirty-five reigns, at Kish and Uruk intervene between the Deluge and the first dynasty of Ur. It is true that mythological longevity is attributed to these kings (the first dynasty at Kish is said to have endured for 24,519 years, 3 months,  $3\frac{1}{2}$  days); but, while the artificial chronology must be ignored, recent discoveries have tended to confirm the authenticity of the names in the king-list. If the average fifteen years be given to each reign, the two dynasties would have lasted some 525 years: thus, since we put the first dynasty of Ur about 3,100 B.C., postdiluvian kingship would have been established about the thirty-seventh century. (It is probable, I think, that the dynasty of Uruk may have partly overlapped that of Kish, and this would reduce the date: on the other hand, a discovery at Ur suggests that in the early part of the king-list some kings' names have been forgotten, and this would lengthen the period. These doubts may be considered to neutralize one another.) Some time—but, as we shall see, probably not a very long one—may be allowed for a period of disorder before civilization was reconstructed after the Deluge: say a century. Thus the tradition, such as it is, seems to indicate, very roughly, about the thirty-eighth century as the date of the event.

The Deluge revealed at Ur may be dated approximately at the same time. The stratification was discussed by Mr. Woolley, and the chronology by me from the epigraphical point of view, in the *Antiquaries Journal* (October, 1929). The stratification suggests perhaps *circ.* 3800-3700 for a stratum fairly high up in the early postdiluvian rubbish. I have argued that the palæography of inscriptions found in the excavation suggests (though it does not exact) a reduction of dates by a century or two.

So much of the place and time of the traditional Deluge. Now of its effects, considered in the most general way. The Sumerians supposed that it had broken the continuity of their history, but not broken it entirely. On the one hand, the Dynastic List divides the whole history of the Land into two periods—dynasties before and dynasties after the Flood, both series being introduced by the

formula "Kingship descended from heaven"; thus after the Flood "Kingship" (practically the Sumerian equivalent for civilization) has to be reinaugurated. On the other hand, the breach in the Sumerian cultural tradition was not believed to be complete: the cities of prediluvian sovereignty continued to exist after the Deluge (though not again as sovereign cities), predynastic kings have already good Sumerian names, and the origin of the arts and science is attributed to prediluvian revelations and sages.

The archæological evidence at Ur corresponds, but is more precise. Here the Deluge overwhelmed a primitive culture which was partly Sumerian, but civilization was reconstructed without loss of continuity in its Sumerian elements. More precisely, *beneath* the diluvial stratum is found (a) the painted handmade pottery which is never found in position with certainly Sumerian belongings, and (b) the unpainted wheelmade pottery that is characteristic of Sumerian culture in all periods: *above* the stratum of the Flood is only the latter pottery. Thus one element in the population or in the culture comes to an abrupt end, but one—Sumerian—survives or is revived.

So the place and time and general effects of the Flood revealed at Ur agree with what is known of the place, time, and effects of the Great Flood of the native tradition.

The people of the painted pottery, whose culture was destroyed by the Deluge at Ur, are the principal subject of this article: it is through them that connexion may be made between the stories of the Flood and scientific history. Something has been known of them since 1920. Quantities of fragments of the painted pottery may be found on early sites in southern Sumer, mostly unrelated to anything datable, but occurring at el-'Obeid (excavated by our Expedition) in position with stone instruments and other primitive remains from a very early settlement. At the time of the recent discovery at Ur the opinion had been current in conversation for some years, and for some months in print, that the culture represented by the painted pottery might well be assigned to the prediluvian age of the native tradition. We were therefore duly impressed

when we found that it did, in fact, characterize the prediluvial stratum at Ur.

It is essential to our argument to summarize the data of this culture as it is known from el-'Obeid. The settlement was on the virgin-soil of a natural mound or island of river-silt, rising above the still marshy plain of the Euphrates delta. The houses were built of reed-matting, plastered with clay and dung or with earth and bitumen, supported on wooden posts and strengthened below with mud walling. The tools in use were principally of stone: polished celts for axes and adzes, hoes of flint and chert, small knives and sawblades or sickle-teeth of rock crystal and obsidian. Sickles and nails were of clay. Metal (copper) was not found in the settlement, but it may have been known as a rarity: the stone technique is post-neolithic, and some think that certain baked clay instruments imitate metal forms. (Possibly they were imitations of metal-work used by contemporaries of higher culture—Sumerians of the cities.) It was then a primitive people—primitive relatively to the Sumerians as we know them, though well advanced relatively to the world at large; they built boats of modern type, kept cattle and pigs, sowed and span. There is little trace of their religion: it is suggested that a model bird may be votive. Two fragmentary figurines, both probably of females, may also be objects of piety. It may be added that many centuries later there was a Sumerian temple of the fertility goddess at el-'Obeid, having a remarkable frieze showing priests herding and milking the sacred cattle, while other imagery represents many birds: it has been suggested that this bucolic cult was a survival of that of the primitives.

Visitors to our Exhibition in the British Museum will have seen objects similar to those of el-'Obeid from presumed prediluvian levels of Ur: flint and obsidian chips, sickle and nail of clay, clay animals. Here besides was a little metal—two copper needles. Impressions of primitive cylinder-seals on clay sealings show figures of animals. Two broken figurines of females, though found loose on a higher level, are comparable to the figures of el-'Obeid.

The pottery of these men—painted mostly with black or reddish geometrical designs—has been much discussed during the last few years. It is at least certain that it has some affinity with that of a wide province of early potteries, painted with more or less geometrical designs, in the neighbouring lands from north-west to south-east (North Syria, East Anatolia, North and Central Iraq, Elam, Bushire on the Persian coast of the Gulf). All these wares make a contrast with the plain pottery of the Sumerians. It would seem that the first and prediluvian culture of lower Iraq was an extension of this widespread mountain-culture. It is not clear to me whether it was introduced wholly from the north. It may be, perhaps, that some bearers of this culture entered into the south of the delta from the Persian Gulf: the painted pottery found at el-'Obeid and the neighbouring places is considered to be identical with that of Bushire, whilst the painted pottery of middle Iraq (Akkad), if I am not mistaken, has specially northern characteristics. Thus the culture of the painted pottery may have entered the Euphrates-Tigris valley both from the north and from the south. Certainly in Akkad its history is somewhat different from what it is in Sumer: it survived in Akkad much longer, even into postdiluvian times. But whatever the origins of the related early cultures of Akkad and Sumer, we have an indication that early postdiluvians of the former and the prediluvians of the latter were culturally somehow akin. A fragment of figurine discovered at Ur, identical in paste and pigment with the supposed prediluvian pottery, shows a peculiar long and very thin beard; just such a beard is worn by figures in a decoration found at Kish in Akkad, and dating from the early postdiluvian.

Such being our information about the people of the painted pottery who were destroyed by the Sumerian Deluge, the theory of our Director is as follows. Before the Deluge there lived in southern Iraq two peoples: the people of the painted pottery, relatively primitive, dwellers in villages of reed-huts; and the more advanced Sumerians, townsmen, people of the machine-made but unpainted pottery. The Sumerian culture was not extinguished by

the Deluge. The Deluge affected especially the primitives of the villages: in Sumer their culture was extinguished, though it survived for a time in Akkad.

In this theory its survival in Akkad might be due, partly at least, to its closer contact there with the large province of the similar culture in the North; moreover, the native culture would have been predominant in Akkad as it was not in the Sumerianized South: but another cause would not be excluded—that the northern population had suffered little from the Deluge that had overwhelmed the South: it might, too, have incorporated refugees from the South—from the reed-hut people of northern Sumer, for instance from Shuruppak.

We here approach the stories of the hero of the Deluge. It is most noteworthy that in the principal native tradition the *reed-hut* is prominent. The gods in council planned to destroy men: Ea, the god friendly to the hero, may not tell him the secret, so by a subterfuge [not quite consistently adhered to] he tells it to the wall of the reed-hut.

Their word he repeated to the reed-hut :  
 "Reed-hut ! Reed-hut ! Wall ! Wall !  
 Reed-hut, listen ! Wall, understand !  
 [Man of Shuruppak, Son of Ubar-Tutu !]  
 Tear down the house : build a ship !  
 Leave riches : seek life !  
 Possessions hate, and life save !  
 Bring the seed of life, all of it, into a ship."

The god's whispering in the wall of the reed-hut—*kikkishu! kikkishu!*—is perhaps the wind therein, announcing the storm. But whatever the motive for the preservation of the detail, the tradition enshrines the valuable fact that the man of Shuruppak belonged to such a people of the reed-huts as was revealed at el-'Obeid. That the reed-hut was the hero's house—and a house of el-'Obeid type—seems to be evident. "Pull down the house! Build a ship!" Later follow details of the construction, and of the abundant bitumen employed. Apparently the Deluge-ship is formed from the house-walls (of timber, wattle, and bitumen-daub as at el-'Obeid) with renewed bitumen to make it watertight.



Further, it is interesting—with reference to the “seed of life” in the vessel—to recall the suggestion (now perhaps confirmed by certain figurines from Ur) that in the culture represented at Tell-el-‘Obeid the care of beasts may have been pursued with a special piety; and—with references to the hero’s directing birds, which play a part like the raven and dove of Noe—the indication that birds may have been sacred in the religion of the people of the reed-huts.

An equally interesting and less adventurous reference to what was learned of this people at el-‘Obeid reminds us that they were probably first established in the delta in conditions not unlike those of the existing Marsh-Arabs of lower Iraq, and were the inventors of vessels of a kind that is in use at the present day. Thus the men of the reed-hut village who built the famous Deluge-ship probably belonged to part of the population which had a special traditional skill in all matters of boat-craft.

It has been suggested by Mr. Woolley that the hero of the Deluge was regarded by the Sumerians as a Sumerian living among the non-Sumerian people of the reed-huts; there would be a motive of racial animosity in the tradition: the Deluge would have destroyed the non-Sumerian population, while the pious Sumerian was saved.

That the Sumerians made the story favourable to themselves, and that the hero was regarded by them as Sumerian, is likely: but we are now justified, I think, in attempting to get behind the legend to the facts. The man’s name in Sumerian tradition is Ziudsudra, meaning approximately “The day (or breath) of life is prolonged”: the native Semitic name, Uta-napishtim, is probably a derivation from this, abbreviated and corrupted to mean “He found life.” Another name, Atrahasis (derived, in my opinion, from a mere epithet in the Sumerian legend), means “Very Wise.” We who believe that the hero was a real person will almost necessarily deny the authenticity of these too descriptive names. In a communication to the Royal Asiatic Society (1925) I pointed out that quite a different name occurred in Hurrian. Hurrian was one of the languages of the eastern part of the Hittite Empire;

some of its literature—in cuneiform—has been discovered at Boghaz-köi, the Hittite capital; in a small fragment from the Hurrian version of part of the Gilgames epic (the principal document about Uta-napishtim) *Nahmau(?)lel* takes the place of Uta-napishtim.\* The name is not Sumerian. The termination *-l* is Hurrian. The rest of the word is perhaps (as Professor Sayce has suggested to me) of Semitic origin, *Nahum-ili* or the like, *Pleasing to the god(s)*: such names are not uncommon. There would be no necessity, I think, to see in a name of such meaning an artificial creation: from this point of view an earlier form of *Nahmaulel* might be regarded as the authentic name of the hero of the Deluge, although Semitic names of the type mentioned are not documented for early times. However, my present point is that the Sumerian name of the hero, which we have seen to be intrinsically suspicious, is not the only one. Ignoring, therefore, his alleged Sumerian name, I hold to the presumption that he belonged to the race of the people of the reed-huts among whom he lived—that is, to the people of the painted pottery.

What was this race? Of their race in the strict (anthropological) sense there is no evidence. As to their language there are three possible hypotheses. Sumerian and Semitic are the old languages of lower Mesopotamia in historical times. In the view adopted in this article—with which all will not agree—it is unlikely that our people of the painted pottery were Sumerian; we are supposing them to be a relatively primitive population, who perhaps entered the Land first. It is true that in Akkad very early Sumerian documents have recently been found with a painted pottery: but I cannot agree that the adoption of Sumerian along with the Sumerian script for literary purposes proves the people to have been Sumerian-speaking, nor that the employment of Sumerian speech at the date in question (perhaps about 4000 B.C.) would prove the Sumerian origin of the speakers. Were, then, the

\* This Hurrian version will have contained the episode of the whispering reeds. From this source it probably passed into Phrygian tradition and survives in amusing disorder in the Greek story of the Barber of Midas (who was so burdened by his knowledge that Midas had ass's ears that he dug a hole and whispered into it his secret; but a reed grew up and repeated the whisper).

primitive people of the Sumerian land Semitic? It is possible; but history suggests that in Sumer the Semite is a relatively late comer. There remains a third possibility. In northern Mesopotamia, apparently already early in the third millennium, were people of a language classed as Caucasian, and sometimes called Subaræan and (incorrectly) Mitannian: this was only dialectically different from Hurrian. There is little or no direct evidence that Subaræan speech ever extended to southern Mesopotamia,\* but we have seen that the people of the painted pottery in Sumer were culturally related to the primitives further north: it is not unlikely that they originally spoke—if not Subaræan, another variety of Caucasian: antecedent probabilities are in favour of the hypothesis, since Caucasian languages appear to have been dominant in early times in the highlands bordering on Iraq, the province of the painted pottery.

I suppose, then, (1) that the hero of the Deluge—that is, Noe—in spite of his Sumerian name in Sumerian legend, which is evidently posthumous, need not be believed to have been a Sumerian; being a chief of the people of the reed-huts, the presumption is that he belonged to their race; (2) that this race may possibly have been Semitic in speech, but as likely as not was, at least in origin, Caucasian; and (3) that in any case this people may have been related through common origin and subsequent contacts to the Subaræan or Hurrian population found further north. The question of the original name of “Noe” is left open. Either we do not know it, or it is represented by Nahmaulel. This may be either Hurrianized Semitic, or wholly “foreign”—*i.e.*, presumably Caucasian or Hurrian.

This, as I see it, is the present state of the questions raised by the new discoveries. More will be learned of the prediluvian people and of the Deluge itself when, at the time when this article is published, our Expedition is

\* A city in the extreme south was called Shubaru; but the significance of this is not known. Certain early Akkadian gods' names, perhaps inherited from the people of the painted pottery, seem to be neither Sumerian nor Semitic: and one of these, *Sin*, would seem to be explicable from Hurrian *sen*, brother.

again at work. Meanwhile I have confidence in our principal results sufficient to justify a collation with the biblical narrative of what is unquestionably the same Flood. Indeed, since the theory of the Deluge published by Mr. Woolley seems likely, in the main, to win general acceptance, such a comparison is almost exacted. If the interpretations which I shall now tentatively adopt or propose are accepted, our principal results will be seen to agree wonderfully well with the main lines of the biblical history. It is not claimed that these interpretations are certain in themselves: it will be enough for the purpose of our comparison if they are probable and legitimate.

At once the obvious question of the universality of the Deluge suggests itself, but little need be said on this subject. It is certain, of course, that the Flood of which we have found the vestiges was neither world-wide nor a universal catastrophe to the human race. This is certain not so much from the direct archæological and traditional indications of its localization and effects as from its position in time: it is obvious that a catastrophe that was universal, if only in its effects on the human species, would necessarily be assigned to an age very much earlier than the end of the fourth millennium. If, then, there are theological reasons sufficient to prove the ethnographical universality of the Deluge, it must be concluded that the apparent discovery at Ur of traces of the Great Flood of the tradition is illusory. But it does not seem that such reasons exist: the restriction of the catastrophe to a part of mankind has found Catholic defenders for many years.\* We may pass on, therefore, to newer questions.†

A preliminary word is necessary on the sources of the Hebrew history. The Hebrew name Noh (which has never been satisfactorily derived from the Sumero-Babylonian

\* It will suffice to refer to what E. Mangenot, not himself a defender of this thesis, says of it in the *Dictionnaire de la Bible* (I, 1356): "Elle compte déjà [1899] beaucoup de partisans. Elle n'est pas tout-à-fait nouvelle." Authors from 1586 onwards are cited. "Un plus grand nombre d'écrivains sans l'adopter positivement, la tiennent pour libre, soutenable et probable."

† No need either to discuss the biblical chronology. It puts 292 years (Greek 1,072 years) between the Flood and Abraham. We require nearly 2,000 years. The difficulty is nothing new, since the common theory, referring the catastrophe to the whole human species, obviously implies an interval far greater than any of these.

tradition) corresponds correctly to the beginning of Nahmaulel, the Hurrian name, and is probably an abbreviated derivative from it. This suggests a Hurrian source for parts of Genesis, as also do other details, notably the reference to Noe's vineyard situated doubtless in the mountains of the north; perhaps also the mention of Armenia.\* Nor is such a source at all unlikely. There is, firstly, the possibility of relations between the early Hebrew patriarchs in Harrañ and men of this stock. Further, the Hurrian-speaking people, situated on the line of communications between Babylonia and the West, were probably among the intermediaries by whom Babylonian tradition was introduced into Palestine. It is even suggested that the biblical Horites and the Egyptian name for Palestine, *H'rw*, indicate that Hurrians were the pre-Semitic people of that land. This early southward extension of the race in the West would be analogous to their early extension into southern Mesopotamia. In any case it is not doubtful that a Hurrian-speaking state (Mitanni) bordered on Syria in the second millennium,† and that men of this nation were at that time in Syria-Palestine. A king of Jerusalem in the fourteenth century B.C. is named from a Hurrian goddess. The prophet Ezechiel (XVI, 3) asserts the Hittite (probably Hurrian) ancestry of Jerusalem or the Jews.

The Hebrew tradition of the Deluge often differs from

\* Ararat (Urartu, Armenia) coincides largely with the principal Hurrian land in the second millennium. In a symbolic or dramatic way the arrival of the refugees in eastern Anatolia agrees with our theory of the history: both archaeology and the native tradition suggest that the culture of the survivors of the Flood was resumed in the north, in the cultural province of which eastern Anatolia is a notable representative. It is, however, difficult to credit literally the conveyance of the Ark itself to Armenia on water fifteen cubits high above the mountains, if we have been right in accepting Shuruppak on the lower Euphrates as the starting-place. This reference to the mountains of Armenia—the only topographical detail in the biblical narrative—will perhaps be objected to our claim to have discovered the Great Flood of biblical tradition. As regards the name Armenia, perhaps it is possible that it was used quite vaguely, for the ancient Syriac and Aramaic (Targum) versions interpreted it of the Kurdish country, which is approximately the region of the Mt. Nisir of the original native tradition, which (as we have seen) creates little difficulty.

† In this region was Hierapolis-Bambyce on the upper Euphrates. I suspect that in the legend of the Deluge preserved at the local temple (recorded in Lucian, *de dea Syria*) we have a survival of the lost Hurrian tradition. The story agrees in several respects with the Hebrew rather than with the Babylonian.



the Sumero-Akkadian. Hitherto it would have been very difficult on historical principles to prefer the late foreign tradition to the early native one: but the state of the question is changed by the possibility of a Hurrian source for the former. Probably, as we have seen, the people of the north-west where the Hurrian language was spoken were culturally related to that people of the painted pottery whom we find to have been involved in the Flood, and a tradition from such a source as this might well be preferable in some respects to the classical Sumerianized native tradition of the event.

In point of fact the Hebrew narrative implies two prediluvian races which—regarded broadly—seem to correspond to those of our reconstructed history. To this matter I confine the examination of Genesis, and so keep within the scope of the present study.

To one race in Genesis is assigned principally the fathers of civilization: agriculture or garden-culture, city-building (which may be taken in the proper sense: we have *bricks* from prediluvian Ur), metallurgy and instrumental music (as though there had survived some memory of such wonderful metal-work—even iron instruments occur!—and such harps as we have found among the relics of the early Sumerians in the necropolis of Ur). The contrasted people, as we may understand, is a relatively simple one: its achievement is to have invoked the true God. The former line, the Cainite, is represented by a series which has some affinity with that of the Sumerian kings, who were before the Flood in the Sumerian king-list: the other by Seth (possibly eponymous of the Sutu, representative tribesmen of the second millennium) and by Enosh (*man*).<sup>\*</sup> The people of the Ark belong to the Sethites, not to the people of the cities. The latter are not explicitly said to have been involved in the catastrophe. Their designation as “fathers” of the arts of civilization may even suggest the continuity of their civilization with the postdiluvian. The refugees of the other race are

<sup>\*</sup> So in the lists of ch. IV. The other list (ch. V) supplies the latter part of the Sethite line with names like those of the Cainites. The editing of the combined narrative may possibly be intended to suggest intermarriage.

brought northwards—that is, in effect, away from Sumer to the region where painted pottery cultures survived.

Thus *in the main*—some details that create a difficulty are necessarily passed over here—the Hebrews appear to have distinguished our two prediluvian peoples; the men of the cities and high Sumerian civilization and the primitives. They relate themselves spiritually, culturally, and racially rather with the latter than with the former. How did they reach this historical view? One answer would be that Israel, which was continually occupied with the antithesis between the simple and primitive life of the steppe and that of agricultural and urban civilization, has here carried the antithesis back to the beginning; another would be that there was a *tradition* that “Noh” was not a man of the Sumerian civilization—a tradition ultimately derived from men of the other culture; or, combining both answers, it may be conjectured that the Hebrews had received an historical tradition of the two prediluvian peoples and expressed in it the contrast that was significant for their own religious history.

A remarkable expression of the tradition of the two opposed races would be the mysterious allusion in Genesis to the marriage of the sons of God with daughters of men—if it were possible to accept the later Christian interpretation of these as respectively Sethites and Cainites. The former, the sacred race with which the Hebrews claimed continuity, would have allowed itself to be corrupted by the profane people, and for this reason would have been purged by the Deluge. But this interpretation could not be carried through in agreement with our theory of the history. The sons of God are apparently represented as tyrannizing over the daughters of men; but it would be unhistorical to suppose that the people of the reed-huts lorded it over the Sumerian city-dwellers, the clever men. Nor for other reasons can this be the solution of the enigma. According to ordinary Hebrew usage *sons of God* should mean supernatural beings, angels: and so, in fact, the term here is understood by early Jewish tradition in part, by early Christian tradition almost universally, and by all independent moderns. On the other hand, the later

Catholic opinion is based on good theology: marriage—the text refers to some sort of marriage, not merely to intercourse—between angels and women is not credible, and if asserted would be pure mythology. However, the two interpretations—apparently perfectly contradictory: angels and not angels—can, I think, be satisfactorily reconciled. There is evidence that the rites of Sumerian religion included a *iepos γάμος* or ritual marriage in which men took the place of gods. Thus the Sumerian king Gudea, according to his inscriptions, seems to have represented the God Ningirsu in a marriage with the Goddess Bau, represented presumably by a woman; and in neo-Babylonian times Herodotus gives details of a similar rite at Babylon. A monotheistic writer would not recognize the gods as such, but would speak of supernatural beings (Hebrew: Sons-of-god) or angels. I think, then, that the reality behind the allusion in Genesis is the religious prostitution (originally a fertility-magic) which may well have been the outstanding scandal of Sumerian religion to the men of Israel, and perhaps—though I can offer no proof of this—to the men of that northern race who may have transmitted the tradition to them. The “giants,” the “ancient heroes,” “the famous men” who were the offspring of these unions, are explicable by the same hypothesis: it is very probable that those famous heroes of Sumerian and Akkadian antiquity who were regarded as sons of goddesses, such as the celebrated Gilgames and the fully historical Sargon, were in reality the offspring of temple-women representing the goddesses in question.

It is not said, but it may well be implied, that these evils were the worst exemplification of the wickedness—in another document corruption and violence—which merited the blotting-out of the contaminated race. The “daughters of men” would represent, at least inclusively, the good race dominated and corrupted by the Sumerian rulers; the Deluge would have been sent to destroy the corrupted race as well as to carry certain blameless survivors to a new land.

We need not expect to find in Sumerian or Babylonian any parallel tradition—in condemnation of the national

religion. In fact, the principal cuneiform Deluge-legends give no reason for the catastrophe other than the will of the gods. There is, however, one work known as *When God man*, which deals with prediluvian conditions, and it attributes the divine displeasure to the fact that the people had multiplied excessively and were satiated like a bull—conceivably another aspect of what is told in Genesis.

It is an apparent objection to what has been said that the abuses in question were not, in fact, extinguished by the Deluge; indeed, my examples of the "giants" and "famous men" were taken from the records of postdiluvian times: but this same consideration or difficulty has occurred to the sacred author or to a glossator, for to the mention of the "giants" who were before the Flood there is added the note—"also afterwards there were giants when the sons of God came in to the daughters of men."

The most astonishing discoveries of the Expedition during the last two years have been the tombs and the funeral rites of the earliest known Sumerian kings. It has been suggested that details of the ritual and the ornaments of the dead indicate that the well-known values of fertility-magic attached to the kings and their slain women (in one burial were as many as sixty-eight slain). These rites are early postdiluvian, about middle fourth millennium, but they are probably a last survival of older prediluvian custom. (It may be significant in this connexion that among the prediluvians in the king-list is mentioned Dumuzi, who is the celebrated fertility-god Tammuz.) I am not persuaded that this view of our tombs is correct, but if the hypothesis does contain a measure of truth the visitor to our Exhibition at the British Museum may have had before his eyes in the numerous slain brides from the "Death-pit" at Ur the actual remains of functions such as those of which an antagonistic memory is preserved in the dim tradition of the daughters of men taken by the sons-of-god.

I would suggest, then, firstly, that Genesis contains a reminiscence of the two prediluvian peoples of Sumer revealed by archæology, and, secondly, that there is a reminiscence of antagonism on the part of the subject

people to the Sumerian religion. Now it is a fact *in any case* that the biblical narrative implies throughout that the Sethite stock were worshippers of the true God. Noe, especially, before and after the Flood receives revelations from Him. But in the native tradition the hero of the Deluge is understood to have worshipped Sumerian gods. It would have been difficult to give any reason for supposing him to have done otherwise so long as he was presumed to be a Sumerian. The alleged Yahwism of the Noe of Genesis has received little attention, so far as I know, from believing exegetes—probably because the story has been vaguely relegated to a vastly remote age of which almost nothing was known and almost anything could be supposed. But this position is no longer possible if Noe is no longer a prehistoric figure, but a person of the historical age.

For an hypothesis as to his religion the discovery of non-Sumerian prediluvians should put us on the right way. Archæology has provided little evidence of the religion of this people—the ambiguous figurines suggest at most a popular fertility-cult; but perhaps something may be divined by philology. According to constant native tradition the god who announced the coming of the Deluge to Ziudsudra in his reed-hut is Ea. Ea, who is unquestionably the special god of the hero, is probably also the god of the people of the reed-huts, as a people. Ea is the name given by the Akkadians to the god called Enki by the Sumerians: yet Ea is no Akkadian name, and, all things considered, I am inclined to believe that it is best explained as an early borrowing by Semitic Akkadians from some earlier speech, which would presumably be the original language of the people of the painted pottery, the early inhabitants of Akkad. Further, that Enki-Ea was not in origin one of the Sumerian gods, but rather a god antagonistic to them, is suggested by a detail in the late Deluge-legend itself. The hero, when building his ship, explains to the men of the city:

I know that Enlil\* hates me.

I will no longer dwell in your town.

On the soil of Enlil I will no longer set my face.

. . . I will dwell with Ea, my lord.

\* National god of the Sumerians.



So Ea was probably a principal god of the people of the painted pottery, and there is nothing to prove that he was not their Supreme God. In later times he was the principal god of the region at the head of the Persian Gulf where the island culture had flourished, and where the people of the painted pottery perhaps first settled. In Sumerian mythology he is specially the god of the waters of the earth: but a Supreme God of the primitive inhabitants of the Marshes, when adopted into the Sumerian pantheon, would naturally be degraded to just such departmental rank. Moreover, even the classical theology preserves traditions ascribing the creation of man to Ea, as though he had once been a Supreme God.

It will be understood that the discussion of Genesis contains much that is provisional. Only a *probable* interpretation was required by the end in view. We set out to see whether a certain reconstruction of the history was conciliable with the biblical tradition. Ignoring details (one that is likely to give most difficulty was indicated) I concentrated on the large matter of *the two peoples*. It is found that in this respect—that is, in the main lines of the history—Genesis is probably in remarkable agreement with our reconstruction. The extent of the agreement is indeed rather surprising, for the question arises how it is possible that the Hebrews can have got behind the old and native tradition of Sumer, the land of the Deluge. I have therefore given reasons for thinking that they may have been at some time in close contact, perhaps even fusion, with people culturally and racially related to that non-Sumerian people of the painted pottery to whom belonged the family of Nahmaulel-Noh.

It seems to be fairly certain that the Deluge has gained a position in protohistory. I refer not so much to the verification of the event as to the fact that it is now referable to the fortunes of known peoples of the historic age. As a corollary something similar may be said of the dim record of the prediluvian age in Genesis. Who has not wondered where the prediluvian patriarchs belong in the scheme of scientific anthropology? Adam remains

indefinitely remote, but, if I am right, the culture-heroes after Adam must represent neither the palæolithic nor the neolithic, but eight civilized generations immediately before the Flood, in the end of the fifth millennium, whose memory was preserved in the Sumerian king-list; and the men of the line Seth-Enos are their humble contemporaries of the reed-hut villages and the handmade pottery.

But we know first and best from archæological discovery of small and concrete things. After all, these are sufficiently interesting. We know with certainty something of the people of the painted pottery to whom probably Noe belonged. By the same tokens, if the finds at Tell-el-'Obeid and elsewhere are adequately representative of this people, we have a probable idea of the personal appearance of the patriarch. He may have had a long thin beard and on his head a cap or turban. Possibly—but the evidence is ambiguous and indirect—he wore a tight loin-cloth laced together in front to form a kilt. He had perhaps a necklace of crystal, carnelian or shell beads; ear or lip studs of stone, clay or bitumen; and nail-like nose-studs of clay, steatite or obsidian.

ERIC BURROWS, S.J.

NOTE.—The archæology and the fundamental theory of this article follow Mr. Woolley's published interpretations of his discoveries. See especially reports in *The Antiquaries Journal*; relevant matter in *Al-'Ubaid*, 1927; *The Sumerians*, 1928. Cf. also C. J. Gadd, *History and Monuments of Ur*, 1929. For the attempted correlations with certain details of the cuneiform documents and with the biblical record I am responsible.

## ART. 2.—ELIZABETH AND MR. STRACHEY

“The history of the Victorian Age,” writes Mr. Strachey in the first words of his Preface to *Eminent Victorians*, “will never be written; we know too much about it. For ignorance is the first requisite of the historian—ignorance, which simplifies and classifies, which selects and omits, with a placid perfection unattainable by the highest art.”

THOUGH wholly unendowed with the large advantages of ignorance, Mr. Lytton Strachey has yet twice been brave enough to “row out,” if one may steal another phrase of his, “over that great ocean of material,” and bring back to us his precious and selected bucketfuls of interpretation upon the era of our grandfathers. We, the grandchildren, have hailed his voyages, each as a triumphant success. With a natural curiosity, therefore, those of us who had laughed over Queen Victoria and Cardinal Manning rushed eagerly to see what bucketfuls Mr. Strachey had brought up from the less ample, or at least less amply charted, ocean of Elizabethan England. That we revelled in the book, that we found in it some of the easiest and most entertaining reading that we had come across for months—all this goes without saying. Its author was Mr. Strachey. Yet the weapons that conquered Victoria would have been impotent before Elizabeth. And Mr. Strachey—the same Mr. Strachey—the Mr. Strachey who would have been happy persuading Madame du Deffand to listen to a passage from Racine, the eighteenth-century Frenchman, whose heart a little regrets the Revolution, though his intellect approves of it—has had to master the sixteenth century with a technique different from that with which he mastered the nineteenth. Let us consider.

To the students of history the sixteenth century differs from the nineteenth not merely in the quantity, but also in the quality of its data. If knowledge can be judged by a mere statistical computation of the number of words of data, then clearly we know immeasurably more about the Victorian than about any other Age. In comparison with it the Elizabethan is at a disadvantage, but at a disadvantage

which it shares with all the other periods and centuries of history. It possesses, peculiarly, another especial disadvantage—a disadvantage of quality.

The Victorians were remarkable not only because they wrote so much, but, even more, because so much of what they wrote was true. For in Victorian England there existed a race of men—compilers of minutes and reports and books of reference and the rest—who had no desire but to record impartial, unimpassioned, objective facts. The works of such men are the stuff upon which Mr. Strachey very legitimately battens, producing out of them results which their respectable conscientiousness is doubtless most surprised to see. In the sixteenth century, on the other hand—in a breaking society, as its members believed it to be—there were no such impartial compilers, no truth told simply for the truth's sake, and very little told for any reason at all. When we study sixteenth-century history, our task is not to discover who are our trustworthy authorities and to tell the tale again as they told it. There are no trustworthy authorities. Whether our problem lie in English history or Scotch, in French or Spanish or Italian, the best that we can do is to collect the evidence of the letters of statesmen and princes and ambassadors; to try to come to some estimate of how far these letters are forged; if we accept them as genuine, to make a guess at the substratum of truth which lies beneath the mass of falsehood and prevarication. We must be willing to be continually reserving judgment, to admit that our conclusions are only more or less probable guesses, and that another little piece of evidence, coming to light to-morrow, may easily overturn them altogether.

Now Mr. Strachey cannot reserve judgment. Of all the qualities of the historian, most of which he so conspicuously possesses, it is this quality which he most conspicuously lacks. His method is to fix upon a rigidly definite interpretation of his characters, and then to marshal his evidence in such a way as to prove himself right.

“It was the meeting of the eagle and the dove; there was a hovering, a swoop, and then the quick beak and the relentless talons did their work.”

This, whether or not it be a just description of the way in which Manning treated Newman, is certainly a most just description of the way in which Mr. Strachey treats his own victims. In *Eminent Victorians* his method was both his strength and his weakness. Where his interpretation was convincing, Mr. Strachey's strong technique carried all before it. Where the interpretation was unconvincing, as in the essay on Manning, the very strength of the writing perhaps only succeeded in strengthening the reader's lack of conviction. Yet, even those who quarrelled most deeply with him for that essay could only quarrel with him because, as they claimed, he had omitted or misemphasised evidence. They could not deny that he had produced it, while in the thirty pages of packed brilliance, which make up the essay on Dr. Arnold, there is no important judgment for which the authority is not immediately given. The complaint of the critics was not of what he put in, but of what he left out.

When he came to Elizabethan history, Mr. Strachey must have found himself faced with a very difficult problem. He no longer possessed that abundance of material upon which the unflinching, unhesitating character-sketch could be so convincingly constructed. What should he do? Should he frankly deny his own nature and say, "It is hard to tell what was the character of Elizabeth," "We can but guess at King Philip's motives," "Essex remains an enigma"? Or should he, on the other hand, as frankly throw history overboard, as the Dry-as-Dusts use the word; call in Herodotus to redress the balance of Thucydides; justify his confident judgments by confessed invention where evidence was lacking and produce a work of a new and delightful kind, that falls somewhere midway between history and the historical novel?

He has elected to do this, and, in all sincerity, I do not at all complain of his having done so. I see no reason why Bishop Stubbs and Baroness Orczy should be allowed to divide the whole world between them, why some pleasant half-way house should not be found, and I know of no man better suited to build such a house than Mr. Strachey. I only ask of him that he frankly admit that he is building it.

Only the creator can read with certainty the mind of the creature. It is, therefore, the privilege of the novelist to describe without hesitation the thoughts of his characters. The historian, *qua* historian, can but lay before us their actions or their words. When once he has made us the master of all that a certain man did, then we have as good a right as he to form our judgment upon the motive behind the conduct. The historian may, indeed, join us in judging if he wishes to do so, but his judgment is the judgment of the man and not of the expert.

Now in *Elizabeth and Essex* Mr. Strachey has given to us vivid and brilliant character-sketches of Bacon and of Essex, of the younger Cecil, of Elizabeth, of Philip of Spain. He has a very clear idea of what each of these characters was like. But all these fine character-sketches are the character-sketches of a novelist rather than those of an historian. He does not try to convince us of his interpretation, as he did in the *Eminent Victorians*, by telling us of their actions. Their actions he describes but sparingly. Instead he forms a certain idea of their characters, and then, taking his own idea as correct, describes their states of mind as he imagines them to have been in certain crises of their lives. I am not so much concerned to argue whether his ideas are historical or unhistorical, as to note the new development in Mr. Strachey's technique.

Let me take examples to show what I mean. Bacon, the villain of the piece, is intriguing for the Attorney-Generalship.

"Francis smiled; he saw a great career opening before his imagination—judgeships—high offices of State—might he not ere long be given, like his father before him, the keeping of the Great Seal of England? A peerage! Verulam, St. Albans, Gorhambury—what resounding title should he take? 'My manor of Gorhambury'—the phrase rolled on his tongue."

Or, again, the Duke of Medina Sidonia has set fire to the Spanish treasure fleet in Cadiz harbour.

"The whole fleet was set on fire; a faint smile, the first in seven years, was seen to flit across the face of Medina Sidonia."

Or turn to the last brilliant paragraph of the whole book :



"But meanwhile, in an inner chamber, at his table, alone, the Secretary sat writing. . . . As the hand moved, the mind moved, too, ranging sadly over the vicissitudes of mortal beings, reflecting upon the revolution of kingdoms, and dreaming with quiet clarity of what the hours even then were bringing—the union of two nations—the triumph of the new rulers—success, power and riches—a name in after ages—a noble lineage—a great House."

How does Mr. Strachey know that Bacon and Medina Sidonia smiled or what thoughts passed through the mind of Cecil?

Only a gross and arid pedantry can object to Mr. Strachey's use of his imagination, but, where the imagination is used, it is important that the result be recognised as imaginative. Bacon and Sidonia and Cecil may have been such people as Mr. Strachey imagines them to have been. But his interpretation of their smiles and their thoughts is probable only to one who previously admits that his interpretation of their characters at large is correct. And his interpretation, perhaps right, perhaps wrong, is at least questionable.

If you would be convinced of Mr. Strachey's changed technique, you cannot do better than contrast the peroration of *Queen Victoria* with that of *Elizabeth and Essex*.

"Perhaps her fading mind called up once more the shadows of the past to flow before it and retraced, for the last time, the vanished visions of that long history—passing back and back, through the cloud of years, to older and ever older memories—to the spring woods at Osborne, so full of primroses for Lord Beaconsfield—to Lord Palmerston's queer clothes and high demeanour, and Albert's face under the green lamp, and Albert's first stag at Balmoral, and Albert in his blue and silver uniform, and the Baron coming in through a doorway, and Lord M. dreaming at Windsor with the rooks cawing in the elm-trees, and the Archbishop of Canterbury on his knees in the dawn, and the old King's turkey-cock ejaculations, and Uncle Leopold's soft voice at Claremont, and Selwyn with the globes, and her mother's features swooping down towards her, and a great old repeater watch of her father's in its tortoise-shell case, and a yellow rug, and some friendly flounces of sprigged muslin, and the trees and the grass at Kensington."

"Perhaps"! There is no saving "perhaps" to guard Mr. Strachey's interpretation of Cecil's mind three hundred years earlier. Nor is it merely in that adverb that the two passages differ. The peroration to *Queen Victoria* begs no debatable question about Victoria's character. Although, it is true, we do not know exactly what passed through the Queen's mind on her death-bed, yet we know well enough that she had been in love with Albert, that Beaconsfield and Melbourne had at different times played large parts in her life, that she had been much moved at the announcement of her accession, and all the rest. The peroration steals no march on us. The peroration to *Elizabeth and Essex* does steal a march on us. For it ascribes to Cecil a character which he may or may not have possessed, but his possession of which was, as I have said, at the least doubtful and debatable.

In another place Mr. Strachey has gone beyond not only the historian's cold permit of evidence, but even beyond the very limit of artistic probability—in his death scene of Philip of Spain. Philip lies dying, his great task of the destruction of Elizabeth still unaccomplished.

"He had existed solely for virtue and the glory of God. One thought alone troubled him; had he been remiss in the burning of heretics? He had burnt many, no doubt; but he might have burnt more. Was it because of this, perhaps, that he had not been quite as successful as he might have wished?"

Has Mr. Strachey any evidence that this "one thought" troubled Philip, or has he made it up? Was this paragraph written by the historian or by the novelist? It is most important that we should be allowed to know. The only *Life of Philip II* to which he refers us in his bibliography is Martin Hume's. There is no mention of any such story there. Yet if Mr. Strachey can produce to us certain evidence that Philip in the agony of his death-bed uttered some great cry of remorse for the leniency which he had shown to heretics, we can, of course, but bow and accept it. If this tale is only the product of his imagination, we have the right to say that we find it quite crudely improbable.

That Philip on his death-bed was tortured with remorse

because he had failed to accomplish Elizabeth's destruction is probable enough. But, if it was so, it is hardly to be believed that he found the reason for his failure in the slackness of his persecution of heretics. No such far-fetched explanation was necessary. Elizabeth had only succeeded to the throne at all, most probably had only survived, because of Philip's support of her cause in the days of Mary Tudor. She had owed the tranquillity of those all-important first twelve years almost entirely to Philip. It was Philip who had prevented Pius IV from taking action against her, persuading himself and persuading His Holiness that Elizabeth would come round at last to the true religion. He had argued thus, though he knew very well in his heart of hearts that his real reason for inaction was an unwillingness to quarrel with one whose territory lay right across the line of communications between Spain and his Netherlands and with the rival of Mary Stuart, the candidate of his French enemy. If Philip was anxious to reproach himself for Elizabeth's survival, he had plenty of reason for doing so without seeking refuge in an explanation of roundabout and perverted mysticism, that would, I believe, have been quite unintelligible to his arid, pious, limited nature.

When we come to the two central figures of the book, we find that Mr. Strachey has set himself a task of enormous difficulty. The relations between Elizabeth and Essex cannot easily be boxed into the conventional formulæ of romance, nor can they be treated as lightly as one can treat the relations between Disraeli and Victoria. Some skill is required to make them seem even tolerably dignified. At the best there was here some very unroyal horse-play, and no love at all; at the worst the affair was a senile and ridiculous one between a toothless sexagenarian disgustingly fondling the round, white arms of a beautiful boy, and a young man, who was shamelessly neglecting his wife. In spite of his reputation for iconoclasm and realism, Mr. Strachey's art is of the type which must please, or it is nothing. He does not deny the ugliness of Elizabeth's relations with Essex, but he dare not insist on it. To do so would be to make his tale nauseating.

Mr. Strachey, a romantic at last, has therefore been forced to attempt to give dignity, and even mystery, to the sordid reality by two hints—the first, that in this affair there came to a head a great conflict between two types of society, between two ages, the one a dream that was dying, the other one that was coming to birth; the second, that in the death of Essex, there was played out to a conclusion a queer complex of love and repulsion, such as we should have expected to find in the pages of Herr Freud rather than in those of Mr. Strachey.

“In the history of Essex,” Mr. Strachey tells us in his second paragraph, “so perplexed in its issues, so desperate in its perturbations, so dreadful in its conclusion, the spectral agony of an abolished world is discernible through the tragic lineaments of a personal disaster.”

It adds great dignity to Mr. Strachey's narrative if he can persuade the reader of the truth of this tragic significance. But can he?

There ran in Essex' veins, it is true, the blood of noble mediæval families, but such blood is not in itself sufficient to prove that there was anything in common between the spirit of Essex and the spirit of the mediæval baron or of those northern earls, the last hope of whose cause went down in the great rebellion of 1569. When Elizabeth struck him in the face, Essex lost his temper. “The last extravagance of the Middle Ages,” Mr. Strachey tells us, “flickered through the Renaissance nobleman.”

“The facts,” he adds, “vanished; his outraged imagination preferred to do away with them. For, after all, what had actually happened? Simply this, that he had been rude to an old lady, who was also a Queen, and had his ears boxed. There were no principles involved and no oppression. It was merely a matter of bad temper and personal pique.”

Precisely. But whose was the imagination which, falling for one moment to temptation, preferred to “do away with the facts”? Mr. Strachey's or the Earl of Essex'? Who was it who pretended, even for half a sentence, that there were any principles involved?

A love for the Catholic religion, a contempt for the

*nouveaux riches* who had made their money out of the successful pilfering of the Abbey lands, a contempt for anyone who preferred to be a courtier in London rather than the lord among his tenants, a dislike of the new centralisation, a support of the old Burgundian alliance—such would be the marks which one would look to find in an Elizabethan nobleman in whose soul there lingered on the lost spirit of the Middle Ages. You find them all in such a man as Thomas Percy. What trace of them do you find in the flashy, pitiable Essex? There was in him little that could pass for statesmanship, but his policy, so far as he had one, was one of bitter and unending war with Spain, the policy *des plus nouveaux des nouveaux riches*, the policy that of all policies flew most defiantly in the teeth of the old English traditions. In his madness he did, it is true, at the last raise rebellion against the Government. But for his support he turned, not to the old Catholic North, but to the new rising Puritanism of London. He failed, not where Percy had failed, but where Cromwell was to succeed. As Mr. Strachey himself elsewhere admits:

“His spirit, wayward, melancholy and splendid, belonged to the Renaissance. . . . He did not know what he was or where he was going.”

More curious even than the political explanation is Mr. Strachey's psycho-analysis of the relations of Elizabeth and Essex. Just as the execution of Anne Boleyn by the father, Henry VIII, had been the victory of Man over Woman, so in the daughter Woman was revenged, when Essex' head fell at Elizabeth's command.

“An extraordinary passion moved the obscure profundities of her being, as she condemned her lover to her mother's death. . . . In this appalling consummation, was it her murdered mother who had finally emerged? The wheel had come full circle. Manhood—the fascinating, detestable entity . . . was overthrown at last, and in the person of that traitor it should be rooted out.”

What, one asks, gasping, is all this meant to mean? How seriously are we to take it? Mr. Strachey gives us no hint. The Tudors were an odd and disgusting race. It

is possible to believe that in Elizabeth frustrated lasciviousness broke out in almost any queer and repellent intermixture of perversions. We ask of Mr. Strachey only that he let us know where we are. Has he somewhere or other collected some peculiar evidence for these speculations upon Elizabeth's motives? If so, where has he collected it? What is the evidence? Or, on the other hand, is he making it all up as he goes along?

Few things in history are less certain and less settled than the question how far exactly was Elizabeth the mistress of the Elizabethan state. The great English historians of the last century who wrote upon those times, Froude and Lingard—oddly enough, Mr. Strachey does not mention Lingard in his bibliography—though they approached the whole period from quite opposite angles, differing in many other things, yet agreed that Elizabeth's control of Elizabethan policy was very partial. In the religious settlement, in the assistance to the Netherlands rebels, in the countenance of the Atlantic piracy, in the treatment of Mary Stuart—in all these, it seems, her masters forced her to do and to countenance things that she would much rather neither have done nor countenanced. A sceptical historian might even have speculated whether she was not perhaps partly forced into the execution of Essex by the power of Cecil and against her better will and judgment. Yet such doubts and hesitations and reservations of judgment do not suit Mr. Strachey's technique. To him, to Mr. Strachey, the romantic, it is Elizabeth the Queen who rules, and, where she changes her mind and procrastinates, it is Elizabeth the woman who procrastinates and changes. A tale of "*varium et mutabile semper*" makes better reading than a crabbed investigation into the nice residence of sovereignty in so obscurely limited a monarchy.

When *Eminent Victorians* appeared, *The Times*, in a laudatory notice, wrote that "there is something almost uncanny in the author's detachment." Detachment in an historian can hardly be anything but a pretence. "*Qui expose, s'expose.*" A writer has but to apply to himself the words "*Je n'impose rien; je ne propose rien; j'expose,*" and we know at once that here comes a breaker of idols,



a smasher of stained-glass windows, a "debunker," to use the expressive Americanism. Detachment is the quality, as Aristotle would have said, of either a god or a beast. For Man has both passions and a moral nature, and he must therefore feel joy at the victory of good, as he sees good, and anger at the victory of evil. In Mr. Strachey is no exception to the general laws of human nature, and there is hardly a quality which he less possesses than that of detachment. As certainly as Dr. Arnold, if less clamorously than Dr. Arnold, he is "concerned with the moral aspect of things." He is not, it is true, a crude propagandist, and, like the rest of us, he is impartial where he is indifferent. Though he is clearly on the whole on the side of the Whigs and the Liberals, yet he is no violent political partisan and finds no difficulty in praising a Tory or in laughing at a Whig, yet he, who is "uncannily detached" as he relates the differences between Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell, makes no pretence to detachment when he comes to dissect the character of Manning, nor when, in *Elizabeth and Essex*, he describes the workings of the Spanish Inquisition. For his interests are not in the superficial fight between Liberals and Conservatives, but in the fundamental fight between the Pagan State and the claims of revealed religion and of its official guardians to interfere in men's lives. In that fight there is no light pose of impartiality. He is on the side of the Pagan State—whether it be in the England of Elizabeth or in the France of Voltaire. He is, as he himself says of Elizabeth, "irretrievably terrestrial." His politics are those of his master. "*Écrasez l'infâme.*" "*Quel dommage que le Saint Esprit eût aussi peu de goût*" is the cry of the spirit of Mr. Strachey as much as of the Maréchale de Luxembourg.

I do not here propose to debate whether in this, the most important of all debates, Mr. Strachey is on the right or the wrong side. His is, at any rate, an intelligible and an honourable position. It is certainly not an impartial position. "Elizabeth," Mr. Strachey writes, "was the champion not of the Reformation but of something greater—the Renaissance"—and by the Renaissance he means

the Pagan State. I agree with him. Mr. Strachey and Elizabeth stand together against the claims of religion to interfere in our daily life. Yet it seems possible that there came an awful moment in which Elizabeth stumbled from the high faith of the stern, unbending Strachey. In Mr. Strachey's brilliant book there are no more brilliant pages than those in which he describes the amazing death-scene of the old Queen, as she sat on the floor, propped up with cushions, her finger absurdly in her mouth, half ludicrous, half heroic, and waiting for the end. Yet when he comes to his picture of Archbishop Whitgift praying by his dying mistress' side, Mr. Strachey throws out a "now, unexpectedly, she seemed to take a pleasure in his ministrations," and skates quickly on. It is possible to use the incident to show how very differently one who does not share Mr. Strachey's philosophy might play Mr. Strachey's game. Might not such a man make much of this "willingness" of which Mr. Strachey makes so little? Might he not think that here for this one moment the Queen was perhaps truly royal? That the spirit "irretrievably terrestrial" was preparing itself at last for a fresh judgment, in which the verdict could not be won by cheating, nor avoided by procrastination? That the champion of the Renaissance had found a cause to champion even larger than that of the Renaissance? That even Elizabeth had at last seen herself to be faced with that great, inevitable problem which Voltaire's flippancy tried to laugh away as "*la petite bagatelle de l'immortalité de l'âme*"?

In his essay on General Gordon, Mr. Strachey, it will be remembered, poked most gorgeous fun at the religious eccentricities of Tien Wang, the Chinese Celestial King. Only a brutal stupidity would interrupt writing so deliciously amusing in order to ask Mr. Strachey what was his exact evidence for his charges against the Celestial King. But then the career of Tien Wang does not affect us. We can afford to use him for our amusement. We cannot afford thus to see Queen Elizabeth. Every judgment that we make upon social or international politics depends upon our interpretation of the gigantic change which was imposed upon English society in the sixteenth

century. If we judge right, we live; if we judge wrong, we perish. For that reason we have a right to demand of Mr. Strachey that he let us know exactly where we are, that he tell us frankly where the question is proved and where it is only very delicately begged. Let him use his imagination as much as he likes, but let him also tell us when he is writing from his imagination and when he is writing from evidence. Mr. Strachey is among the most entertaining, if not the most entertaining, of living prose-writers. But the Sirens were dangerous ladies. We ask of him only that he warn us when is about to sing his Siren-song, so that the poor Odysseus may first make sure that he is safely strapped to the mast before he gives himself to the delicate music of enchantment.

CHRISTOPHER HOLLIS.

### ART. 3.—ISLAMIC MYSTICISM

1. *Studies in Islamic Mysticism*. By R. A. Nicholson. Cambridge, 1921.
2. *The Idea of Personality in Sufism*. By R. A. Nicholson. Cambridge, 1923.
3. *The Mystics of Islam*. By R. A. Nicholson. Bell, 1914.
4. *La Passion d'al-Hosayn-ibn-Mansour Al-Hallaj, Martyr Mystique de l'Islam*. (Exécuté à Bagdad le 26 Mars, 922.) Etude d'histoire religieuse. Par Louis Massignon. Two vols. Paris: Geuthner. 1922.
5. *Kitab al-Tawasin*. Par Al-Hallaj. Edited by L. Massignon. Paris: Geuthner. 1913.
6. *Essai sur les origines du lexique technique de la mystique musulmane*. Par Louis Massignon. Paris: Geuthner. 1922.
7. *Rabi'a the Mystic and Her Fellow-Saints in Islam*. (Being the Life and Teachings of Rabi'a al-'Adawiyya Al Quaysiyya of Basra, together with some account of the place of the women saints in Islam.) By Margaret Smith. Cambridge, 1928.
8. *Islam Beliefs and Institutions*. By H. Lammens, S.J. Translated from the French by Sir E. Denison Ross. Methuen, 1929.
9. *The Problem of Mystical Grace in Islam*. (Studies in the Psychology of the Mystics.) By J. Maréchal, S.J. Translated by Algar Thorold. Burns Oates and Washbourne, 1927.

THE list of books which prefaces this article shows how much attention has been devoted in recent years to the study of Mohammedan mysticism by European scholars. Nor is it difficult to understand the reason of this attraction, since of all types of mysticism that of Islam is the richest perhaps in the quantity and certainly in the quality of its literature. In the West, apart from a few outstanding exceptions, mysticism and literature have followed separate paths, and the man of letters often knows nothing of works which from the religious point of view are spiritual classics. In the East, however, this is not so. Mysticism and letters go hand in hand in all the Moslem countries—among the Persians, above all, but also among the Arabs and the Turks.\* The greatest poets have devoted themselves to give literary expression to spiritual experience, and to fuse

\* Cf. especially E. J. W. Gibb's great *History of Ottoman Poetry*.

poetical and mystical ecstasy in a single flame. A short time ago only the great mystical poets of Persia—'Attar, Jalalu'ddin Rumi, Hafiz, and Jami—were well known in the West, and it was usual to regard Moslem mysticism as predominantly Persian, but the works of Professor Nicholson have now introduced us to the works of the great Arab mystics, such as Ibnu'l 'Arabi and Ibnu'l Farid, and it is at last possible for an Englishman to obtain some idea of the wealth and variety of Sufi literature.

It is true that it is difficult for the Western mind to appreciate Arabic poetry in the same way as Persian. The mystical poets of Persia belong to the literature of the world, and it is as easy for an Englishman as for an Oriental to understand the spiritual passion of Jalalu'ddin Rumi or the classical perfection of Jami's famous lines on the Divine Beauty:

Beware! Say not, "He is All-Beautiful,  
And we His lovers." Thou art but the glass,  
And He the Face confronting it, which casts  
Its image in the mirror. He alone  
Is manifest, and thou in truth art hid.  
Pure Love, like Beauty, coming but from Him,  
Reveals itself in Thee. If steadfastly  
Thou canst regard, thou wilt at length perceive  
He is the mirror also—He alike  
The Treasure and the Casket. "I" and "Thou"  
Have here no place, and are but fantasies  
Vain and unreal. Silence! for this tale  
Is endless, and no eloquence hath power  
To speak of Him. 'Tis but for us to love  
And suffer silently, being as naught!\*

Arabic poetry, on the other hand, is alien from European standards both in form and content, and its combination of far-fetched symbolism with an acrid intensity of sensuous passion is disconcerting to the Western mind. Contrast, for example, with Jami's lines the following typical passage from Ibnu'l 'Arabi:

She is a bishopess, one of the daughters of Rome, unadorned;  
thou seest in her a radiant Goodness.

Wild is she, none can make her his friend; she has gotten in her  
solitary chamber a mausoleum for remembrance.

\* Trans. E. G. Browne.

She has baffled everyone who is learned in our religion, every student of the Psalms of David, every Jewish doctor and every Christian priest. . . .

The day when they departed on the road, I prepared for war the armies of my patience host after host.

When my soul reached the throat, I besought that Beauty and that Grace to grant me relief,

And she yielded—may God preserve us from her evil and may the victorious King repel Iblis.\*

It is not easy for us to realize either the literary attraction or the religious significance of such poetry; indeed, the detailed mystical interpretation with which it is accompanied only serves to increase our bewilderment. Nevertheless we have in the work of St. John of the Cross an example nearer home of the same methods. He also uses the magic of strange words and obscure imagery to transport the mind to a suprarational sphere, and employs the language of human passion to express spiritual experiences. Indeed, in some of his verses, the images and the turns of expression show an almost verbal similarity to those of Arabic poetry. Nevertheless the magic of his poetry is perceptible even in an English version, whereas that of the Arabs is so closely bound up with their language that it cannot survive the test of translation into a European tongue.

There is nothing in the Arabic poetry translated by Professor Nicholson to compare with "En una noche oscura," still less with those incomparable lines of the *Spiritual Canticle*:

Hide thyself, O my Beloved!  
Turn thy face to the mountains.  
Do not speak,  
But regard the companions  
Of her who is travelling amidst strange islands.

Consequently it is in their prose writings that the Arabic mystics are seen to most advantage. The genius of the language and the race lend themselves to the vivid portrayal of individual character and the eloquent expression of personal emotion, and there are many passages in

\* *Tarjuman al-Ashwaq*, Ode II, p. 49. Trans. R. A. Nicholson.



the lives of the Sufi saints which are of unsurpassed beauty and religious significance.

Thus it is related of Rabi'a, the saintly freedwoman of Basra, that at night she would go up to the house-top and pray as follows: "O my Lord, the stars are shining and the eyes of men are closed, and the kings have shut their doors and every lover is alone with his beloved, and here am I alone with Thee."

Then she prayed all night, and when the dawn appeared she would say: "O God, the night has passed and the day has dawned; how I long to know if Thou hast accepted my prayers, or if Thou hast rejected them! Therefore console me, for it is Thine to console this state of mine. Thou hast given me life and cared for me, and Thine is the glory. If Thou wert to drive one from Thy door yet would I not forsake it for the love that I bear in my heart towards Thee."\*

Again she would say: "O my Lord, whatever share of this world Thou dost bestow on me, bestow it on Thine enemies, and whatever share of the next world Thou dost give me, give it to Thy friends; Thou art enough for me."†

Even more remarkable are the prayers of al-Hallaj, the great Martyr of Sufism, who suffered at Bagdad in A.D. 922, and whose life and teaching have been so admirably and exhaustively dealt with by M. Massignon.

His disciple Ibrahim ibn Fatik relates:

When Husayn ibn Mansur al-Hallaj was brought to be crucified, and saw the cross and the nails, he laughed so greatly that tears flowed from his eyes. Then he turned to the people, and, seeing Shibli among them, said to him: "O Abu Bakr, hast thou thy prayer carpet with thee?" Shibli answered: "Yes, O Shaykh!" Hallaj bade him spread it out, which he did. Then Hallaj stepped forward and prayed two rak'as on it, and I was near him. . . . And when he had finished he uttered a prayer of which I remember only these words: "O Lord, I beseech Thee to make me thankful for the grace that Thou hast bestowed upon me in concealing from the eyes of other men what Thou hast revealed to me of the splendours of Thy radiant countenance which is without a form, and in making it lawful for me to behold the mysteries of Thy

\* Smith: *Rabi'a*, p. 27.

† *Ibid.*, p. 30.

inmost conscience which Thou hast made unlawful to other men. And these Thy servants who are gathered to slay me, in zeal for Thy religion and in desire to win Thy favour, pardon them and have mercy upon them; for verily if Thou hadst revealed to them that which Thou hast revealed to me, they would not have done what they have done; and if Thou hadst hidden from me that which Thou hast hidden from them, I should not have suffered this tribulation. Glory unto Thee in whatsoever Thou doest, and glory unto Thee in whatsoever Thou willest.”\*

What strikes us in these passages is not, however, their literary beauty so much as the extraordinary Christian spirit that they manifest. Nothing could be more unlike the harsh legalism and militant intolerance which we are accustomed to regard as characteristic of the religion of Islam. And this brings us to the fundamental problem of Sufism. Is it a genuinely Islamic movement? Or is it a foreign importation which has no real roots in the religion of the Prophet?

The majority of Western scholars have decided in favour of the latter alternative. Either with Renan they have regarded it as “the reaction of the Aryan [*sc.* Persian] genius against the frightful simplicity of the Semitic spirit,” or they have looked to some other external source, whether Buddhist, Vedantist, Neoplatonist, or Gnostic, for the origin of the movement. Certainly it is impossible to deny the influence of some of these factors, at least in the later developments of Sufism. There is no disputing the neoplatonic inspiration of such writers as Ibnu’l ‘Arabi, or the importance of the Persian contribution to Sufi literature. It is noteworthy that the majority of the more pantheistic mystics were of Persian origin, and that even Ibnu’l ‘Arabi himself owed much to Persian influences.† Nevertheless the fact remains that Sufism originated as an historical movement, not in Persia or Turkestan, but in the very centre of early Moslem orthodoxy in eighth-century Basra. Hence the ruling tendency among those who had made the closest study of Sufi origins—above all, M. Massignon—

\* Massignon, *Passion*, pp. 301-2; and Nicholson, *Idea*, p. 34.

† It is also noticeable that the great majority of Sufi saints and the founders of the dervish orders derive their origin from the most outlying regions of Islam—viz., Khorasan in the East and Morocco and Spain in the West.

is to emphasize the Mohammedan character of Sufism and to seek its sources in the Koran and in orthodox Islamic tradition.

Now the religion of the Koran undoubtedly provides a certain foundation for mysticism. Its first principles are the same as those which the Epistle to the Hebrews lays down as the first conditions of Faith—namely, the belief that God is, and that He is a Rewarder of those that seek Him. Mohammed himself was a visionary with a profound sense of the reality of God, and of the transitory and dependent nature of created things. He lived in a continual meditation of the Four Last Things, and he taught his followers to do the same. But apart from this, nothing could be less mystical than his religious teaching. It was a religion of fear rather than of love, and the goal of its striving was not the vision of God, but the sensible delights of the shady gardens of Paradise. And this was not simply due to lack of spirituality; it had a positive theological basis. Man's reward was proportionate to his nature. God was so exalted above creation that any idea of human communion with the Divinity savoured of presumption. The duty of man was not the transformation of his interior life, but the objective establishment of the reign of God on earth by the sword and submission to the law of Islam.

Thus the religion of Mohammed has more in common with Mahdism than with mysticism. It is a militant puritanism of the same type as the modern Wahhabite movement. But it was never a purely external system. Its puritanism was not only that of the warrior, it was also that of the unworldly ascetic who spends his time in prayer and fasting and his goods in almsgiving. From the first there existed in Islam, side by side with the externalism and legalism of the canonists and theologians, a tradition of interior religion, an "Islam of the heart," which showed itself in the simple and unworldly piety of men, like Abu Dharr or Hodhayfah Ibn Hosayl, among the Companions of the Prophet. Such men, however, can hardly be called mystics, as they are by M. Massignon,\* unless we use the word in a very extended sense.

\* Massignon: *Lexique*, p. 135 ff.

It was only by slow degrees that this pietist movement developed a genuinely mystical character. During the period of fermentation and schism which followed the establishment of the Syrian Khalifate, the pietists, like the puritan Kharijites, though in a different sense, reacted against the growing worldliness of Islam and began to follow a definitely ascetic rule of life founded on prayer and retirement from the world. The great leader of the movement was Abu Sa'id Hasan (A.D. 643-728), who lived at Basra during the first century of the Hejira, and has always been regarded as the real founder of Sufism. Even he, however, was an ascetic rather than a mystic. His teaching, primarily concerned with penance and moral amendment, is marked by an intense preoccupation with the thought of death and the wrath to come. So great was his fear of Hell that when he heard of a man who was condemned to a thousand years in Hell before he could be saved, he wept and said, "Would that I were like that man." Nevertheless his asceticism and his emphasis on the importance of prayer and detachment gave a great impulse to the development of religious life, and it was among his disciples at Basra during the two following generations that the first true mystics of Islam made their appearance. One of the greatest and certainly the most attractive of these early Sufis was the woman saint Rabi'a, to whom Miss Margaret Smith has recently devoted a monograph.\* Her life is marked by the same asceticism and spirit of penance as that of Hasan, but in her the purely ascetic phase is definitely transcended, and later Sufi writers are fond of contrasting her spirit of pure love and self-abandonment with the less disinterested devotion of her predecessor Hasan.†

It is to her that the famous verses on the Two Loves are attributed, possibly with justice:

I have loved Thee with two loves, a selfish love and a love that is worthy,

As for the love which is selfish, I occupy myself therein with remembrance of Thee to the exclusion of all others,

\* *Rabi'a the Mystic*, 1928.

† No doubt these anecdotes are apocryphal, as Hasan died when she was still a child.

As for that which is worthy of Thee, therein Thou raisest the veil that I may see Thee.

Yet there is no praise to me in this or in that.

But the praise is to Thee whether in that or this.\*

She is also the subject of an anecdote which has found its way into Christian literature.† She was seen one day running with a torch and a pitcher of water, and when she was asked what she was doing, she replied: "I am going to set fire to Paradise and to extinguish the fire of Hell, so that both Veils may disappear from the Pilgrims, and their intention may be pure, and the servants of God may see him without any object of hope or motive of fear."

The anecdote is no doubt legendary, but it harmonizes well with her authentic utterances on the subject, one of which has been quoted above. This attitude is so unlike that of orthodox Islam that it is not surprising that she should have met with criticism from the traditionalists and the doctors of the law. Indeed, the latter looked askance at the whole ascetic movement and even Hasan did not escape their criticisms. The introduction of the monastic life, the wearing of the woollen robe (*suf*) which became the badge of the movement, the practice of penances such as the wearing of a chain, and, above all, the doctrine of pure love, and of a reciprocal friendship between God and His creatures, were all looked upon as a departure from true Islamic principles and an approximation to Christian ideas. Ibn Sirin accuses the early ascetics of assuming the Suf "in imitation of Jesus," instead of following the example of the Prophet who wore cotton, and Hamad ibn Salamah appealed to Farqad Sinji, the friend of Hasan, to "rid himself of Christianity."‡ The well-known hadith (traditional sayings) of Mohammed against monasticism—"there is no monasticism" [var. "celibacy"] "in Islam" and "the monastic life, for my community, is the Holy

\* *Op. cit.*, pp. 102-3.

† The story appears in Joinville's *Vie de St. Louis*, ch. 87, where it is told of an old woman of Damascus who met the envoy of St. Louis, Frère Yves le Breton. Thence it was taken by Jean Pierre Camus as the text of his treatise on pure love, "La Carité ou le Portrait de la vraie Charité," and also by Drexelius. Cf. Bremond: *L'Humanisme Dévot*, pp. 183 ff.

‡ Massignon: *Lexique*, p. 131-2.

War"—were also probably fabricated by the traditionalists at this period as part of their anti-ascetic propaganda.\*

These criticisms are not altogether unjustified. It would, in fact, be extremely surprising if the rise of the ascetic and mystical movement in Islam owed nothing to Christianity. Syriac Christianity had already begun to affect Arabia in the sixth century, and its influence is plainly perceptible in the rise of Islam itself. The conquest of Mesopotamia and Syria had brought the Arabs into still closer contact with a Christian population, as well as with the various Gnostic and Manichæan sects which were still numerous in these regions. The latter had an obvious influence on the development of the Shiah and other heretical movements in Islam, and there are features in Sufism, such as the religious dance and the use of music and poetry to produce an orgy of collective emotion—the so-called *sama'* or "spiritual concert"—which suggests analogies with the practices of the Messalians and similar sects.

But it was, above all, in the case of monasticism that Christian influence on the rise of Sufism is apparent. Spiritually-minded Moslems could not but be interested in the life and ideals of the monks of the desert, and there are numerous references in Arabic literature to the impression created by their stories and sayings. Primitive Sufism was nothing less than an attempt to introduce the institution of ideals of Christian monasticism into the bosom of Islam. It is true that there was no attempt to tamper with Moslem dogma, and the earlier type of Sufi ascetic, such as Hasan of Basra, was thoroughly loyal to the religious law and traditions of Islam. Nevertheless it is obvious that the substitution of a new ideal of interior piety for the militant puritanism of the early believers involved nothing less than a religious revolution of the most radical character. There was implicit in the movement a revolt against the

\* M. Massignon has shown that the passages dealing with monasticism in the Koran are to be interpreted in a favourable sense (*op. cit.*, pp. 123-131). The fabrication of traditional sayings of the Prophet in the interests of sects and parties and even on purely general grounds had attained vast proportions by the ninth century. There is even a hadith which justifies the forgery of hadith as follows: "If you come across a fine saying, don't hesitate to attribute it to me. I must have said it"!



whole legal and traditionalist's conception of Islam. The latter felt no need for any intermediary between God and Man other than the written revelation of the Koran and the inspired teachings of the Prophet. It inculcated an attitude of submission to the power of Allah and a morality based on the exact performance of the ritual and religious law. Sufism, on the other hand, demanded the transformation of the inner man by which he should become the familiar friend of God and should attain to a union of divine love. And this acceptance of the Christian ideal of spiritual perfection brought with it a need for something corresponding to the Christian discipline of salvation. Islam possessed neither sacramental system nor the belief in a personal mediator between God and Man, but since the whole tendency of its creed was to emphasize the transcendence and power of God and the utter dependence and creatureliness of Man, it was at first unconscious of any deficiency. The new tendencies that were at work in Islam from the ninth century and earlier led men to seek some solution which might bridge the unfathomable gulf between the Creator and the creature. Thus the Shi'ah found such a solution in the doctrine of the Imamate which made of Ali and his descendants the living representatives of God on earth, while the Ismaili went still further and introduced a whole system of gnostic emanations to fill the gap. The Sufis avoided such manifest departures from Islamic tradition, but they attained the same goal by their doctrine of sainthood, which was their greatest contribution to Mohammedanism as a living religion.

"The *wali* (or saint)," writes Professor Nicholson, "bridges the chasm which the Koran and scholasticism have set between Man and an absolutely transcendent God. He brings relief to the distressed, health to the sick, children to the childless, food to the famished, spiritual guidance to those who entrust their souls to his care, blessing to all who visit his tomb and invoke Allah in his name."\*

And these features of the saint in popular cult are but the working out in practice of his position in Sufi theology as the bond between the One and the Many and the organ

\* Nicholson: *Idea*, p. 78.

of the divine power in the cosmic order. This theory reached its full development in the doctrine of the Perfect Man elaborated by Ibnu'l 'Arabi and 'Abdu'l Karim al-Jili in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries A.D.,\* but its roots lie deep in the early history of Sufism. Mohasibi (781-857), one of the earliest systematic writers in Sufism, has a magnificent passage on how God has chosen His saints from all eternity, that by means of them the creation may be brought to know and love Him. Finally, He sends them forth, saying: "O you, my witnesses! whomsoever cometh to you sick, because he has not found Me, do ye heal him; a fugitive, because he flies from My service, bring him back to Me; forgetful of my succour and my graces, remind him of them. Verily I will be to you the best of Physicians, for I am merciful, and he who is merciful takes as his servants only those who are merciful."†

This doctrine of the saints, as the recipients of a divine mission for the service and salvation of mankind, became crystallized at an early date (? the tenth century A.D.) in the theory of a spiritual hierarchy, consisting of a fixed number of saints headed by the Qutb or Pole and the four Awṭad, who are the pivot of the world and upon whom depend the order and harmony of human affairs. "It is their office," writes Hujwiri (in the eleventh century A.D.), "to go round the whole world every night, and if there be any place on which their eyes have not fallen, next day some flaw will appear in that place; and they must then inform the Qutb, in order that he may direct his attention to the weak spot, and that by his blessing the imperfection may be remedied."‡

These thaumaturgic supermen obviously have much more in common with the Hindu rishi or the "Pure Men" of Taoism than with the prophets and warriors who were the saints of primitive Islam. "Mohammed himself, as described in the Koran," writes Professor Nicholson, "is no more than a man subject to human weaknesses who receives at intervals the divine revelation, not from God, but from an angel. He has never seen God, he does not

\* Cf. especially "The Perfect Man," in Nicholson: *Studies*, pp. 77-161.

† Massignon: *Lexique*, p. 219.

‡ Nicholson: *Studies*, p. 79.

share God's secrets, he cannot foretell the future, he can work no miracle: he is only the servant and messenger of Allah."\* The Wali, on the other hand, is a veritable divine man. He is not merely the preacher of the divine unity, he is one who has realized that unity in his own person, and through whom the divinity is manifested to men. Jalalu'ddin Rumi relates in the *Masnavi* how the Qutb met Bayazid of Bistam as he set forth to Mecca and absolved him from the necessity of the pilgrimage, saying:

Of a Truth that is God which your soul sees in me,  
 For God has chosen me to be His House.  
 When you have seen me, you have seen God,  
 And have circumambulated the real Ka'ba.  
 To serve me is to worship and praise God;  
 Think not that God is distinct from me.†

Sufism ultimately succeeded in reconciling these ideas with Moslem orthodoxy by means of a *tour de force* which, in defiance of history and of the evidence of the Koran, converted Mohammed himself from a simple messenger of Allah into the Spiritual Pole, the archetype of mystical sanctity, and of the whole lower creation—in other words, a Mohammedan Logos. In the ninth century, however, this development was still only in germ, and the new ideal of mystical sanctity was still unassimilated by Islamic theology. There were Sufis such as Ibn al-Hawwasi and al-Tizmidhi, who maintained the superiority of the saint over the Prophet, and who regarded Jesus, in accordance with certain passages of the Koran, as the type of sanctity and the Seal of the Saints as Mohammed is the Seal of the Prophets. This latent conflict between the Religion of the Saint and the Religion of the Prophet came to a crisis in the case of al-Hallaj, whose life and death mark the turning-point of the whole Sufi movement. It is due to the epoch-making researches of M. Massignon that the true personality and religious significance of this remarkable figure in the history of Islam have at last been made clear after nearly a thousand years of misunderstanding. He has shown that al-Hallaj was not the pantheistic enthusiast of later Sufi tradition. His piety was founded on that of

\* Nicholson: *Idea*, p. 58.

† *Ibid.*, p. 57.

the earlier ascetics, and was far more traditional and Koranic than that of Ibnu'l 'Arabi or Jalalu'ddin Rumi. On the other hand, it was a consistent attempt to work out the Sufi ideal of the saintly vocation to its full practical conclusions, and thereby it came into a far sharper conflict with the orthodox piety of the theologians than did the esoteric theosophy of the later Sufis.

The early Sufis, with the exception of Rabi'a, had concentrated their attention on the negative aspect of the mystical way, which taken by itself must lead in M. Massignon's words to "the slow destruction of man, consumed away by the inaccessible sun of the divine unity." Al-Hallaj also emphasized this negative process, but he went beyond it and sought to realize the positive aspect of the mystical union. To him the mystery of creation was not, as to Mohammed, the divine Will—the sheer decree of divine Omnipotence; it was the divine Love, the Essence of the divine Essence in which man was called to participate. Hence the mystical union does not consist in that pure intuition of the divine unity which is the goal of later Sufism; it is a personal adhesion to the divine *fiat* which makes the soul of the mystic the organ of the Divine Spirit and causes it to participate in the life of God.\*

This ideal of mystical conformity with the divine Will was personified in the person of Jesus, who even in the Koran appears as the typical representative of the outpouring of the Spirit, and of "those who have near access to God." Al-Hallaj, however, goes further and regards Jesus as the type of deified humanity—the second Adam† in whom the divine vocation of the human race is realized.

"Glory to God," he writes, "whose Humanity has manifested to the Angels the secret of His radiant divinity" (*i.e.*, in Adam). "And who then has appeared to His creatures visibly in the charge of one who eats and drinks" (*i.e.*, Jesus).‡

\* Massignon: *Passion*, pp. 514-521. A detailed summary of his conclusions will be found in Père Maréchal's essay "The Problem of Mystical Grace in Islam" in his *Studies in the Psychology of the Mystics*, translated by Algar Thorold, 1927.

† Based on the passage in the Koran (III, 52): "The likeness (or analogy) of Jesus is as the likeness of Adam in the sight of God."

‡ Massignon: *Passion*, p. 602.

It was this new conception of the mystical vocation which led al-Hallaj to break away from the narrow circle of traditional Sufism and to embark on an apostolate which extended to every part of the Moslem world, from Mecca to India and the frontiers of China, and to every class of men; above all, to the Carmathian heretics who were regarded with fear and loathing by orthodox Islam.

And the same burning desire for the divine glory and the salvation of men leads al-Hallaj on to the supreme degree of heroic sanctity—the desire to die anathema for the sake of his brethren. We can trace in the story of his life a growing thirst for martyrdom which is, so far as I am aware, absolutely unparalleled in the life of any other Sufi saint.

The martyrdom of al-Hallaj is the culmination of the Christian tendencies which were already latent in the earlier Sufi movement. As M. Massignon has shown, al-Hallaj had founded his ideal of mystical sanctity on the Koranic tradition of Jesus, and this imitation of the Koranic Christ led him on to a literal conformity with the real Christ in His Passion and Death.

Many different causes contributed to bring about the death of al-Hallaj—the hostility of the theologians and canon lawyers, the scribes and Pharisees of Islam, the distrust of the government for his activity as a propagandist, and the disapproval of many of the Sufi leaders themselves; but behind them all there lay a conviction of the incompatibility of the Hallajian doctrine of mystical sanctification with Islamic orthodoxy—the conflict between the Religion of Law and the Religion of the Spirit. And consequently the condemnation of al-Hallaj was not an isolated episode. It was the decisive refusal of the dynamic and transforming power of sanctity. The rejection of al-Hallaj forced Sufism aside towards intellectualism and monism, and ultimately led to its absorption by the forces of an alien syncretism which were then beginning to invade the world of Islam.

For the third century of the Hejira, which saw the full development of Moslem mysticism in such figures as Mohasibi, Bayazid of Bistam, Jonayd, and Hallaj, was an

age of profound intellectual unrest and change. It was marked on the one hand by the introduction into Islamic culture of Greek neoplatonic philosophy and science, as interpreted by the Christian and "Sabæan" scholars of Mesopotamia, and on the other by the reappearance of the gnostic tradition which had been preserved by the Manichæans and lesser sects, such as the Mandæans and the Bardesanians. Both these currents were united in the Ismailian or Carmathian movement which organized an elaborate system of secret propaganda against the unity and even the social existence of Islam. The Ismailian doctrine is gnostic in character and teaches the evolution of the world from the unknown and inaccessible Godhead through a series of seven emanations. The temporal order is likewise divided into a series of seven cycles, in each of which the Universal Intelligence manifests itself anew in human form. These seven manifestations are the Speakers or Prophets—Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, Mohammed, and the Ismaili Messiah "The Master of the Hour." Corresponding to these are seven manifestations of the Universal Soul—the Helpers or Bases, whose function it is to manifest to the elect the esoteric meaning of the Speakers' teaching. Thus Aaron supplements Moses, Peter Jesus, and Ali Mohammed.

All these successive revelations, embodied in the world religions, are summed up in the Ismailian doctrine in which all veils are removed. But this doctrine is essentially esoteric, and is imparted only to those who have passed through the seven degrees of initiation which compose the Ismailian hierarchy. Only when the disciple has given himself up body and soul to the Imam and his representatives, the *da'is* or missionaries, is the *ta'lim*, the secret doctrine, revealed. The adept is then emancipated from all positive dogmas and religious obligations. He is taught the inner meaning which is hidden under the veils of dogma and rite in all the positive religions. All religions are false and all are true, but it is only "the gnostic," the Ismailian initiate, who realizes the truth of the divine unity—that God is One because God is All, and that every form of reality is but an aspect of the Divine Being. This esoteric theosophy which is represented by



the treatises of "the Brethren of Purity," dating from the eleventh century, was, however, unequally yoked with the sanguinary anarchism of the Carmathians and the political schemes of the founders of the Fatimid Caliphate. Consequently it was regarded by the Islamic world in general with similar fear and repulsion to that evoked by anarchism or communism in modern times. By the thirteenth century the movement had collapsed as a social force and survived only in the form of scattered sects such as the Druses, who to-day still worship the mad Fatimid Caliph Hakim as the final incarnation of God and the consummation of revelation.\*

The speculative and theosophical aspects of the movement, however, had a considerable influence on Islam and, above all, on Sufism. In fact, Sufism in its later developments may be regarded as a parallel movement to Ismailianism and the outcome of a similar process of syncretism. It also incorporated neoplatonic, gnostic, and cabalistic elements, and developed an esoteric theosophy very similar to that of the Ismailians. Like the latter, it made extensive use of the principle of the symbolical or esoteric interpretation of dogma and of the Koran. Thus Jalalu'ddin Rumi speaks of the seven successive meanings which every passage in the Koran contains and adds:

Do not limit thyself, my son, to the external sense, like the demons who saw in Adam only the clay;

The external sense of the Koran is like the body of Adam, for its appearance alone is visible, but its soul is hidden.†

Indeed, some of the Sufis go even farther than the Ismailians by openly proclaiming the subversive doctrines which the latter kept as jealously guarded secrets. One of the quatrains attributed to Abu Sa'id Ibn Abi'l Khayr runs as follows:

So long as the mosques and colleges are not utterly destroyed, the work of the Qalendars (dervishes) will not be complete;

So long as faith and infidelity are not altogether similar, not a man will be a true Moslem.

\* The ass on which he rode was believed to typify the Speakers of the former religions which he had come to abrogate.

† *Masnavi* (Whinfield), 169.



One of the great dervish orders, that of the Bektashis, which possessed exceptional importance in the Ottoman Empire owing to its influence on the corps of Janissaries, was really a secret society of Ismailian character, but such examples of direct contact and fusion between the Sufis and Ismailians are rare. Esoteric Sufism is a parallel phenomenon to the esoteric Shi'a sects, but the two movements remain distinct and for the most part hostile to one another.

By far the most important representative of this movement of syncretism in orthodox Islam is Ibnu'l 'Arabi, the great Spanish mystic, who is known as "The Great Shaykh," *par excellence*,\* since he was the first to organize it in a system of speculative thought dominated by a monism as absolute and as unflinching as that of the Vedanta. Being is one, whether it be pure and unmanifested or contingent and manifested. Pure Being is not God, since it cannot be known and is beyond existence; nor is Contingent Being God, since, though it is ultimately identical with Him, it has no independent subsistence, but is restricted to its particular mode of being. Creation is therefore necessary as the medium through which God realizes Himself. The contradiction of the two forms of Being is resolved and transcended in man—not indeed in the rational man who only participates in the Universal Soul, but in the perfect or spiritual man who is the expression of the Universal Intelligence. He is to God as the pupil to the eye, by which God sees creation, and the mirror which displays God to himself. "Man is the substance of every attribute wherewith he endows God: when he contemplates God, he contemplates himself, and God contemplates Himself when He contemplates man."† He is the copy of God and the pattern of the world—a microcosm in which all attributes are united and by which creation is brought back from diversity to unity and from separation to union.

The perfect man is, of course, the type of Sufi saint, but primarily he is Mohammed, the archetype of the saints and the Divine Logos.

\* Born 1165 at Murcia in Spain. Died 1240 at Damascus.

† *Tarjuman al-Ashwag*, p. v.

All the beauty of the world is borrowed from him and subsists through his beauty and his light. 'Tis his beauty that is beheld in every beauty; 'tis his light that is seen in every light, in the sun, the moon, and the stars. Those who love the Prophet ought to behold his perfection in all that is beautiful and meditate on him, revering him in their hearts and praising him with their tongues. I knew one of our Shaykhs who, whenever he saw or thought of anything beautiful, used to cry, " Blessings and peace on thee, O Apostle of God!"\*

Thus Ibnu'l 'Arabi is trinitarian in a double sense: there is the triad that consists of The One, The Universal Intelligence, and the Universal Soul; and in the second place there is the triad—Pure Being, The Perfect Man, and The Phenomenal World, and in each triad the members are arranged in a descending hierarchy consisting of successive emanations.

The whole system resembles a gnostic or neoplatonic version of Christianity rather than an orthodox interpretation of Islam, and it is remarkable that it can ever have been regarded as tolerable in orthodox circles. Nevertheless from the thirteenth century onwards Ibnu'l 'Arabi has been accepted as the great doctor mysticus of Islam, and has set his seal on the later development of Sufism. And this reception of his doctrine involves a vital change in the character of Moslem mysticism. It marks the triumph of an intellectualized theosophy over the experimental mysticism which the earlier Sufis had drawn from their life of prayer. It substituted an intellectual intuition of pure being for the transforming union of the will, and thus dispensed with the necessity for moral discipline and renunciation which had been the foundation of the original movement. In the words of Professor Nicholson: "The living clash of personality, divine and human, resolves itself into a logical distinction between God and man as aspects of the One Essence, whose attributes receive their most perfect manifestation in the first-created Light of Mohammed, the Prophet of Allah."†

Consequently M. Massignon is fully justified in regarding Ibnu'l 'Arabi as the evil genius of Sufism and as the

\* Quoted in Nicholson, *Idea*, p. 61.

† Nicholson: *Idea*, p. 31.

chief agent in the divorce between Moslem mysticism and moral life and its stagnation in a speculative quietism. Nevertheless we must not exaggerate his influence, since it is very possible that even without his intervention Islamic mysticism would have been forced by the internal logic of its development to a similar conclusion.

As early as the ninth century, in the case of Bayazid of Bistam, we see the emergence of the pantheistic and antinomian strain which ultimately came to predominate. Some of his utterances are as extravagant as anything that is to be found in the writings of the disciples of Ibnu'l 'Arabi. For example, "Allah is great, and I am greater still." "Praise be to Me, Praise be to Me, how great is My Glory!" Again he said on one occasion to his disciple: "It is better for you to see me once than to see God a thousand times." He also claimed unlimited powers of intercession with God on behalf of the human race. "My standard" (of protection at the Last Day), he said, "is broader than the standard of Mohammed," since it extended even to the infidel and the souls in Hell. "On the Day of Judgement, I will draw nigh to the damned and I will say to Thee, 'Take me for their ransom; if not, I will teach them that Thy Paradise is nothing but a children's game!'"\* No doubt these utterances are mystical paradoxes of the kind that we find in the poems of Angelus Silesius, and are not to be interpreted in the sense of the later monistic theosophy. Nevertheless they had an unfortunate influence on Sufi piety.

In the year 1045 the great Sufi doctor, 'Abdu'l Karim al-Qushayri, addressed an epistle to all the Sufis of Islam, in which he complained that the whole movement was being compromised by the antinomian and unorthodox opinions which were then in the ascendant. Everywhere, he says, asceticism has been abandoned, and the Sufis, intoxicated by their sublime doctrines, regard themselves as emancipated from the most sacred duties of religion.†

\* Massignon: *Lexique*, pp. 247, 252-3.

† Al-Qushayri's moderate and circumspect type of Sufism is also represented by his contemporary al-Hujwiri, the author of the oldest Persian manual on the subject which has been translated by Professor Nicholson (1911). He adopts a distinctly unfavourable attitude to *sama'*, the use of ecstatic song and dance.

The intervention of al-Qushayri, and still more that of al-Ghazali, the greatest of Moslem theologians—did much to stem this antinomian and pantheistic current and to establish a *via media* between the mystical extravagances of the dervishes and the narrow traditionalism of the canonists and the theologians. But this compromise was not permanently acceptable to either party, and it was the theosophical monism of Ibnu'l 'Arabi rather than the mystical theism of al-Ghazali which was ultimately victorious.

The fact is that when once the possibility of a living communion of the human soul with God and its progressive transformation by divine grace according to the teaching of al-Hallaj was excluded as savouring of dualism and *hulul* (incarnation or infusion), the solutions of the extremists became the only logical ones. The transcendence and omnipotence of Allah, carried to their logical conclusions, involved the denial of any ultimate reality to created being and to human experience. God was the Real (al-Haqq), all else was vanity and nothingness. God's Will and Power were the only source of movement in the world. The apparent activity of man as a free moral personality was but an illusion which veiled the operation of the one real agent—the Will of God. And this view finds its speculative and dogmatic justification in the orthodox Asharite doctrine, which denies not only moral freedom, but even the principle of causality in the interests of divine transcendence. There are no necessary principles of relationship or succession in the order of things or the order of consciousness, only a juxtaposition of unintelligible states of being called into existence and destroyed by the arbitrary *fiat* of divine omnipotence.

The natural outcome of this theory in the religious life is a blind fatalism which adheres to the strict fulfilment of the religious law and forbears to scrutinize the mystery of the divine purpose. Al-Ghazali writes:

He whom Allah wills to guide, he opens his breast to Islam; and he whom he wills to lead astray, he narrows his breast. He is the guider aright and the leader astray; he does what he wills, and decides what he wishes; there is no opposer of his decision and no

repeller of his decree. He created the Garden (of Paradise) and created for it a people, then used them in obedience; and he created the Fire (of Hell) and created for it a people, then used them in rebellion. . . . Then he said, as has been handed down by the Prophet: "These are in the Garden and I care not; and these are in the Fire and I care not." So is Allah Most High, the King, the Reality; "He is not asked concerning what he does; but they are asked."\*

But the mystic cannot rest content with this external fatalism. The refusal of all moral and intelligible value to the phenomenal world only serves to throw him back upon the One Reality. If God alone Is, then all that is, is God, and the transitory being of creatures is but a veil thrown over the one true substance. Thus the Moslem theologian's insistence on divine transcendence and unity culminates in a monism no less complete than that of the neoplatonist philosopher. Indeed, the Sufi goes further, for he is not content to say that all the positive qualities of creatures are the reflections of the Divine Perfections; even the negative element in creation must be divine, as Jalalu'ddin declares in those marvellous lines of the *Diwani Shamsi Tabriz*:

I am the theft of rogues, I am the pain of the sick,  
I am both cloud and rain, I have rained in the meadows.†

It is this intuition—this *realization*—of the Divine Being as the One Reality which constitutes the essence of what the Sufi conceives to be mystical union, and all his spiritual life is orientated in this direction. In the words of Baba Kuhi, the eleventh-century mystic of Shiraz:

In the market, in the cloister—only God I saw,  
In the valley and on the mountain—only God I saw,

In prayer and fasting, in praise and contemplation,  
In the religion of the Prophet—only God I saw.  
Neither soul nor body, accident nor substance,  
Qualities nor causes—only God I saw.  
Like a candle I was melting in His fire  
Amidst the flames outflashing—only God I saw.

\* D. B. Macdonald: *The Religious Attitude and Life in Islam*, pp. 300-1.

† Trans. Nicholson, *Selected Poems from the Diwani Shamsi Tabriz*, p. 332.

Myself with mine own eyes I saw most clearly,  
 But when I looked with God's eyes—only God I saw.  
 I passed away into nothingness, I vanished,  
 And lo, I was the All-Living,—only God I saw.”\*

Thus the mystical experience is not, as Hallaj and the Christian mystics taught, a real transformation or assimilation of the human soul to God. The Sufis themselves describe their doctrine as a Unitarian Gnosis, and it is impossible to define it more perfectly. It is simply the affirmation of a unity which has always been, and which will always be, a naked identity of pure being with itself. It leads not to the transfiguration of the soul, but to its disintegration and annihilation. The same vision which unites the soul with God unites it with everything else and all distinctions vanish in an iridescent mist.

This pantheistic ecstasy is the characteristic note of later Sufism and is the inspiration of all the great mystical poets of Islam. It finds expression in Attar's curious allegory of the Quest of the Simurgh, a kind of mystical Hunting of the Snark; in the Masnavi of Jalalu'ddin, the Yusuf and Zuleika of Jami, and the odes of Ibnu'l 'Arabi and Ibnu'l Farid. We may quote as typical the following lines of Ni'matu'llah of Kisman:

King and beggar are one, are one; foodless and food are one,  
 are one.

We are stricken with grief and drain the dregs; dregs and sorrow  
 and cure are one.

In all the world there is naught but One; talk not of “Two,”  
 for God is One.

Mirrors a hundred thousand I see, but the face of that Giver of  
 Life is One.

We are plagued with the plague of one tall and fair, but we  
 the plagued and the plague are one.

Drop, wave, and sea, and the elements four without a doubt  
 in our eyes are one.

Ni'matu'llah is one in all the world; come seek him out, he is  
 one, is one.”†

And these lines of Jili:

\* Trans. Nicholson in *Eastern Poetry and Prose*, p. 101.

† Trans. E. G. Browne.

I am the existent and the non-existent, and the naughted and the everlasting.

I am the avowed and the imagined and the snake and the charmer.

I am the loosed and the bound, and the wine and the cup-bearer.

I am the treasure, I am poverty, I am my creatures and my Creator.\*

It is true that the genuine mystic often uses language which is practically indistinguishable from that of the Gnostic—as, for instance, the famous stanzas of St. John of the Cross, beginning, "My Beloved is the mountains";† or the words of St. Catherine of Genoa, in which she declares that "my Me is God, nor do I recognize any other Me except my God Himself."‡ But then similarities of expression cover a profound divergence of moral attitude and theological doctrine. Christian mysticism is nothing but the experimental realization and personal appropriation of the new relationship of mankind to God which is involved by the Incarnation. The sacramental economy is not transcended, but becomes the pathway to Reality and the organ of union. The Moslem, however, who is bound to reject the whole concept of Incarnation, has for a discipline of salvation only the strict traditional observance of the religious law. But the mystic necessarily transcends this external discipline, and is thereby left face to face with the Absolute. He is forced to find his own path, to build his own bridge between the world of sense and the world of spirit. Consequently he is driven to create a pseudo-sacramentalism or pan-sacramentalism, in which every created form may serve as a means of access to God, since, as Shabistari says, "Beneath the veil of each atom is hidden the soul-ravishing beauty of the face of the Beloved."

Jami writes:

Sometimes the wine, sometimes the cup, we call Thee.

Sometimes the lure, sometimes the net, we call Thee.

Except Thy name there is not a letter on the tablet of the universe.

Say by what name shall we call Thee?

\* Nicholson: *Studies*, p. 90.

† *The Spiritual Canticle*, stanzas XIV-XV.

‡ Cf. E. I. Watkin: *The Philosophy of Mysticism*, pp. 320 ff, which gives a catena of similar passages.



But it is, above all, in sexual love that the Sufi finds a symbol and sacrament of worship. Omar Ibnu'l Farid writes :

Declare the absoluteness of beauty and be not moved to deem it finite by thy longing for a tinselled gaud;

For the charm of every fair youth or lovely woman is lent to them from Her beauty.

'Twas She that crazed Qays the lover of Lubna; ay and every enamoured man, like Layla's Majnun or 'Azzar's Kutbayyir.

Every one of them passionately desired Her attribute (Absolute Beauty) which She clothed in the form of a beauty which shone forth in a beauty of form.

The loved women and their lovers—'tis no infirm judgement—were manifestations in which we (my Beloved and I) displayed (our attributes of) love and beauty.

Every lover, I am he, and She is every lover's beloved, and all (lovers and loved) are but the names of a vesture,

Names of which I was the object in reality, and 'twas I that was made apparent to myself by means of an invisible soul.

I was ever She, and She was ever I, with no difference; nay, my essence loved my essence,

Though there was nothing in the world except myself beside me, and no thought of besideness occurred to my mind.\*

This erotic symbolism, together with that of wine and intoxication, runs through Sufi literature and has done much to discredit it in Western eyes. No doubt in many cases the use of such imagery is as free from sensuality as it is with the Catholic mystics. But the latter possess a series of safeguards against moral antinomianism which are wholly lacking in Islam. In the hands of a poet like Hafiz, for instance, mystical interpretation is a double-edged weapon which is deliberately used to exalt earthly passion rather than to typify spiritual experience. Yet even here it is not, as some have supposed, a mere literary device. It is a sincere attempt to view earthly love *sub specie aeternitatis*. "For all eternity," he writes, "the perfume of love comes not to him who has not swept with his cheek the dust from the tavern threshold." For Hafiz it is only in love that the transcendent can be realized: "Heart and soul are fixed upon the desire of the Beloved: this at least

\* Nicholson: *Studies*, pp. 222-4.

is, for, if not, heart and soul are naught. Unfortunately the same pan-sacramental theory which inspires this worship of the Beautiful will also serve as a justification for what Père Lammens terms "Rasputinism." Many of the Sufi saints were very queer saints indeed, as we may see from Professor Nicholson's interesting account of the great Persian Shaykh Abu Sa'id Ibn Abi'l Khayr\* (A.D. 967-1049). In his youth he was famous for his severe asceticism,† but in later life he laid aside his penances and spent much of his time with his disciples in feasting and mystical revelry. It is probable that the famous quatrains which bear his name are not his own work, but at least they faithfully reflect his spirit:

Thou bidst me love and midst Thy lovers pine  
Of Sense and Reason stripped this heart of mine;  
Devout and much revered was I, but now  
Toper and gadabout and libertine.‡

His powers as a wonder-worker (which were largely employed in extracting money from wealthy admirers) were only surpassed by his boundless self-exaltation. When a critic asked him why his neck was too big for his collar he replied: "I marvel how there is room for my neck in the seven heavens and earths after all that God has bestowed upon me! (You ask) why I have not performed the Pilgrimage (which is one of the five pillars of Islam incumbent on every believer). Is it so great matter that thou shouldst tread under thy feet a thousand miles of ground in order to visit a stone house? The true man of God sits where he is, and the Bayt al-Ma'mur (the celestial Ka'ba) comes several times in a day and a night to visit him and performs the circumambulation above *his* head. 'Look and see!' All who were present looked and saw it."§

This antinomian attitude is not limited to matters of conduct, it is also applied to the sphere of religious belief. If every created form is a sacrament and a means of access

\* Nicholson: *Studies*, chapter I.

† On one occasion he recited the Koran standing on his head in order to imitate the angels who were said to praise God in this attitude!

‡ Trans. E. G. Browne: *History of Persian Literature*, II, p. 265.

§ Nicholson: *Studies*, p. 62.

to the Beloved, the same is likewise true of the forms of religious revelation. The general principle is laid down in one of the most beautiful of the quatrains attributed to Abu Sa'id:

By whatsoever Path, blessed the Feet  
Which seek Thee; blessed He who strives to meet  
Thy Beauty; blessed they who on it gaze;  
And blessed every tongue which Thee doth greet!\*

And it is developed in detail by all the great later Sufi writers, such as Omar Ibnu'l Farid, Hafiz, Jalalu'ddin Rumi, and Ibnu'l A'rabi.

The last writes:

My heart has become capable of every form: it is a  
Pasture for gazelles and a convent for Christian monks,  
And a temple for idols and the pilgrims Ka'ba and the tables  
of the Tora and the book of the Koran.

I follow the religion of Love: whatever way Love's camels  
take, that is my religion and my faith.†

Elsewhere in "The Bezels of Divine Wisdom" he develops the same idea more systematically:

Those who adore God in the sun behold the sun, and those who adore Him in living things see a living thing, and those who adore Him in lifeless things see a lifeless thing, and those who adore Him as a Being unique and unparalleled see that which has no like. Do not attach yourselves to any particular creed exclusively so that you disbelieve in all the rest; otherwise, you will lose much good, nay, you will fail to recognize the full truth of the matter. God, the omnipresent and omnipotent, is not limited by any one creed, for he says (in the Koran), "Wheresoever ye turn, there is the face of Allah." Everyone praises what he believes; his god is his own creature, and in praising it he praises himself. Consequently he blames the beliefs of others which he would not do if he were just, but his dislike is based on ignorance. If he knew Junayd's saying, "The water takes its colour from the vessel containing it," he would not interfere with other men's beliefs, but would perceive God in every form of belief.‡

Here Sufism has reached its ultimate conclusion. The movement which began as an extreme development of orthodox Islamic pietism ended in a pantheistic universalism which transcended alike religious dogma and moral

\* Trans. E. G. Browne, *op. cit.*, p. 266.

† *Tarjuman al-Ashwaq*: Ode XI, p. 67.

‡ Nicholson: *The Mystics of Islam*, pp. 87-88; cf. *Studies*, 159 and 263-5.

law. In fact, Sufism in its extreme development may be regarded as the most perfect and consistent type of an universalist or undenominational religion which has ever been achieved. It seems paradoxical to suggest that the dancing dervish is a truer undenominationalist than the Liberal Protestant, but it is justified by the fact that his undenominationalism is the direct outcome of his religious experience, whereas in the other case it is an artificial construction. The dervish rejects dogma because of his overpowering realization of the reality of God; the Protestant rejects it because he realizes the importance of man and the inconveniences of sectarianism. It is part of a movement to humanize religion, and in the majority of cases to secularize it—to substitute social “uplift” for the service of God.

In Sufism, however, we see undenominationalism carried out consistently and unflinchingly as a religious movement and not as a secularizing one, and consequently it leads to a purely religious conclusion, to spiritual ecstasy. But it is a sterile ecstasy which no longer fructifies the social life of the Islamic community, as it did in the days of Hasan of Basra, and Rabi’a and al-Hallaj, but which allows the vital sources of spiritual energy to waste away in a nihilistic quietism. It is remarkable that three writers who differ so widely in their general outlook, as Count Gobineau, Père Lammens, and M. Massignon, should all agree in their unfavourable verdict on the social and moral effects of the later Sufism. To Gobineau it is this quietism, this “passive disposition of spirit which surrounds with a nimbus of inert sentiment all conceptions of God, of man, and of the universe . . . that is the running sore of all Oriental countries.” To M. Massignon it is the divorce between social life and mysticism and the degeneration of the latter into a kind of “supernatural opium smoking,” which is, “far more profoundly than all the military and economic factors, the true cause of the present disintegration of the Moslem community” for the salvation of which the early ascetics and mystics had struggled and suffered.”\* It is no doubt due to a confused sense of these dangers that

\* Massignon: *Lexique*, p. 286.

there has been so widespread a reaction against Sufism in modern Islam—a reaction which is represented both by the extreme Puritan traditionalism of the Wahabis, and by the ultra-modernist reform movement in post-war Turkey. The death of the last Grand Tchelebi, the lineal successor of Jalalu'ddin himself, who put an end to his own life after the dissolution of his order, is a tragic symbol of the failure of Sufism to face the harsh realities of existence. Yet the mystical tradition has entered so deeply into the mind of Islam that its disappearance would leave the religious life of the Moslem world disastrously impoverished. For with all its faults and weaknesses the Sufi movement remains one of the great witnesses outside Christianity to the religious need of humanity. The Sufi is like the merchant in the Gospel who found the pearl of great price; he found one truth—the Reality of God and the worthlessness and emptiness of all apart from Him—and for that truth he sacrificed every other. But that truth is so great that it suffices to outweigh a vast amount of speculative error. The Sufi held fast to this, and consequently, in spite of his theoretic monism and pantheism, he preserves, unlike the Western philosophic monist, a genuine religious attitude. The Sufi may reason like a pantheist, but when he prays it is with the humility and adoration of a creature in the presence of his Creator; witness the prayer with which Jami concludes the preface to his *Lawa'ih* :\*

My God, my God! Save us from preoccupation with trifles and show us the realities of things as they are. Withdraw from the eyes of our understanding the veil of heedlessness, and show us everything as it truly is. Display not to us Not-Being in the guise of Being, and place not a veil of Not-Being over the beauty of Being. Make these phenomenal forms a mirror of the effulgence of Thy Beauty, not a cause of veiling and remoteness, and cause these phantasmal pictures to become the means of our knowledge and vision, not a cause of ignorance and blindness. All our deprivation and banishment is from ourselves; leave us not with ourselves, but grant us deliverance from ourselves, and vouchsafe us knowledge of Thyself.

\* Quoted by E. G. Browne in his *History of Persian Literature under Tartar Dominion*.

CHRISTOPHER DAWSON.

#### ART. 4.—MARY WARD

##### *Foundress of the Institute of the Blessed Virgin Mary*

1. *The Life of Mary Ward.* By M. C. Chambers.
2. *The Life of Mary Ward.* By M. M. Salome (I.B.V.M.).

MARY WARD was the eldest child of Marmaduke Ward, lord of Mulwith, Givendale and Newby, and was born in 1585. We have many sources of information concerning her life, the most interesting of which is her autobiography, which reflects, as do all her writings, her own characteristic simplicity. Her letters, 132 of which have come down to us, are astonishingly modern in their directness, quite unlike the highly ornamented epistles of her century. Her notes of meditations and resolutions go so straight to the heart of the matter that their genuineness is felt.

Looking back upon her childhood, she accuses herself of little subterfuges which shame her adult mind. As a baby of five at Ploughland Hall, she gave up her cherished chickens and her much prized pence to her grandmother for the poor prisoners, but it was to be praised, she says, and to gain her grandmother's esteem! "When my Grandmother commanded me to pray, I sat in the place, but spent my time in sports. Yet wanted I not wit to seek cunningly to have my own will oft times by others and to excuse it, sometimes in overt or otherwise." One day, playing in her father's room with another child, she repeated aloud her little companion's oath, hoping her father would hear her and understand her horror at such swearing, for she well knew that of all vices he hated profanity the most. Marmaduke was writing, but Mary's clear shrill tones reached his ear. Thinking she had sworn, he strode across to where she stood, and without enquiry "with great choler, corrected her himself." "Afterwards he heard me speak," she adds pathetically.

She was a lonely child, weaned from mere natural affections from her earliest years. Her father's love of her was beyond that given to the other little ones, and he

made constant sacrifices for her good. Times were bad, persecution raging. To escape monthly fines for non-attendance at church, Marmaduke left his beautiful Yorkshire estates and travelled with his family out of the reach of Lord Huntingdon's cruel zeal. Mary was delicate, and he dared not risk the bleak cold of Northumberland for her. Most of her childish years and early youth were spent therefore away from her parents and little brothers and sisters, without the love which makes all the difference in the heart of a child. Five years were passed in Ploughland with that staunch confessor of the Faith, her grandmother, Mrs. Wright; another period at Harewell Hall, where she made her first Holy Communion. Then from her fourteenth year to her coming of age, she lived with her cousins, the Babthorpes of Hemingborough. Whenever possible, it is true, her father fetched her home to Mulwith and Newby and surrounded her with greatest love, but these holidays were short and troubled, and the frequent partings a sore trial.

That the child was highly educated is a fact that might puzzle anyone who knows how low was the ebb of women's education in general. It was usually thought sufficient for girls to know how to read, write, spin, and cook. But Mary's education was not pursued on general lines. From their earliest years Marmaduke himself instructed his children in their Faith so thoroughly that, when they visited Protestant neighbours, they were able to hold their own. Her grandmother, before Mary was ten, had her taught the rudiments of Latin and Italian, in which languages she later became so proficient as to be able to write them fluently and to read the writings of the Fathers of the Church. Better still, the saintly Mrs. Wright "was a great prayer," and Mary learnt from her to recite daily the Little Office of our Lady, the Litany of Loreto, the whole rosary, and many other prayers, which she continued throughout her life. But of all the households she frequented, she loved Babthorpe best, for there they lived as in a religious family, beginning the day with two Masses, notwithstanding the risk, followed by daily meditation, afternoon matins, "litanies at 9, and so to bed."



It was at Babthorpe that her soul expanded, her mind was enlightened. She saw her defects and set to work to root them out. To her family pride she opposed self-humiliation. With mop and pail, turned-up sleeves and an apron, she passed through the grand old Hall when her uncle and cousins and their guests were setting out for the hunt, and often enough she played her part so well that she was mistaken for a servant at work. Her healthy appetite she curtailed by abstinence and fasting; she denied herself all country sports, and spent her time praying and reading the Lives of the Saints, especially those of Martyrs, until she longed to die a martyr's death. "My favourite thoughts were how and when," she writes. With her little cousin Barbara, she used to take her work to the sewing room where old Margaret Garrett, the Sacristan, presided, and from her she learnt stories of olden times, when chosen souls could retire to convents in England, and give themselves up entirely to God.

Between the ages of fifteen and sixteen, Mary tells us in her autobiography, our Lord inspired her with a desire for religious life in general, for "I had no inclination to any order in particular. My loving Lord did so touch my heart with a longing to dedicate myself to His divine service, as that I do not remember since, any one moment in which I had not rather have suffered death than betake myself to a worldly life." Eligible offers of marriage had been made since Mary's tenth year, and these are almost humorously depicted—the discomfort of the suitor being so apparent—in the priceless heirloom, known as "The Painted Life," that has come down the centuries to the Institute. But to none after childhood did Mary give a thought.

A lovely child, the Servant of God grew to lovely womanhood; "exquisitely beautiful," one biographer says. When, therefore, she asked her father's leave to cross the seas and follow her vocation, it is hardly wonderful, considering his love for her, that he should peremptorily forbid her. It was only after what was looked upon as a miraculous intervention of Providence that he, following her confessor's advice, left her free to follow the divine call.

And she followed it immediately. Her vocation was to religion in general, with a leaning towards the most austere and secluded, for, "I would do in earnest what I did," she says, "believing that women did not know how to do good except to themselves, a penuriousness which I resented even there." Strange vicissitudes were in store for this young exile. Even before she embarked on her first sea voyage, she wrote later: "A great obscurity darkened my mind and doubts rose up within me, as to where and in what religious order I should have to remain, and in this darkness and disquiet of soul I passed the sea and arrived at St. Omer." The presage of trials to come was a merciful preparation. Her young soul had already tasted the delights of contemplation and holy solitude, and she hungered for more. Instead the divine Spirit led her into the market-place to be jostled by the crowd. The confessor, to whom she brought letters of recommendation, told her authoritatively that her vocation was to join the outsisters of the Poor Clares. Their life differed only outwardly from that of the enclosed, he said; they had besides the inestimable benefit of a state of greater humility and mortification; such a life was undoubtedly God's will for her. Though, as she confided to one of her first companions, she felt so great a repugnance to this form of life that she would rather have been thrown into a cauldron of boiling oil, she determined "to embrace it with all affection as the will of God, which *only, only* I desired."

So an outsister she became and tramped the streets of St. Omer, its by-ways and water-ways, a basket on her arm, begging from door to door for food for her cloistered sisters. For nearly a year she made her rounds, which lasted all day throughout the seasons, with little time for prayer and none for seclusion, until she learnt the lesson God was teaching her, humility gained by humiliation. Then, with His all-powerful Voice, He freed her from her place of trial and set her another task.

A convent of Poor Clares was needed. English ladies came in numbers to seek religious life abroad, and often found great difficulty in gaining admittance to convents

and still greater in conforming to foreign customs. Mary thus summarizes this work of hers: "For that work God knows I did little, but His divine Majesty supplied all my deficiencies in such a manner that in the space of two years, a little more, or less, a convenient site was found, a spacious monastery and church built, English nuns of that order taken out of other monasteries to preside in it, and persons of fitting qualities and talents admitted to probation." For nearly a year Mary with great fervour followed the austere life of a Poor Clare. But half a year before profession a new light flooded her soul, which after being tested by six months of redoubled austerities she was allowed to follow. The calm life of a Poor Clare was not for her, "but some other good thing was what God willed."

Once more she trod the streets of St. Omer in secular dress. She had learnt the second lesson in the school of prayer, seclusion and austerity, and was thus brought further on her way towards the goal that awaited her.

Being in England in 1609, whither her zeal for the souls of her countrymen had called her, casually almost, passing in and out of the houses of friends and relations, Mary attracted to her girls of her own rank and age. Five of the choicest of these determined to throw in their lot with her and quit home and country. With characteristic promptitude, Mary and her companions crossed the seas together. A house was bought at St. Omer, which soon filled with elect souls, and became a joy to the saintly Bishop Blaise, whose letters of high praise have come down to us. "The holy spirit of God entirely possessed this house as His own and richly endowed it with heavenly love." "Their course of life was a model of the choicest virtues and perfection." Zeal for her own soul no longer sufficed the Servant of God. She had seen noble women in England braving prison and death for their faith. Such as these would surely be capable of active life in the midst of dangers, without losing their union with God, and for such as these the world cried aloud. The boys of England found shelter and education in colleges at St. Omer and elsewhere; but for the girls, who was responsible? One answer at least was Mary Ward's house in the Grosse Rue.

There is no lack of testimony as to the benefits conferred. "Amongst other goods which they did the public . . . was the education of youth . . . who were taught gratis the sciences fitting our sex and all that became good Christians and worthy women. The English in regard to the distance lived wholly under their care, tabled," etc. In an old town chronicle we read: "Si a une des dites maisons qui est remplie de jeunes filles Anglaises, s'y retrouvent illet de trente à quarante les quelles vivent aussi sous quelque forme de vie monastique s'exerçant en toutes sortes d'austerité et macération de corps, combien qu'elles fussent des corps délicates et belles en perfection comme Anglaises."

Lest the mention of "macération de corps" should inspire fear, it must be stated that, though true to the letter at the time, it was never intended to be kept up permanently. The brave little band at Mary's suggestion led lives of great austerity, notwithstanding their activity for their neighbour, in order to bring down God's blessing upon their work, with light to know distinctly God's will in their regard. No one who saw the demeanour of the "English ladies" in the streets and at church, their dress so suggestive of religious, could doubt but that they were souls set apart; all who visited them were touched at their winning kindness and their easiness of access. Then friends asked, since they went so far in religious life, why did they not go further and adopt one of the many approved rules. Mary's answer always was, "They are not such as God would have." She was held in suspense waiting for a sign.

And the sign came. In 1611, the Servant of God tells us, "I fell sick in great extremity . . . being alone in some extraordinary repose of mind, I heard distinctly, not by sound of voice, but intellectually understood, these words: 'Take the same of the Society' [S.J.]. These few words gave so great measure of light in that particular Institute, comfort and strength, and changed so the whole soul, as that impossible for me to doubt but that they came from Him, whose words are works." Out of darkness into brilliant light—such was the effect on Mary's

mind. "All was to her as already done," she used to say; "as often as she opened her eyes, she did as it were visibly see it."

What then did the words mean? In a Latin memorial drawn up for presentation to the Holy See, after great labour and suffering, Mary states that the two great ends to be kept in view by those entering her Institute are their own perfection and the salvation of their neighbour; therefore a continual study to acquire virtue by total abnegation of self, and for their neighbour to engage in the education of girls and any other means judged suitable to work for the Church.

How simple to us living in the twentieth century does such a rule appear! We know it entails non-enclosure and in this case a Superior General. The world is peopled with such congregations. But in those days religious women (with few exceptions) were supposed to be able to do good to themselves alone; enclosure was strictly obligatory and never more insisted on than in Mary Ward's lifetime. Hence there came opposition from all sides, ecclesiastical and lay, secular and regular. Some of the opposers were holy men honestly fearful of dangerous innovations; others were influenced by passion and jealousy, and these were keen and unscrupulous. This is no place to dwell upon the calumnies and misrepresentations and vicissitudes of all kinds that brought about the suppression of Mary's first Institute. Nor is there space to dwell on her gallant endeavour to save it, her labour and sufferings illustrating well her resolve, "There shall be no let or hindrance in me." Suffice to say that the long deliberations of the Congregation of Cardinals appointed to investigate the case found approbation inexpedient, and Urban VIII in 1631 published a Bull of Suppression. Mary, unknown to him, was hurried off to prison as "a heretic, schismatic and rebel."

Thus far her enemies triumphed. Mary's work was shattered. Eleven houses founded in Flanders, Italy, Germany, and England with incredible toil and sacrifice, and all equipped with flourishing schools, were closed, their members dispersed. It was a severe blow and dealt

severely. Mary had been in all her undertakings frank and straight. She had taken no step without ecclesiastical authority. The whole aim of her life was God's glory and the good of souls. To be branded as a heretic—a terrible word in those days—was striking in the quick. With something like fear one turns to look at the Servant of God. How was she bearing her cross? Ample testimony remains in many biographies. "Nor was there seen in her the least alteration in her peace when by the Bull she beheld the ruin of her labours past, the loss of so many houses, and so many souls running the risk of perdition. Only conformity to the divine will could have made her, without the slightest disturb, sadness, or least unquiet, rise above the total destruction of her work of nearly thirty years, both spiritual and temporal." So undaunted was she by failure, so certain of God's will, that she set out again for Rome, presented herself to the Holy Father, and began again! With Urban's permission and blessing, she gathered about her in the Eternal City the scattered members, bought a house on the Esquiline, and once more busied herself with the education of children.

In 1633 a full exculpation of the "Lady Donna Maria Della Guardia" and her English companions was issued by the Holy Office and sent to the Nuncio of Cologne, in which it is stated that the said ladies "are not found, nor ever have been found, guilty of any failure which regards the holy and orthodox Catholic Faith." The house in Rome continued to do excellent work until about 1703, the year Clement XI approved the Rules of the Institute. Mary's foundation in England is represented by the Bar Convent, York, founded in 1686. The house in Munich, fostered by the Electors of Bavaria and presided over by highly educated women, lasted down to the Secularization in 1809, and was restored again after a few years in the present flourishing house of Nymphenburg-Munich. The Institute now counts more than 228 houses and 7,000 members, and is found all over the world, and will, we may humbly hope, fulfil Fr. Roger Lee, Mary's saintly confessor's last wish: "I hope you will continue to the Day of Judgement and that many thousands will profit by you."



Mary Ward closed her wonderful life in the January of 1645. And she closed it wonderfully. Twenty-four hours before her death, she noticed the sad faces of her dearly loved ones around her bed; their tears were falling fast. "O fie, fie! What! look so sad," she said. "Come, let us rather sing and praise God joyfully for all His infinite loving kindness." She intoned a hymn they often sang, and together they sang it to the end. When the morning of the last day dawned, she drew each sister into her arms and kissed her tenderly. "Then seemed to mind us no more, but made sweet interior acts." Saying the holy name of Jesus three times, she bowed her head in death. It was January 30, 1645. As her sorrowing children laid her to rest in the little village church of Osbaldwick, near York, with no priest to read the beautiful prayers over the holy remains, a cry went up from the rustic folk standing round, "There never was such a woman, no, never."

And now her grateful children are earnestly praying that at last God may glorify one who has glorified Him so much and will raise to the altars His humble servant Mary Ward. The Cause for Beatification has begun and is proceeding step by step. All lovers of England, for whose conversion she suffered so much, and all lovers of education and of every active work done by religious, are asked to join in prayer that more and more miracles may be soon vouchsafed.

M. M. SALOME.



ART. 5.—THE "CONGREGATIO DE AUXILIIS"

AT the end of the sixteenth century a Congregation was convened by Pope Clement VIII for the deciding of a theological dispute on grace that had arisen between the Dominicans and the Jesuits. This famous Congregation lasted for over nine years; the first session under the presidency of Cardinal Madrucci took place on January 2, 1598, and the last session under the presidency of Paul V on March 8, 1607.

Neither the doctrine of the Dominicans nor that of the Jesuits was ultimately defined as the true doctrine of the Church; both parties therefore are allowed to teach their respective doctrines.

To give an account of the origins of the dispute would be impossible in the space allotted to an article in a Review. All we can hope to do is to put before the reader briefly the following points: (1) A word concerning the Histories written on the Congregation; (2) the precise point discussed by the most eminent theologians of both sides in the presence of Clement VIII and Paul V; (3) the outcome of the discussions, and the attitude of Clement VIII and, after him, of Paul V; (4) concerning the Bull or Constitution of Paul V.

I

HISTORIES OF THE CONGREGATION

The first history of the *Congregatio de Auxiliis* was written by Hyacinth Serry, O.P. (under the pseudonym of Augustin Le Blanc), and published at Louvain in 1700. In reply to this a history was written by Livinus de Meyer, S.J. (under the pseudonym of Theodorus Eleutherius), and published at Antwerp, 1705. Serry replied to this by adding to the four books of his *Historia* a fifth book, in which he refuted the errors of de Meyer and vindicated the truth of his own history. No history of any note has been written since that time, but De Scoraille, S.J., and

Astrain, S.J., have written on the subject, but they have added nothing of note to the histories aforementioned, except the endeavour to interpret documents in favour of Molinism.\*

Von Pastor, in his latest volumes of the *History of the Popes*, has added nothing new of importance to the histories already written, but he has made certain serious omissions which are unworthy of an impartial historian. But of this later.

An important point to be remembered is that of all the above writers Serry alone has had access to the authentic documents preserved in the Vatican Secret Archives, from which alone a true history can be written.† De Meyer, Scoraille, Astrain, and von Pastor have all had to go to Serry's *Historia* for these documents, and until the Secret Archives of the Vatican library are thrown open to the public, all historians must perforce go to Serry if they wish to study these documents.‡ Recently there has been an endeavour to show that Serry's *Historia* is untrustworthy and therefore to be discredited; but this recent attack, we hope, has been refuted.§

Among other important documents from which Serry has drawn a great deal of his matter are the *Acta* of Coronel, the first secretary of the Congregation. These *Acta*, in the form of a diary, fill two massive volumes in quarto, and are preserved intact in the Bibliotheca Angelica of the Augustinians in Rome; to this document all have access. Much has been done to discredit the authority of Coronel because his diary militates so strongly against the Jesuit doctrine: even recently,|| in order to belittle Coronel's authority, it was asserted he was not secretary of the Congregation, but only of the Board of Theologians. This

\* This, of course, they are at perfect liberty to do. But they can never disguise the fact that in the documents they use, Molina was condemned four times by the Board of Theologians which was deputed to examine his doctrine.

† Serry, O.P., the friend of several cardinals, was in particular the personal friend of Cardinal Casanate, the Vatican Librarian, who allowed him free access to these authentic documents for the purpose of writing his *Historia*. Since Serry's day no one has had this privilege.

‡ Serry at last refused to discuss any further with de Meyer because the latter would not use the authentic documents as the basis of discussion.

§ Cf. *Blackfriars*, July, 1928.

|| Cf. *Blackfriars*, June, 1928, p. 374, note.

is a serious error.\* To all the other documents to which Serry had recourse everyone has access, except to the original Diary of Pegna, which was most unfortunately destroyed by a malicious hand; fortunately, however, a copy of the diary had already been made.†

It may be correctly inferred that Serry copied the documents in the Vatican Archives faithfully, seeing that his quotations from the *Acta* of Coronel are accurate, word for word, as anybody can attest if he will only take the trouble to make the comparison. We therefore take Serry's *Historia* as the trustworthy source of what we write in these pages.

## II

### THE PRECISE POINT DISCUSSED IN THE "CONGREGATIO DE AUXILIIS"

We shall now endeavour to make clear the precise point of theology concerning grace which was the cause of the endless discussions held during the Congregation, assembled by Clement VIII, and after him by Paul V.

The crucial point of the whole controversy was the reconciliation of the efficacy of grace with human freedom. We know that the efficacious grace given for the performance of an action obtains infallibly man's consent and

\* (a) Serry (*Historia*, Preface, paragraph 8, *De Gregorio Coronello*) says Coronel was instituted secretary of the *Congregatio de Auxiliis* by Clement VIII.

(b) It is proved from the title-page of Coronel's own manuscripts in his own handwriting: "Acta Congreg. . . . collecta a F. Greg. Nun. Coronel, Lusitano, ordinis S. Aug. professore, et ejusdem Congregationis Secretario, etc."

(c) Keller, O.S.A. (*Kirchenlexikon*, III, 1104-5), states that Clement VIII, whose confessor Coronel was, appointed him first secretary and a consultor of the *Congregatio de Auxiliis*. Keller also records the fact that Paul V offered the sees of Civita Castellana and of Orta to Coronel, and that he modestly declined them. If Coronel had not discharged his duty of secretary satisfactorily, he would not have been offered one bishopric, let alone two.

(d) Abert, O.S.A. (*Kirchliches Handlexikon*, I, 993), states that Coronel was secretary of the Congreg. and as such drew up the censures of Molina's propositions.

(e) Palmieri, O.S.A. (*Dict. de la Théologie Cath.*, III, 1866), says: "Il fut nommé par Clement VIII, secrétaire de la *Congregatio de Auxiliis*."

† See Serry, *Historia*, Preface, under "Pegna."

that the action takes place. On the other hand, it is certain that in so acting man is free. Hence the difficulty: how can these two things—the infallible result and liberty—be harmonized?

Calvinists asserted that if an efficacious grace were given (e.g., for conversion) man was of necessity converted, so that his will was not free. Diametrically opposed to this stood the Pelagians, who denied grace altogether, asserting that without grace man by his own free-will could convert himself. But certain others, the semi-Pelagians, forced to admit the existence of grace, asserted that the beginning of man's conversion was due to grace, in the sense that man's consent to grace and perseverance therein was due to man's free-will alone.

These three opinions are heretical and condemned by the Church. Hence both Dominicans and Jesuits in formulating theories of efficacious grace had to avoid the pitfalls into which the above-mentioned heretics fell.

The Dominicans, following in the footsteps of their masters, St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas,\* solved the difficulty by their theory of physical premotion whereby God determines man to determine himself freely to a supernatural act. In their theory efficacious grace (which infallibly obtains the result for which it is given) is of itself, or *intrinsically*, efficacious. This is the old and traditional doctrine.

The Jesuits, in the footsteps of their master Molina,† endeavoured to solve the difficulty by inventing a new theory called the *Scientia Media*, whereby it was urged God knows what a man under any circumstances in which he might be placed would do. Forseeing, for instance, by the *Scientia Media* that a man would correspond freely with grace A, and that he freely would not correspond with grace B, God, desirous of man's conversion, gives him grace A.

Whence therefore arises the efficacy of the grace? If Peter is given the efficacious grace for conversion, he is infallibly converted: must we say Peter's conversion was

\* Whence Dominicans and all who follow their doctrine are called Thomists.

† Whence Jesuits and all who follow their doctrine are called Molinists.

the infallible result of the grace itself, or that he was converted because he *consented* to the grace? There is the greatest difference between these two things: in the first case the grace *of itself* is efficacious, but in the second case the grace *becomes* efficacious by Peter's consent. In short grace in the first case is *intrinsically* efficacious or of its very nature so; in the second case it is *extrinsically* efficacious because it is by something extrinsic to the grace itself—namely, Peter's consent—that makes it efficacious. The first answer is that of St. Thomas and of all Thomists, the second that of Molina and his followers.

At first sight it would seem as though the Dominican doctrine approached to that of Calvinism,\* and on the other hand it would seem as though the Jesuit doctrine approached to that of Pelagianism or at least to that of semi-Pelagianism. Hence the dispute!

It is not difficult to see that at the root of the whole matter lies what has been called the ethical difficulty. The Dominicans teach that the divine action upon the will is so powerful and yet so sweet that grace does not destroy the nature of the will, but perfects it, moving it in accordance with its nature—that is, premoving it to determine itself freely. So that grace, intrinsically efficacious, effects that the will determines itself freely to the act of consent in such wise that these two things, "given efficacious grace" and "man *actually* dissents," are inconceivable; but these two things, "given efficacious grace" and "man is able to dissent," are compatible. Since therefore efficacious grace by which God moves the free-will to consent does not take away the will's power to dissent if it so wills, but effects that the will (while retaining the power to dissent, yet does not dissent) infallibly consents, the free-will is in no way prejudiced, but rather is its liberty perfected and strengthened.

For the Molinists such doctrine is subversive of free-will. Hence they teach that efficacious grace is not *of itself* or *intrinsically* efficacious, but that of itself it is *indifferent* as

\* Recently, Fr. Masterson, S.J., in the *June Month*, 1928, so explained the Thomist doctrine that there was no difference except in words between it and Calvinism. Needless to say, every Dominican theologian repudiates Fr. Masterson's précis of the Thomist doctrine.

regards consent and dissent: if the free-will consents, the grace is said to be efficacious; if it dissents, the grace remains merely sufficient.

It is evident that the Dominican doctrine safeguards the universal causality of God, since it teaches that God *pre-moves* the will as a free instrument to produce an act; on the other hand, the Jesuits claim to safeguard the same truth by teaching that God "simultaneously concurs" with the free-will to produce the act. In the first case God is *behind* the will, in the second case He is *alongside* the will; just as a billiard cue is *behind* moving the billiard ball, and two men pulling a load, one *alongside* of, and concurring simultaneously with, the other to move the load.

If only Thomists and Molinists could agree on the definition of liberty, there would be no dispute as to the nature of efficacious grace.

At first sight it would seem that the freedom of the will demands that it is master of its own choice in such wise that it is the *first* principle of its own choice. Those who say this beg the whole question. Can any reason be given that the free-will is such a principle? None whatever. To define free-will thus is to define it *a priori*; and Dominicans defy anyone to demonstrate from any part of philosophy that such is the true definition of liberty. Freedom of the will must be defined *a posteriori*—that is, in accordance with principles firmly laid down in metaphysics—namely, that there is a real distinction between *act* and *potency*: that what is in potency can never pass to act unless it be reduced to act by an agent already in act (that is, by one who already possesses the perfection which it gives to another according to the axiom: *nemo dat quod non habet*).

Indeed, the principal argument for the Thomist doctrine on efficacious grace is none other than the first argument of St. Thomas for the existence of God *ex motu*, a conclusion drawn from the aforementioned irrefragible principles.\* Now, mindful of these metaphysical principles, St. Thomas defines the freedom of the will dependently upon them and not, as do the Jesuits, independently of

\* It is not therefore surprising that Suarez, S.J., did his utmost to try to prove this argument was invalid!

them. "Freedom," says Fr. Joyce, S.J.,\* "consists essentially in the power of self-determination. To assert that the choices of the will are predetermined by a higher cause appears to be wholly irreconcilable with freedom." Hence, according to this, it is the essence of freedom that its immediate cause, the created will, determines itself to this or that independently of God. Now this *a priori* definition of free-will can be established neither by experience nor by reason. Further, it is based upon a manifest *petitio principii*, and Thomists protest against it in the name of the universal and transcendent supereminence of the Divine Causality.

No argument from reason has ever been, nor can be, put forward to show that the will is the *first* principle of its choices, but an unphilosophical method of introspection has apparently led many astray. Consciousness perceives only this—namely, that we are the *immediate principles* of our determinations or choices. Far from denying this, Thomists insistently assert that divine grace *makes us determine ourselves to this or that*; but they firmly deny that we are the *first principles* of our choices. Now, as to this last point, consciousness tells us nothing, nor can it tell us anything; just as it tells us nothing concerning our conservation in being, whereby God, without ceasing, communicates existence to us. Could it therefore be said that we conserve ourselves in existence independently of God?

If we turn to reason we arrive at this, the only logical conclusion: no creature *in its acts* can escape the efficient causality of the Prime Mover.

Strictly speaking, therefore, there is no ethical difficulty except for him who defines the freedom of the will *a priori*: and if it is not possible to square an *a priori* definition of free-will with metaphysics, the only logical attitude is to suspect that definition of free-will.

Further, in accordance with the scholastic adage "a thing is perfect in so far as it is in act" (*unumquodque est perfectum in quantum est in actu*), it is clear that the free-will attains its perfection when it is *actually* willing; *before* it is actually choosing, it is in a state of imperfection

\* *Natural Theology*, p. 553; for criticism see *Blackfriars*, January, 1924.



according to the axiom "a thing is imperfect in so far as it is in potency" (*unumquodque est imperfectum in quantum est in potentia*). In order therefore to understand in what precisely the essence of freedom consists, we must have recourse to that state of the will in which it is *in act*—that is, in its state of perfection and not to that state in which it is imperfect, or in the state of potency, or *before* it acts.

All agree that free-will must consist in an indifference with regard to two things (at least in regard of *to act and not to act*); then, when the free-will is in its state of perfection—that is, *while it is acting*—it must also consist in the aforesaid indifference. In other words, freedom must consist in this: that during an actual choice, *the will must retain the power to do the opposite*. This is what Dominicans teach; whereas the Jesuits make freedom to consist in the aforesaid indifference *before* the will acts, and refuse to acknowledge any indifference in the will *while* it is acting, whence for them the will while acting *does not retain the power to do the opposite*. The actual choice therefore in the Jesuit teaching cannot be intrinsically free, but is only said to be free by an extrinsic denomination in so far as *before* the choice (and therefore extrinsic to *during* the choice) the will was free. Dominicans therefore define free-will by a consideration of the free-will in its state of perfection or *whilst* it is actually choosing; whereas Jesuits attempt to define free-will by a consideration of the free-will in its state of imperfection or *before* it chooses.

Wherefore the Dominican doctrine on grace and free-will comes to this: given an efficacious grace for consent, the will premoved by that divine motion actually determines itself to consent, infallibly, and could not *actually* dissent; but while actually consenting it is free because it retains the *power* to do the opposite. It would be just as impossible for the will actually to dissent, given the divine motion to consent, as it would be for a man actually to sit down while he is standing up; and yet *while* a man is standing up he still retains the *power* to sit down.\*

God, in His operations *ad extra*, is free; He must there-

\* This is the famous distinction between *sensus compositus* and *sensus divisus*, which is essential to an understanding of the Thomist doctrine.

fore still retain the power to do the opposite of what He actually does, although His acts are eternal, unchangeable, and irrevocable. If God does not retain the power to do the opposite of what He actually does, He would not be a free agent, but a necessary one. God's freedom therefore has its possible explanation in the Thomistic doctrine of free-will; but in the Jesuit theory God's free-will would appear wholly inexplicable, since it is impossible to conceive of an instant *before* God acts *ad extra*, in which instant His will was indifferent in regard of *to act* or *not to act*. Therefore the Jesuit doctrine, forced to its last extremes, seems a denial of the Divine freedom.

### III

#### THE OUTCOME OF THE DISCUSSIONS HELD IN THE "CONGREGATIO DE AUXILIIS"

The doctrine of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, on the intrinsic efficacy of divine grace, was attacked by Luis de Molina, S.J., in 1588 in a book called the *Concordia*. Owing to the influence of his master Fonseca, S.J., Molina put forward a new theory in the endeavour to explain more easily the freedom of the will under grace. Looking upon his new theory as heavenly inspired, Molina even goes so far as to say that if only St. Augustine and St. Thomas had known this theory they would gladly have embraced it!

This doctrine of Molina embodied in the *Concordia* was condemned by the Spanish Inquisition, and was eventually delated to Rome. So intense became the dispute between Dominicans and Jesuits that Clement VIII decided to have the matter thrashed out at Rome. To this effect he convened what is known as the *Congregatio de Auxiliis* for a minute examination of the new doctrine put forward by Molina. A special board of theologians, with Cardinal Madrucci as president, was appointed by the Holy Father to examine the *Concordia* and to pronounce upon it. After the first examination the Board of Theologians condemned the doctrine and besought the Holy Father to issue a Papal

definition. But so great was the outcry among the Molinists that Clement ordered another examination, and again the Board of Theologians condemned the doctrine. Owing to further remonstrances of the Molinists, and seeing that Cardinal Madrucci had died, Clement decided to have another examination made in his own presence, and commanded eminent Dominican and Jesuit theologians to discuss the whole matter before him. The first debate took place on March 19, 1602; the Pope himself presided, with Cardinals Borghese (afterwards Paul V) and Arrigone assisting. There were sixty-eight sessions in all under the presidency of Clement. After this third examination of the *Concordia*, its doctrine was summarily set forth in twenty propositions. Of the bishops who were on the Board of Theologians, all signed the condemnation; of the remaining theologians, all did likewise except two—Antonius Bovius, who was formerly a member of the Society, and always held Molina's doctrine to be probable, and Joannes Baptista Plumbinus, who formerly held the doctrine to be Pelagian, but had changed his opinion. The propositions with the appended condemnatory censure duly signed were handed to Clement VIII on October 12, 1600, and the Holy Father discoursed for more than three hours on the *intrinsic* efficacy of divine grace, demonstrating this from Holy Scripture, from the Councils, from St. Augustine and from St. Thomas.

Foreseeing the formal condemnation of Molina by the Holy See, his followers did their utmost to avert the disaster. They filled the Roman Curia with the cry that a condemnation was most unjust, that the doctrine of the Society was misunderstood by the examiners, that not sufficient opportunity had been granted them to defend the doctrine, etc. Further, in order to delay or prevent altogether a formal condemnation, the Molinists spread abroad that a General Council was necessary to settle the matter. Finding that Cardinal Bellarmine (now Blessed Robert) was also with his brother Jesuits spreading abroad the last rumour, Clement summoned the Cardinal to his presence, and, taking a volume of St. Augustine,\* read to Bellarmine

\* *Ad Bonifacium*, Lib. IV, number 34.

a passage from the last chapter, showing how the Pelagians had used exactly the same arts as Bellarmine and his brethren were now employing in order to escape a definition of the Supreme Pontiff.\*

That Clement VIII had made up his mind and was fully determined to condemn Molina is therefore certain. But fortunately for Molina, Clement died on March 5, 1605, before launching the condemnation.

After the brief reign of Leo XI, Paul V became Pope. Scarcely had Paul V become Pope than he determined to put an end to the controversy. In order therefore to silence the clamours of the Molinists, he instituted yet another enquiry. After further disputations between Dominican and Jesuit theologians in the presence of Paul V, once again Molina's doctrine was condemned by the Board of Theologians. In all, in the presence of Clement VIII, and after him of Paul V, there were eighty-five conferences, and during the assembly of the Congregation there were four minute examinations of Molina's doctrine, and four times it was condemned by the Board of Theologians.

At the end of the discussions Paul V deliberated on the formal condemnation of Molina's doctrine by the Holy See, and with this end in view he called the Cardinals together on March 8, 1606.

Twelve Cardinals came to the assembly in obedience to the command; of the remaining two, one was lately dead and the other was sick of a fever. The Pope asked whether for the good of the Church the controversy should be ended by a Papal definition.† Ten of the Cardinals agreed; two,

\* See Serry, *Historia*, Col. 270. Clement said there was no reason whatsoever to call such a Council, for the simple reason that there was question not of condemning a new heresy but of reaffirming the condemnation of an old one reborn. Moreover, Bellarmine himself (*De Concil.*, Lib. I, cap. x), quoting St. Augustine, says that to suppress the Arian heresy a General Council was necessary, but not to suppress the Pelagian heresy. If this is so, then why, in Bellarmine's mind, should a General Council be necessary in order to condemn Molinism, since, it was averred, it was Pelagianism reborn?

† There was no question of calling a General Council, nor did the Molinists again put forward such a plea. Paul V intended to define the matter on his own authority as the Supreme Pontiff, just as Clement VIII had intended to do. Von Pastor should have remembered this before giving his support to Bellarmine that the *Congregatio de Auxiliis* was neither the normal nor the suitable method to employ.

Bellarmino and du Perron, replied in the negative—the latter in accordance with the wish of Henry IV of France, who had espoused the cause of Molina; the former out of his love for, and obedience to, the Society. Seeing that the decision in favour of a Papal definition was practically unanimous, Paul V gave orders to the Consultors to draw up a specimen of a Bull, giving particulars in his own writing as to the manner of procedure.\* A specimen of the Bull was duly drawn up and approved by His Holiness.†

As a matter of fact, the Bull was neither signed nor promulgated by Paul V, owing to a serious political situation that had arisen. When the Molinist cause was at the very nadir of its fortunes, the gravest trouble occurred between the Holy See and the Republic of Venice. The Republic had forbidden the construction of any ecclesiastical edifice or hospital without special license from its own authorities; it forbade the founding of any new religious society without its special sanction; it forbade the bequeathing or the selling of properties to ecclesiastics for more than two years, etc.; it threw ecclesiastics into prison without having recourse to an ecclesiastical court, etc. Seeing his rights thus violated, Paul V put the Republic under an interdict. The Jesuits most loyally defended the rights of the Holy See, and in consequence were banished from the Republic. The trouble grew worse; Princes began to take sides and to prepare for war, and endless trouble would have ensued had not Henry IV of France interceded. By the ministrations of two Cardinals in his service, one at Venice and the other at Rome, Henry succeeded in throwing oil on the troubled waters. Conditions of peace were at length drawn up, of which one (most desired by Paul V) was that the Jesuits should be recalled and reinstated in Venice. This condition the Republic flatly refused to grant at any cost. At length, after many negotiations, the Holy Father had perforce to forego this condition, and eventually peace was established on April 1, 1607.

\* This rescript of Paul V is to be seen in the *Acta* of Coronel, principal secretary of the *Congregatio de Auxiliis*.

† The specimen of the Bull is given *in extenso* in Serry's *Historia*, Appendix, pp. 155-175.

Immediately Cardinal du Perron (acting on behalf of Henry IV to avert Molina's condemnation) seized the golden opportunity of averting the meditated condemnation of the Society's doctrine. He pictured to the Holy Father the noble stand the Jesuits had taken up in defence of his rights: he insisted on the wishes of Henry IV, who had espoused their cause, and by whose timely intervention in the recent trouble much misery had been averted from the Church; he insinuated into the mind of the Holy Father how ungrateful and cruel it would be to add to their present affliction by solemnly condemning their doctrines.

That du Perron's good offices on behalf of the Society influenced the Pope is certain, for on August 28, 1607, Paul V called the Cardinals together once more and asked them whether they thought it better, seeing what unforeseen turn events had taken,\* to defer the condemnation of Molina. All the Cardinals, with the exception of Asculano, a Dominican, voted that the condemnation of Molina should be deferred to a later date. Paul V therefore decided to put off the Papal definition to some future date. On September 5, 1607, he issued a decree to both Dominicans and Jesuits, commanding both parties to return to their homes, allowing them, in the meantime, to defend their respective doctrines, enjoining each to refrain from censuring the other's doctrine, and commanding them to await the Papal decision. To this day that decision has never been promulgated, which is unfortunate for the Molinists, because their cause is still *sub judice*.

However, the outcome of the disputations proved such a moral defeat of pure Molinism that with the help of his advisers (among whom Bellarmine was the most ardent) Aquaviva, the General of the Society, issued a solemn decree (signed December 14, 1613, and promulgated December 24), forbidding henceforth pure Molinism to be taught within the Society. For the doctrine of Molina, the doctrine of Suarez was substituted as being more conformable to the doctrine of St. Augustine and St.

\* The words of Paul V, recorded by Coronel in his *Acta*, are: "*His maxime temporibus. . .*"



Thomas.\* In spite of this solemn decree, which was obeyed for more than 200 years, some Jesuits have returned to the doctrine of pure Molinism,† a doctrine which not only Molina himself, but which also Aquaviva with his Consultors, declared to be against the doctrine of St. Augustine and St. Thomas.

## IV

## CONCERNING THE BULL OR CONSTITUTION OF PAUL V

It is very strange that no Jesuit writer, as far as we know, mentions the *two* assemblies of Cardinals under Paul V, the first of which took place on March 8, 1606, and the second on August 28, 1607. Von Pastor himself has made this serious omission. All speak as though there were only *one* assembly, and that it took place on August 28, 1607. That there was also an assembly on March 8, 1606, is evidenced by Serry,‡ by the *Acta* of Coronel, and by a letter written by none other than Cardinal du Perron himself to Henry IV, dated March 8, 1606. Now in this first assembly which Molinists sedulously omit to mention, all the Cardinals, except Bellarmine and du Perron, voted for the condemnation of Molina; in the second assembly, the one spoken of by Molinists as though it were the *only* assembly, all the Cardinals except one (Asculano, a Dominican) voted for the postponement of a Papal definition. Schneeman, S.J., reproduces at the end of his book (*Controversiorum Div. grat. initia et progressus*) a facsimile of the autograph made by Paul V, in which the latter wrote down replies of the Cardinals. Schneeman, S.J., gives his readers to understand that there was only this one assembly, and thereby insinuates a victory for Molinism!

Now it is manifest that if the assembly of the Cardinals

\* Which, as a matter of fact, it is not, since it is based on the *Scientia Media*, of which neither St. Augustine nor St. Thomas dreamed; its sense, however, is to be found in Pelagius. "Nullum alium theologum ante Molinam *ne per somnium quidem*, de *Scientia Media* cogitasse. . . ." Claudius Typhanius, S.J., *De Ordine*, cap. 24.

† Cf. De Regnon, S.J., *Banes et Molina*, pp. 128-133.

‡ *Historia*, col. 551.



by Paul V on August 28, 1607, was the only assembly, it would be unintelligible that Paul V should order a Bull to be drawn up for the condemnation of Molina. Hence Molinists refuse to entertain for a moment that such a Bull was ever meditated at all, least of all that it was ever drawn up. Von Pastor never even mentions the matter at all, and, as a recent Jesuit has said,\* he passes over the whole thing in "contemptuous silence."

That the official draft of the Bull was in the Vatican Secret Archives a few years ago is certain. Gundisalvus Feldner, O.P., Prior of Lemberg, in reply to the assertion of Frins, S.J.—namely, that the late Fr. Schneeman, S.J., by his publication of the autograph document of Paul V, had rid the world of the fable about the Bull of Paul V, and thereby had acquired a mark of distinguished merit for his defence of Molinism—wrote as follows in *Commer's Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Spekulative Theologie*, vol. viii (1894), page 384: "Now Fr. Schneeman unfortunately must remain without a claim to this merit. Because, in order to rid the world of the alleged fable, he would have been necessitated to remove that Bull from the Papal Secret Archives, which he would have found rather a difficult task. Some years ago we were assured by one of the Papal subarchivists in person that the Bull in question actually exists, but that it does not bear the customary counter-signature of a Cardinal. Doubtless our author also knows this, but the world is not to know it. Whether at the present moment the Bull is still in the above-named archives we are not aware, and we have not asked."

Having mentioned the assembly of Cardinals on August 28, 1607, as though it were the only assembly, it was not necessary for Schneeman to make mention of the serious political situation that had arisen and of the *finesse* of Cardinal du Perron in averting Molina's condemnation. But since there was another assembly previous to this on March 8, 1606, then it is necessary to discover reasons why there should have been a second assembly which took place nearly eighteen months after the first. The reasons were

\* Fr. Brodrick, S.J., in *Blackfriars*, June, 1928.

the serious trouble that had arisen between the Holy See and Venice and the *finesse* of Cardinal de Perron; or, to be more correct, it was not precisely the political situation so much as the *finesse* of du Perron, who, taking occasion from the political situation, exercised his extraordinary astuteness in influencing Paul V not to promulgate the Bull condemning Molina. This is evidenced by Laemmer:\*

"Bekanntlich motiviert man die Suspension der Promulgierung gewöhnlich mit der Gehorsam der Jesuiten gegen die päpstlichen Befehle bei Gelegenheit der Vene-  
tianischen Wirren—Dies ist falsch; das authentische unser Codex sagt ausdrücklich: 's'averte la cagione, perchè non fu publicata, cioè pel maneggio del Cardinale du Perron, non per causa dell'Interdetto di Venezia, e per l'ubbedienza dei Gesuiti.'"<sup>†</sup>

On page 107 (*op. cit.*) Laemmer adds that there is another copy of the Bull in Cod. Preuck, A. 6, fol. 173, *seqq.*

This, then, is the true historical account of the affair as far as the authentic documents published by Serry allow it to be known:

At the end of the disputations held during the great controversy Paul V deliberated upon issuing a Papal definition. To this end he assembled the Cardinals on March 8, 1606; all the Cardinals except two voted for the condemnation of Molina. Owing to the universal suffrage, practically speaking, of the Cardinals, Paul V gave orders for the drawing up of a Bull. As regards the manner of procedure in the drawing up of the Bull, the Pope gave minute instructions in his own handwriting. This rescript, transcribed from Coronel by Serry, may be seen in the latter *Historia*, col. 561. A specimen of the Bull was drawn up

\* *Zur Kirchengeschichte*, 1863, pp. 106, 107.

† The codex from which these words are cited by Laemmer is the *Acta* of Coronel, and the words are in Coronel's own handwriting, and may still be seen in the Bibliotheca Angelica in Rome. The translation of the above is as follows: "As is well known, the reason usually assigned as the cause why the promulgation was suspended is the obedience of the Jesuits to the Papal commands on the occasion of the troubles in Venice. This is untrue; the authentic express statement of our codex being:

" 'Notice the reason why it was not published—namely, the astute management of Cardinal du Perron, not the interdict of Venice, nor the obedience of the Jesuits.' "

and approved by Paul. Then arose the trouble at Venice, in which the Jesuits were implicated to such an extent that they were banished from the Republic. Cardinal du Perron seized the opportunity, and by his astuteness averted the condemnation of Molina, which would have been a further disaster for the Jesuits, with the result that Paul V called the Cardinals together again on August 28, 1607, that he might learn the attitude of the Cardinals, seeing what serious course events had taken. Although in the first assembly all the Cardinals except two voted for the condemnation, in this second assembly all except one voted for the postponement of the condemnation.

ÆLRED WHITACRE, O.P.

## ART. 6.—A PHILOSOPHY OF MOODS

*Pascal.* An Essay by Aldous Huxley. The Realist. Nos. 1, 2, 3.  
*Do What You Will.* Essays by Aldous Huxley. Chatto and Windus.\*

AS Mr. Huxley tells us himself, his article "Pascal" is not so much a study of its ostensible subject as an exposition of the writer's personal philosophy of life. We are glad this is the case. Pascal's philosophy of life is well known; Mr. Huxley's, to our knowledge, accessible only in these essays. It is primarily Mr. Huxley's and not Pascal's views that we propose to examine here, but with him we will take our start from Pascal.

Mr. Huxley agrees with Pascal in his philosophic scepticism, his preliminary pyrrhonism, disagrees with his Christianity. But is Pascal a typical representative of Christianity? Once Mr. Huxley admits that he was not—that his "was a special, a rather dreadful kind of Christianity." Elsewhere, however, he forgets this and treats as Christian what is the exaggeration and therefore the distortion of one among the many aspects of Christianity. This the Catholic Mind has judged long since, condemning Pascal as at least a *Jansenisant*, and with Mr. Huxley pronouncing on the whole in favour of his Jesuit adversaries. Not a single orthodox theologian could Mr. Huxley find who would subscribe to Pascal's dictum about marriage that it is "*une espèce d'homicide et comme un déicide.*" If Mr. Huxley desires to make his account with Christianity, he must choose another exponent than Pascal.

But no doubt it is Pascal's preliminary scepticism which has attracted Mr. Huxley. If he believed in the Christian revelation, he was at least too wise to believe in reason, at any rate when employed on ultimates. Of Pascal's pyrrhonism nothing need be said here. As Mr. Huxley points out, it is a bad foundation for religious

\* The Essays appeared only after the article had been completed. There is nothing in the book which seems to demand modification of my arguments. Account, however, has been taken of certain admissions which, in the writer's opinion, are inconsistent with Mr. Huxley's standpoint.

belief. Before I can even consider whether or no God has revealed any truth to mankind, I must be sure that the sole instrument by which an alleged revelation can be tested is a trustworthy instrument—and moreover trustworthy in the relevant spheres—philosophy and, where an historical revelation is in question, history. Pascal apparently admitted the validity of reason in the latter, but not in the former sphere. Mr. Huxley denies it in both. He is almost a complete sceptic. Almost—for grudgingly and illogically he admits that objective knowledge of the sensible world is attainable. True, what he gives with one hand he takes away with the other. Even in this order the denial of the most evident, the most ineluctable facts—*e.g.*, that Socrates is mortal, that two and two make four, is simply “outrageously bad taste universally condemned,” and these facts no better than “rationalizations of psychological experiences more or less uniform for all men.” A desperate attempt to keep the sceptical flag flying to the last, despite the overwhelming attack of commonsense. For Mr. Huxley is obliged to admit—an admission fatal to pure scepticism—that to deny the facts of sensible experience is to collide not merely with the consent of one's fellow men but with things. “The hero,” he remarks, “of Dostoevsky's *Notes from Underground* protests against the intolerable tyranny of two and two making four. He prefers that they shall make five, and insists that he has a right to his preference. And no doubt he has a right. But if an express train happens to be passing at a distance of two plus two yards, and he advances four yards and a half under the impression that he will still be eighteen inches on the hither side of destruction, this right of his will not save him from coming to a violent and bloody conclusion.” In other words, his alleged right is meaningless. The universe, truth disallows it. Practically, then, Mr. Huxley admits that our senses and the logic which marshals and argues from their data give us knowledge of objective reality.

However, though not, save perhaps in words, a complete sceptic, he restricts the sphere of knowledge considerably. As we have seen, he disbelieves in historical

truth. Here, indeed, he is self-confuted. If historical truth be unattainable—or at best only a knowledge of external facts—how comes he to be discussing the opinions and sentiments, the interior life of Pascal, and, further, utilizing for that purpose not only Pascal's actual writings, but his sister's biography? Moreover, he illustrates his thesis by quoting, as historically authentic, sayings of Jesus recorded in Gospels which he argues elsewhere cannot give us a reliable account of His life. Mr. Huxley has certainly made generous use of "that non-existent thing, the Historical Truth." But we need not take this attack upon history too seriously. It is but a casual stick taken up to beat the apologist who appeals to history. The heart of his scepticism is not here. It is the denial that *philosophic* truth is attainable—that is to say, that we can have any certain knowledge of the ultimate nature of reality. To maintain any view of reality as a whole—its ground, its meaning, its end—is for Mr. Huxley a contemptible "rationalism," due largely to the weakness which demands fixed truth as the basis and goal of life—in fact, to habits implanted in the European mind two thousand years ago by Christianity.

So far as sense knowledge and the physical sciences based upon it are concerned, we grant that they do not, and cannot, give us a knowledge of ultimates. As Professor Eddington has pointed out so forcibly, science is confined "to pointer readings," to measurements. Of the matter thus measured we know only that it exists outside ourselves. Even the spatial and temporal qualities which in our normal experience are inseparable from it appear to hold good only of material complexes, not of the ultimate units. So far Mr. Huxley is right, though he might perhaps remember that when those incurable "rationalists" Aristotle and St. Thomas taught that quantity was an *accident* of matter, and *materia prima* an unintelligible potentiality incapable of existing apart from form, they anticipated, substantially at least, these humbling confessions of modern science. But is sensible knowledge scientifically organized our total knowledge of reality? Why this arbitrary limitation? Throughout his essay

Mr. Huxley allows the reality of a host of experiences more or less transcendent of the sensible mechanical order—ecstasies (we use the word here in the widest and most untechnical sense) of every description, from the ecstasy of sex or drugs to the ecstasy of the mystic. Their existence is, he admits, as certain, although of course far less common than the existence of sensible experiences. Why, then, am I to allow objective reference to the one and deny it to the other? Why is it reasonable to believe my senses, "rationalism" to regard the more or less super-sensible experiences of myself or others as affording knowledge of a reality, other than the emotion of the experient? Because, Mr. Huxley replies, whereas the "psychological experiences" on which scientific theories are based "are more or less uniform for all men and for the same man at different times," the experiences on which a metaphysical world view is based "are diverse, irrational, and contradictory." No doubt the higher experiences are comparatively rare; mystics are few. But directly religious experiences of an inchoate semiconscious type are extremely common—we think universal—and experiences of a lower order, which, nevertheless, transcend measurement and mechanism, are as much a part of normal human experience as the measurable and mechanical aspects of experience on which the pointer readings of sciences are based. That from their very nature they cannot give us that distinct scientific knowledge of reality, which is by definition measurement, does not in the least invalidate a reference equally objective. That they are diverse—why not? We should expect—and no one expects it more than Mr. Huxley—richness and diversity in the universe. That they are contradictory: Mr. Huxley does not prove it, and on occasion, to the jeopardy of his entire thesis, admits that after all they may be, not contradictory, but complementary, and "each" of the views of reality which rationalize such experiences, *a fortiori*, therefore, the experience itself "represent one aspect of the whole." Elsewhere (*Do What You Will*, p. 4) he tells us that "art deals with many more aspects of internal reality than



science." This implies that art reveals a profounder level of truth than science, to which, as we have seen, he so grudgingly concedes an assured objective reference to truth. The fact is, and this we believe is the reply to Mr. Huxley's semi-pyrrhonism (has the complete pyrrhonist ever existed?), there is not, and cannot conceivably be—a purely subjective experience—an experience which conveys *no* knowledge of external reality. A wholly subjective experience is a contradiction as meaningless as the complete lie or the wholly evil man or action. If, e.g., I dream that I am King of England, my dream is only possible because, outside dream and dreamer, England exists and kingship exists. The illusory or purely subjective element in my dream is simply a wrong relationship between the objective realities—monarchy, England, and myself. Every desire, moreover, contains an element of knowledge. I cannot desire the simply non-existent. "From the fact of change and decay," writes Mr. Huxley, "the logic of desire deduces the existence of something changeless. . . . It is desirable that there should be noumena" (by this Kantian phrase he understands permanent spiritual realities); "therefore noumena exist. . . . A similar conjuring trick produces the One out of the deplorably puzzling Many, draws the Good and the Beautiful out of the seething hotch-potch of diverse human tastes and sensibilities and interests, deduces Justice from our actual inequalities, and absolute Truth from the necessary and unescapable relativities of daily life. *It is by an exactly similar process that children invent imaginary playmates to amuse their solitudes, and transform a dull, uninteresting piece of wood into a horse, a ship, a railway train, what you will.*" The sentence italicized gives away Mr. Huxley's entire case. Unless playmates really existed in *rerum natura* children could not invent imaginary ones—were there no real horses, ships, and railway trains there could be no toy horses, ships, or trains. What child before the first half of the last century ever "transformed a piece of wood into a railway train"? Only because playmates, horses, ships, and trains pre-exist and enter somehow into their ex-

perience can children desire them, and, to satisfy their desire, form mental or material images of these things.\* And it is because the "One," the "Good," the "Beautiful," "Justice," and "absolute Truth" actually pre-exist, and somehow are experienced by us, that by a similar process we form, not indeed images of these things, as like as children's toys to their originals—the gulf is too wide for that—but true, if vague, notions of them, as transcending yet partially reflected in the imperfect unities, goodness, beauties, justice and truth of our normal experience. Moreover, as a child's dissatisfaction with its loneliness presupposes the existence of human companionship, our dissatisfaction with the relative and changing presupposes the existence of the Absolute and Unchanging. How could we object to the sight of "change and decay in all around" unless we possessed some, however vague, experience of the changeless and abiding? The insect does not chafe against its ephemerality, nor the cat lament the passing of youth and love.

But, objects Mr. Huxley, the rationalizations of our transcendental experiences are various and conflicting. We deny the assertion. By no means are they so various as is usually supposed; on the contrary, almost fatiguingly alike, and contradictory, only in so far as they deny or restrict unduly either the experimental facts which they profess to explain or the data or logic of other experiences equally authentic.

First a necessary distinction.

Analyzing Pascal's "conversion" experience as recorded in his "Memorial," Mr. Huxley insists on the distinction to be made between the pure, we may say, the raw experience—for example, "*Feu. Pleurs de Joie*"—and its intellectual interpretation—for instance, "*Dieu d'Abraham, Dieu d'Isaac, Dieu de Jacob . . . Dieu de Jesus Christ.*" The distinction is true and important but insufficient. We must further distinguish between the intellectual interpretation of the experience based wholly on its own data and the interpretation which consists in relating that

\* Imaginary objects are but compounds of real (l. 7, the dragon = serpent + wings + fire) and confined to the same order of being.

experience to data derived elsewhere. No doubt both interpretations blend and cannot be completely separated. But roughly the distinction may and should be made. Take, for example, the following lines of the "Memorial":

"Dieu d'Abraham, Dieu d'Isaac, Dieu de Jacob  
Non des Philosophes et des Sçavans  
Dieu de Jesus Christ."

All this is interpretation, but the interpretation is not of a piece. It moves on two levels.

There is first the direct, the internal, interpretation which (terminology apart) makes use of no data external to the experience. The "Being" *experienced* by Pascal, and simply *as* experienced by him, is not an abstract conclusion, but a living and active Being in personal relationship with the soul, is therefore *supra non infra* personal—which, of course, is the true meaning of the much misunderstood expression a personal God. This is the primary sense of the lines, especially of the second. The interpretation is directly based on the experience it interprets, and would be what it is and equally true if Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and even Jesus Christ, had no existence.

These, on the contrary, belong to the secondary interpretation, which relates the experience to data external to itself. Pascal's experience warranted the interpretation that he had experienced the presence and operation of a personal God; it did not, and of its nature could not, warrant the further statement that the God thus experienced had revealed Himself to three Jewish patriarchs some three thousand years before, or was in a unique sense the God of Jesus Christ. The truth of this secondary indirect and partially external interpretation cannot be established by the experience it interprets. It is essentially a relationship between that experience and facts or beliefs wholly outside it.

Before, however, we complain of the diversity and contradiction which exist between the rationalizations of religious experiences (indeed of higher experiences of

every kind), we must eliminate all those based on interpretation of this second class. Not, of course, that such interpretation, such relating, is necessarily false or illegitimate. But it is part neither of the experiences whose validity is in question, nor of their direct rationalization. We cannot, therefore, object against the validity either of the experiences or of their direct rationalization, divergencies and contradictions due to this secondary and indirect interpretation, which, therefore, *from our present standpoint*, must be left out of account.

When this has been done, and we confine our attention to the religious experiences themselves and their direct internal interpretations, we are struck not by the diversity but the similarity between them. To convince ourselves of this we have but to compare such a typical product of Christian mysticism as Ramon Lull's book of the Lover and the Beloved with the psalms of the Hindu mystics Kabir and Dadu. The experience of God which underlies these poems, as described and directly interpreted in them, is substantially identical. This is not to claim for all religions an equal level of value and truth. The direct religious experiences of the individual are not the whole of religion, and the interpretations of the second degree which relate them to a total world view vary enormously in truth and value from one religion to another. Nevertheless, the likeness which obtains between the experience of mystics of every age, country, and creed constitutes a massive witness to its objective validity and to the truth of, at least, its direct, its internal, interpretation. Mr. Huxley, however, denies this. "Mystical experiences," he tells us, "which in Europe are interpreted in terms of a personal God, are interpreted by the Buddhists in terms of an entirely godless order of things." This appeal to Buddhism, common with those who wish to discredit the powerful and world-wide witness of religious experience to God, is, we are convinced, a travesty of the facts. We will concede, though it cannot be regarded as strictly proved, that the teaching of Gautama was atheistic—that is to say, that for him the ultimate reality was a sheer Nonentity. But if this be so,

the history of Buddhism is the history of the transformation *under the pressure of religious experience* of an original atheism into a practical theism. For Mahayana Buddhism, and even in large measure for the more primitive Hinayana school, the Absolute is not, save (since the original terminology survives), to some extent, in words : Nothingness, but a Being above, not below Determination, substantially identical with the Brahman of Vedanta. How are we to differentiate such an Absolute from the super-determinate Deity—the super-God of Christian mysticism, as formulated in the classic treatises of the Pseudo-Dionysius? The most that can be said is that in Buddhism, as in Vedanta, the real existence of creatures is insufficiently safeguarded, and the *doctrine* of Deity is too often formulated in terms of an acosmic pantheism, for which God is in such wise the sole Reality that nothing exists that is not Himself or Itself. Be it observed, however, that this error is not the primary interpretation of the religious experience, but originates in the secondary interpretation which relates other aspects of reality to it. Also, it is an error of denial—*i.e.*, it refuses to do justice to the distinct reality of the creature—not of affirmation, and an error not about the Being of God, but about the being of creatures. For the Christian mystic also his experience of God involves an experience of the comparative non-reality of everything else, including himself. If he is saved from the further step of denying any real being to creatures, it is the effect of a creed and philosophy which supplement the immediate data of his experience as a mystic. And after all, we may doubt whether the pantheism of Buddhist or Vedantist is at bottom anything more than this appreciation of the comparative non-being of creatures, their *utter* dependence on God. We may be permitted in this connection to refer to the article by Fr. Johannis, S.J., in this review (January, 1929), in which he argues that the philosophy of Sankara, the founder and metaphysician of Advaita Vedantism, whose system is generally supposed to be sheer pantheism, is not really pantheist, but though incomplete, is, as far as it goes, entirely compatible with Christian theism. Nor do we

think that a similar examination of great Buddhist teachers would lead to a very different conclusion. Of religious experience we may safely say that with one voice in every place and in every epoch it proclaims the Being, Presence, and Operation of God.

Nor do lower forms of qualitative, more or less sense-transcending, experiences—the experience, for example, of the artist or the lover—imply world-views incompatible with that of the theist. Certainly an article gives no scope to prove a universal proposition of this kind; but neither does Mr. Huxley bring forward any fact which disproves it. “The life-worshipper,” he writes, “is in a position to accept all the partial and apparently contradictory syntheses constructed by philosophers.” “Partial,” certainly; “apparently contradictory”—examination reduces the contradiction either to mere appearance or to that unwarranted exclusion and rejection of other aspects of experience which Mr. Huxley himself so rightly repudiates. “He [the life-worshipper] is at one moment a positivist and at another a mystic . . . now a pessimist and now, with a change of love, or liver, or even the weather, an exuberant believer that God’s in His heaven, and all’s right with the world. . . . *Each belief is a rationalization of a prevailing mood.*” Falser philosophy and falser psychology than those expressed in this quotation it would be difficult to find.

False philosophy in the first place. Positivism, in so far as it affirms the reality of the purely physical and mechanical aspects of existence, is not opposed to mysticism. On the contrary, it valuably supplements and corrects it—is a salutary check on such exclusive pre-occupation with the direct experience of God (evidently not His Will for man on earth) as might lead the mystic to deny or unduly minimize the value and reality of creatures, especially bodily creatures, and our necessary occupation with them. Only when the positivist presumes on the strength of this, in itself true and valuable, experience of the reality and worth of the physical and mechanical to deny the mystic’s—indeed generally the religious man’s—experience of God and the soul does his positivism in any



way contradict mysticism. Human experience reveals God, the soul, bodies, machinery, and measurement, and if the true philosophy must accept all the data of human experience, it cannot, like Mr. Huxley, acquiesce in an alleged incompatibility between them. Christian philosophy, at any rate, if not always the individual Christian, has found room for all these facts.

False and extremely crude psychology.

Mr. Huxley actually confuses, in the teeth of everyday experience, mood and belief, emotional colouring and intellectual judgement. He shuffles off this confusion by making use of the ambiguous terms pessimism and optimism. These words denote two different things: moods and judgements. As moods, pessimism and optimism have little intellectual significance. They witness respectively to the obvious facts that there is much good, also much evil, in human experience; and that is all. Whether we are at a particular moment more pre-occupied with the good or the evil is indeed largely a matter of mood, dependent, as Mr. Huxley remarks, on love, liver, or weather. But they may also be judgements—optimism that the good exceeds the evil, pessimism the reverse. Here, indeed, a genuine conflict arises; but it is an insult to a professedly reasonable being to suggest that his decision should depend on the accidents of his individual experience or bodily constitution. No doubt it often does; but even Mr. Huxley will hardly maintain that whatever is ought to be. When the question is considered from a rational standpoint it is plain that there is much evidence to support both views, and that an ultimate decision must depend not on an impossible calculus of the good and evil in human life, but upon a world-view based on other grounds. But the evidence does forbid both the absolute optimism of Browning's absurd "All's right with the world," which, one need not say, he didn't really believe himself, and the absolute pessimism of Hardy's Tess—to which Mr. Huxley opposes it. But we may be sure neither Browning nor Hardy would have seriously maintained *as deliberate intellectual judgements* that the world is good after dinner, a success in



love, or on a fine day ; that it is evil before dinner, after an unsuccessful love, or on a rainy day. For although even our moods give us *some* knowledge of reality, to found upon them considered judgements of the universe, "world-views," is the bankruptcy of reason. Mr. Huxley's philosophy of moods is the abdication of the intellect in favour of the most superficial emotion, the canonization of chaos.

Indeed, we doubt if such a "philosophy" could ever have been propounded except as a reaction against three excesses—two theoretical and one practical. One theoretical excess is the attempt to construct a philosophy in terms of one aspect only of experience, suppressing or distorting by unnatural interpretation all evidence to the contrary. Such an excess is at the root both of idealism and materialism. The other is the belief that a complete philosophy is attainable ; that not only ought all the views and aspects of experience to be taken into account (as Mr. Huxley and Catholic philosophy would agree) and cannot be really incompatible, for truth is self-evidently one (though Mr. Huxley questions this, it is the presupposition of every attempt to give a rational account of experience, and therefore of the special sciences), but that we can attain so complete an understanding of reality that we can see clearly how they are to be harmonized. This is indeed an excess of rationalism, of confidence in human reason and knowledge. Though we know enough to be certain that the jig-saw puzzle of experience does present one coherent design—too many pieces fit together for this to be reasonably questioned—we cannot and never shall be able to put together that pattern in its entirety. Only the knowledge of God sees the whole and every detail. Plato, who, we think, believed a beatific vision of the Good attainable on earth, hoped for such knowledge of the universe as would enable us to assign a final cause why trees are green. He was mistaken—such knowledge is not for mortals. Moreover, in consequence of the element of irrationality due to the *comparative* non-reality of creatures and increasing as we descend the hierarchy of being, there may be no

rational ground for these accidents of material bodies. Nor even to the riddles presented by the fundamental aspects of experience do we possess the key. Why is there suffering, such suffering, in the creation of a good God? In these dim regions of ultimate truth we can see only through a mirror and in an enigma. Obscure intuitions of truth—stammering formulations. But the fact that we cannot hope to possess the loaf of complete knowledge is no ground for saying with Mr. Huxley that there is no bread, or even less bread than there is.

The practical excess from which Mr. Huxley reacts, and which he finds not unfairly in Pascal, is the attempt to act, as if only one type of experience possessed value for man. Mr. Huxley, on the contrary, argues that we should treat all types of experience as possessing equal value.\* Surely a more rational attitude than either is that expressed by the Vulgate text "ordinavit in me caritatem"—"He set charity in order within me." Obviously experiences are not of equal value. The enjoyment of a good dinner is self-evidently less valuable than the enjoyment of poetry. It does not follow that we should wholly sacrifice the art of cookery in favour of the art of poetry. For if the value of good cookery is inferior to that of poetry, the former is a distinctive value not to be omitted from the complete experience of mankind. (Not that there is the least danger of this!) Moreover, when occasion arises to cook or appreciate food, we should do it wholeheartedly. Neither the cook nor the diner will wisely divide their attention between the dishes and the study of Shelley. But to go farther than this and object to any and every sacrifice of a lower to a higher order of values, even to deny that such an order is possible—is to make life as irrational and chaotic in practice as the rejection of any certain world-view does theoretically. Mr. Huxley bids us worship life. But

\* Yet in his essay entitled "Fashions of Love" (*Do What You Will*) Mr. Huxley condemns *purely* physical love-making as destructive of love itself and finally of pleasure. If, however, physical values were equal to spiritual, as his theory demands, this surely would not be the case.

order is the very essence of life ; disorder, that is to say, disintegration and corruption, are death.

And though it is true that the experience of the race ought to find place for every type of experience, it does not follow that the experience of every individual must do the same. We must specialize in practice as in study. Though, for example, all men should value art, not all need practise it. And similarly, though all should hold sexual relations in honour, not all need marry. It may, however, be urged, and this in fact is the peculiar excess in Pascal which annoys Mr. Huxley—that since God is the Absolute Good we *all* ought to sacrifice as far as possible every other activity to the direct practice of religion. If, indeed, we could see God as He is, we should practise and enjoy all other activities and experiences formally or eminently in Him, and should *need* nothing beyond. “Deus meus et omnia.” Since, however, we can at best only apprehend Him in the darkness of incomprehensible intuition, the secular aspects of experience contain and reveal values and aspects which, though in God as He is, are not contained in His revelation to man on earth. Therefore, even in presence of the fullest possible knowledge of God, these secular experiences and activities have claims upon us, urgent in proportion to their rank in the scale of values. This, indeed, is the radical fallacy of St. Augustine’s conclusion that it is enough to know God and the soul, and we are no better if we know other things besides. If we could know God as He is, this would be a truism. Since in fact we cannot do so, man (not necessarily Augustine) needs to know these other things which reflect uniquely aspects of His Being of which we should otherwise be ignorant, and thus indirectly increase our knowledge of Him.

But it does not follow that the Saint should devote much of his time and energy to these lower values. He is entirely justified in sacrificing, indeed it is his vocation to sacrifice, them, for the sake of a more continuous and deeper communion with God. If Mr. Huxley objects, he is objecting to all specialization, expecting the individual to realize powers and functions which can only be realized

by the united work and experience of the community. We can only legitimately complain when, as we must admit is too frequently the case, the Saint expects all his fellows to specialize in holiness, and despises and denounces the lower experiences and activities he is himself called upon to renounce. And holy men and women have no doubt in practice unduly starved the non-religious aspects of life, natural affections and emotions. Hence a nervous tension which too often mars the serenity and impairs the complete sanity of their lives, incidentally depriving them of much of that attractiveness they would otherwise possess. But even these excesses are not, as Mr. Huxley terms them, death-worship, or necessarily the product of a sickly weakness of the natural desires. St. Augustine's view of life—as he holds it up *as a law for others*—was, no doubt, too exclusive; but in view of his history to ascribe it to a weakness of natural desire would be absurd. And to call it death-worship is caricature. The Saint, even a somewhat perverse saint like Pascal, seeks life, to say the least, as ardently as any of Mr. Huxley's life-worshippers. But he will be content with nothing less than the eternal and complete life of God, and that not simply or primarily as a promise of the hereafter, but as present and operative here and now. "With Thee is the well of life." "That they may have life and have it more abundantly." These are not the accents of death-worship. That holy men have dwelt too long and too delightedly on the death which inevitably awaits all life merely natural is no doubt true. Every excess—therefore also Mr. Huxley's—is the reaction against a counter-excess. But they did not therefore worship death. Nor is their ecstasy, as Mr. Huxley will have it, negative—the contemplation of death and its void. It is a possession by the plenitude of a Life transcending the determinations which limit while they characterize and diversify the life of nature and the normal life of man.

The true life-worshipper, while *duly* prizing every manifestation of life, will prize supremely the life of God, communicated to the soul, and will be glad that there are men called to partake it so fully, that they reject

to a large degree, though of course never completely, those lower modes of life which the majority do, and should, live. And seeing, moreover, that everywhere life is form and unity, he will hold the conviction that though man's short vision may not see it, and the inevitable death in a world so remote from the eternal deficiency and life of God may involve a necessary element of disorder and irrationality, as a whole the universe, which man so diversely experiences, manifests a harmony, increasing no doubt in perfection and fulness as created life—in its lower degrees we call it energy—approaches the life of God, but absent nowhere. And so convinced he will, not by himself alone, but working in his due place with his fellows, endeavour, theoretically to discover and understand the harmony and order in the world, practically to introduce it into his own life and the life of society, both thus made more alive.

Mr. Huxley himself perceives that unrestrained abandonment to any and every desire is death, though his refusal to accept a hierarchy of values leads him to apply this so perversely to the desire for God. This, however, is implicitly to admit that life itself demands a co-ordination and subordination of desires. And this in turn involves the scale of values and "fixed point of reference," theoretical and practical, against which he rebels. Life, no doubt, welcomes—nay, requires—every form of human experience and action, but only in its due place and scope, which is by no means the same for all. And the complete life can be only the life of the entire human race, with its saints, its artists, its scientists, also its dress-makers and its cooks. All must specialize—but not equally. The saint must specialize more than the artist, the artist more than the cook.\* For everywhere the higher manifestations of life must be preferred to the lower, and the lower exist to subserve, not directly even the highest—not even the mystic's *knowledge* of God is the *summum bonum*—but that which is revealed most adequately in man's highest activity, mystical experi-

\* Not necessarily in the amount of time actually spent in the preparation or practice of his art, but in the reference to it of his experience as a whole.

ence—least in his lowest activities—though fully in none and partially in all—namely, God Himself—that is to say, Life itself—the Life that is the source of all lives beside. This is the life-worship of the theist—balanced, sane and full—not the tight-rope walking between unco-ordinated excesses to which Mr. Huxley invites us, but a climb, at least equally thrilling with adventure and risk, to a summit where the entire being of man, individual and social, is alive with the Life of God and ecstatic with the Vision of His Beauty.

E. WATKIN.

ART. 7.—THE ROMAN QUESTION: A  
DIPLOMATIC RETROSPECT

*Per la Storia Diplomatica della Questione Romana.* By Francesco Salata.

THE first volume of Signor Francesco Salata's collected papers dealing with the Roman Question contains revised, with addenda of copious secret and confidential correspondence, articles published in the daily and periodical press during the months following upon the signature of the Lateran Treaty, February, 1929. This date closed the Question which had been open, virtually, from the date of the departure from Rome under duress of Pope Pius VI in 1798. The articles aroused more than ordinary attention, and the book, *Per la Storia Diplomatica della Questione Romana*, with its subtitle, "Da Cavour alla Triplice Alleanza," offers a comprehensive survey of the acute phase of the ground traversed from the date of Count Cavour's celebrated pronouncement, "*Chiesa libera nello Stato libero*," to the closing years of the nineteenth century, when the solution, to be affected only by what has been termed the post-war mentality, was adumbrated in the policy of the Church by Pope Leo XIII.

The introduction, with its special reference to the Cavour, Santucci, Nigra, and Tosti letters examined in the opening chapters, whilst announcing the early publication under Government auspices of the entire Cavour correspondence in the last twelvemonth of that statesman's life (d. June 6, 1861), together with official papers from that date to the occupation of Rome, September, 1870, and after, expresses the hope that Pope Pius XI may sanction the publication of the documents preserved in the Vatican Archives also bearing upon the question. The sudden and to the outer world inexplicable change of front when the Holy Father's assent (?) was withdrawn from Cardinals Antonelli and Sanctucci, who, relieved from their oath to the Pontiff, had been authorized to examine Count Cavour's proposals set forth by accredited representatives of the Turin Cabinet, had taken politicians by surprise. *Non Possumus*, the words of the Holy Father to the Consistory of



March 18, brought forth Count Cavour's retort in a lengthy speech to the Senate and Chamber of Deputies at Turin when, proclaiming the capital of Italy to be Rome, he added : "It would ill become us to enter Rome as conquerors . . . or to constrain the Pope to flight." The account of the conversations above mentioned was contained in a confidential memorandum circulated on August 29, 1870, to Italian representatives abroad by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Marchese Emilio Visconti Venosta, who, it may be noted, was Cavour's nephew, with the purpose, it may well be suggested, of laying the onus of the conquest of Rome, deprecated eleven years earlier and a bare three weeks distant now, upon the shoulders of the Pope; in view also of the failure of Count San Martino's mission with renewed offers of a settlement upon Cavour's alleged original terms—namely, independent sovereignty over the Leonine City.

This memorandum, communicated by persons unknown to Cardinal Antonelli, drew a flat denial in a circular dated October 17, addressed to the Apostolic Nuncios abroad :

"Une circulaire du 29 août dernier adressé par le Gouvernement italien à ses représentants à l'étranger, portait annexé un imprimé qui me fut confidentiellement communiqué. . . . Dans ce document on fait l'historique des négociations qu'on *prétend* avoir été ouvertes . . . relativement à ce qu'on est convenu d'appeler la Question Romaine."

The Italian Government nevertheless regarded the substance of the memorandum as valid, in despite of Cardinal Antonelli's denial "*with original proof at hand.*" The episode acquired additional weight through the Marchese's speech in the Italian Legislature during the debate upon the Law of Guarantees, when, recalling Count San Martino's abortive mission above mentioned, his comment recorded his conviction :

"that the country would not have condemned us had we appeared before Parliament with the scheme accepted and sanctioned by the Pope, the Roman Question fully settled, and our future destinies liberated from entanglements and all uncertainty."

Signor Salata admits errors of judgment in the choice of certain among Cavour's emissaries; tactical errors also,

which, acting cumulatively, brought the edifice of his anticipations to the ground. *Nondum venit hora*, as the Abbot of Monte Cassino, Mgr. Pappalettere, Padre Tosti's Superior, justly observed when discussion of the limits of temporal power was proposed to him in the pages of the *Edinburgh Review*, 1861. How the statesman and the idealist both were proved wrong by the historian and student of human nature, is common knowledge to-day, and his dictum, "the Roman Question is one of those problems which, set by one century, can only be solved by another," honours Cesare Cantù's foresight. The good faith, however, of the writers of these letters hitherto unpublished is above suspicion; they do more than outline the *modus operandi* of Cavour's famous postulate, and both Nigra and Tosti's records disprove the charge of insincerity too often levelled at Cavour by contemporary observers for his offers of a settlement of the Question which the state of public opinion at the time made it impossible to realize.

Cavaliere Nigra opens the correspondence with a letter to Padre Tosti dated March 22, 1861, not printed, but the tenor of which can be read in the reply, March 25:

"I had the honour yesterday to receive your letter of the 22nd inst. The matter it contains respecting a possible reconciliation of Italy with the Church confirms the certitude I have cherished of the honesty, justice, and religion in your heart. I do not think that a better course, in view of the state of the times and of men, can be taken than your proposals inspired by the wisdom of H.E. Count Cavour. If I were Pope I should by this time have sanctioned them with Amen. But the Pope is Pius IX, and he is in Rome. Hence I doubt whether the articles of the settlement you set forth can be accepted without the support of a guarantee which shall assure their continued observance.

"The idea of a collective guarantee of all the Catholic Powers, which I had considered feasible hitherto, now appears to me both inconvenient and dangerous. Beneath the cloak of Catholicism, of the Papacy or what not, they would intrude upon us at home, and would persist, through mystical religious argument, in that interference in our affairs which has been the daily outcome in our times of their political predominance.

"Another way open to me appears to achieve the ends of a guarantee. I venture to lay it before you, for your impartial and manly judgment.

"Were the Pope to accept the occupation of his state and of Rome, reserving his rights in the form of a Protest, an annual revenue could be provided with the College of Cardinals to that end by the Government. Nevertheless, in lieu of that revenue, would it not be preferable to invest him with the possession of all the churches and convents in Italy? He would draw the necessary revenue from that source. The surrendered *political* dominion would be replaced by *ecclesiastical* sovereignty, the right of the Church to temporal possessions would be safeguarded, and the Church would gain guarantees for her freedom of action alike towards the State and the clergy both regular and secular. The Government of Italy would avoid all litigation over matters of secondary moment; they would similarly clear themselves, in the eyes of Catholics, of the onus of usurped power, inasmuch as the Government would only take away from the Pope political powers no longer consonant with the times, which they would offset by a wider and uncontested ecclesiastical dominion.

"In this wise the problem of temporal power could advance a long way towards a final solution—namely, through the distinction between temporal political and temporal ecclesiastical dominion. The former belongs to other times and other political conditions; it would disappear, to give place to the latter, which, in my view, is the one, true, necessary and immutable condition. Not all Catholics would take exception thereto, and the Church would *ipso facto* retrieve the fulness of her local immunity, since ecclesiastical property, to furnish revenue for the use of the Pope and the Cardinals, should be exempt from State imposts. The State would incur no loss, since, waiving that taxation on the one side, they would on the other incur no liability in respect of dues to the Pontifical Court. Nor would the Pope underlie the sense of semi-dependence upon a stipend, but he would possess the revenue of his independent ownership."

Padre Tosti submits these suggestions in a letter to Cardinal Santucci (April 4), asking for his opinion of the proposed guarantees in view of his purpose, as he is advised, to lay them before the Holy Father, yet not concealing his misgivings in regard to their reception, as he observes grimly: "Blows are always the asses' portion of the burden." He stresses his views, for the appreciation of which he quotes lengthy passages from Nigra's first letter emphasizing their import, outlining as they do Cavour's interpretation of a free Church in a free State. Standing warrant for the writer's good faith and sense of duty as a Catholic, Nigra, he points out, though speaking

in his private capacity, and not as Minister to the Lieutenant of the Kingdom of Naples for King Victor Emmanuel, was nevertheless the channel of official views. Nigra's words deserve thus quotation :

“ Can it be that the Holy Father will not have mercy upon the anguish of our consciences? Can he think us no longer sons of the Church, and deriding his castigation? Could he look into our hearts, the sight would sadden him more than the irremediable acts of Time and Man. A Nation, to-day represented by a Parliament, urges us to Rome. How shall resistance avail? Powerless to repel, why not open arms to us and receive us, not as invaders but as sons penitent for a fault none of our doing? St. Peter entered Rome in despite of the Cæsars, and he turned heathen revolt towards Christ. Italy would enter Rome to-day, and St. Peter will lead her to Christ. The Holy Father need entertain no fear of Italians; their hearts hold a faith more single-minded, less double-tongued than that of alien protection. The peace of our consciences, the outward union of hearts, the might and grandeur of our Kingdom of Italy are surely not negligible in the sight of the Pontiff, who shares [fellowship] in our land. We do not ask him to purchase that boon with the surrender of the rights of the Church he has sworn to uphold nor with a cession of her hallowed patrimony. Rather indeed would we sever the bonds that have enchained her freedom throughout the ages. [Let there be] no more royal exequaturs, no more King's Courts, no more sham presentations of Bishops to their benefices at the hands of secular authority. The Pope shall enforce his rule untrammelled; neither also as hitherto shall he stand a petitioner in the secular courts for a Placet to his ruling . . . nor shall he hold out a hand for a pittance to anyone soever, but the property of all the Churches and Monasteries of Italy shall be his; he will derive thence the means adequate for his needs and those of the S. College of Cardinals. The liberty wrested from the Holy See we shall restore, and shall widen those earthly possessions. These are what our hands would bring to the Pope in Rome to offset a political dominion of which the foreign armed protectorate saves not even a semblance. Let the Vicar of Christ turn from the counsels of political rulers, let him enter [the union of] our Country. There he will find independence, sovereignty in the true temporalities of the Church; thence will he draw the power to regain that which he has yielded in Catholic States, power filched through the cunning and violence of a criminal policy.”

Brave words, but a passage in Padre Tosti's reply to Nigra (March 25) discloses consequences far outstripping

the written word which, if nothing else stood in the way, account fully for the Pontifical *Non Possumus*. The passage is significant :

“ Observe, that should the Italian Government and the Pope agree to a substitution of ecclesiastical sovereignty in Churches and Monasteries for political dominion in the Pontifical State, the recognition by the Pope of the new King of Italy *ensues by implication, and that is no slight achievement.*”

Tosti, however, hastens to record his doubts :

“ It remains,” he adds, “ a source of regret to me that instinctive elements yet dominant in the United Italy movement may hinder the tranquil development of these negotiations.”

Nigra's letter to Cavour (March 27) also reports Padre Tosti's scheme; he refers to conversations along similar lines with the Abbot of Monte Cassino, Mgr. Pappalitere, Padre Tosti's Superior. Nigra asks for instructions. These are conveyed to him by Cavour in a letter (April 2) in which, approving the course taken to win the adhesion of the Neapolitan clergy through whom he states “ the Pope and Antonelli hope to recover lost territory, taking their stand upon the alleged impossibility to unite and fuse upper and lower Italy in one,” he desires him to “ continue in this excellent and honest propaganda.”

Padre Tosti's letter to Cardinal Santucci (April 4) closes this curious episode. Padre Tosti did not go to Rome after all. The discussion, as the mass of published correspondence, etc., concerning the Roman Question from that date shows, had created a situation whence all the exits explored by opinion of all shades proved blind alleys. While all honour is due to Padre Tosti's sentiments as a son of the Church and a patriot, surprise cannot but be felt to-day at his scant sense of the practical issues involved by his scheme of devolution. He appears to have ignored not only that the confiscatory Napoleonic ordinances concerning ecclesiastical property and the status of certain religious Orders in Italy had not been abrogated by King Charles Albert in the Kingdom of Sardinia, but that the Royal Lieutenancy instituted in the Kingdom of Naples by King Victor Emmanuel was applying that very legisla-

tion with ruthless severity. Indeed, Mgr. Pappalettere and Padre Tosti's correspondence with Nigra seeks primarily to save Monte Cassino from the sequestrator! The experience of Pope Pius IX during his episcopal career in the Legations and Marches from 1830 to his elevation to the Pontificate in 1846 was not such as to commend Padre Tosti's subtle distinction between ecclesiastical and political temporalities, either, to the insight of Cardinal Antonelli; and the course of events which Padre Tosti, as his published writings show, followed with historian's acumen, should have convinced all but the incurable optimist in him of the impracticability of his proposals. Events from 1870 onwards were to emphasize their unreality the more sadly in that the optimist clung to his daydream long after morning mists had lost their radiance, and until Pope Leo XIII was constrained sternly to repeat, "*Nondum venit hora.*"

Signor Salata was appointed in the autumn of 1918 a Commissioner for the execution of the Peace preliminary stipulations with Austria (Treaty of Trianon, 1919) which provided for the restitution of property, works of art, etc., claimed by Italy in virtue of the cession of Austrian territories, 1859 and 1866, and the devolution to the kingdom of principalities ruled over by members of the imperial Hapsburg family. He was thus in a position to obtain access to the secret papers preserved in the Vienna Haus, Hof, und Staats Archiv (Family, Court, and State Archives). He publishes correspondence of the Emperor Francis Joseph and Pope Leo XIII; Prince Bismarck and Prince Henri Reuss, German Ambassador in Vienna; the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, Count Kalnoky, with the Ambassadors to the Quirinal and the Holy See, Counts Wimpffen and Paar; and the reports of Baron Huebner's two special missions, 1882 and 1888, to the Holy Father. These papers reveal for the first time the precarious situation of the newly constituted Italian Kingdom at the bar of European opinion when, desirous to consolidate both position and policy in respect of the Roman Question, the Government viewed with misgiving the victory won by the Church over Bismarck's *Kulturkampf*, frustrated by



the genius of Pope Leo XIII, supported by the faith of the German people. Alliance with Austria and Germany tended to obtain the sanction of a *de facto* situation, guarantee which, proclaiming the integrity of Italy with her capital in Rome, was to erect barriers "against our adversaries, France and the Papacy." The Italian Ambassadors at Berlin and Vienna were thus instructed to press for the guarantee above mentioned, which, in the view of the Consulta (Italian Department for Foreign Affairs), was the sole *raison d'être* for or advantage to Italy in the Triple Alliance.

Prince Bismarck's rejection of the Italian request was first communicated to Prince Henri Reuss at Vienna (December 31, 1881). The correspondence with Count Kalnoky, also translated from the German text by Signor Salata, and here summarized, only connotes at once the insight of the German and Austrian negotiators and what may be defined as the political astigmatism of the Consulta at that time. In his instructions to Prince Reuss, Bismarck refers to Baron de Keudell (German Ambassador to Italy) who reports that Count Robilant, Italian Ambassador at Vienna, uncertain of the reception the proposed guarantee would have, is reluctant to press for consideration. Prince Reuss is reminded of the recent Pontifical Allocution in which the Pope, recalling the shameful mob violence at the translation of Pope Pius IX's ashes from St. Peter's to S. Lorenzo for burial, had proclaimed "the necessity of temporal power, wrested from Us, [to be restored] for the liberty and independence of our spiritual dominion." This *fact*, he points out, suggests an ulterior motive behind the Italian request, but it also traverses their position. The guarantee of Italian territorial integrity implies *de jure* recognition of the annexation of the Pontifical State, and would bring German international relations into an issue that appears directed against the recently restated Pontifical claims. Partisanship in the conflict between the Papacy and the Italian State is fraught with disadvantage for all Powers with a numerous Catholic community among their subjects. These disadvantages would, however, be minimized were the Consulta to open conversations with



the Vatican, and in accord with the Holy Father bring about conditions such as to render possible his continued decorous and independent residence in Rome.

Prince Bismarck places his finger upon the crux of the Roman Question. Pope Pius IX had protested to the world against the conqueror's might righting a wrong. The protest had not been withdrawn. The Italian Law of Guarantees had been framed without consultation with the Pope or regard for the millenary rights of the Papacy. Protest against that enactment had not been waived. Hence we note Prince Bismarck's *sine qua non* condition for a guarantee clause in the Treaty—namely, an agreed *modus vivendi* with the Pope. He admits the wellnigh insuperable difficulties, and concludes that now, were the Consulta to prefer a direct request, he would say *no*, an answer such as was given to suggestions "which have reached us from certain ecclesiastical quarters, aware as we are that the go-between receives no thanks from reconciled adversaries." Strictures are passed upon the weakness of the Italian State, enhanced by the personality of the Sovereign (King Umberto I, assassinated 1900). A possible Republican régime is contemplated, with reflections upon France, which nevertheless would not imperil the existence of the Papacy, and might conceivably facilitate a settlement; and Prince Reuss is instructed to obtain the Austrian Foreign Minister's views.

Prince Reuss reports these in a lengthy confidential despatch (January 7, 1882). Count Kalnoky agrees that a *modus vivendi* would prove an admirable preliminary to the guarantee, but he perceives no chance of acceptable offers being made. The suggestion that, like Moscow, Rome should not be the residence of the Italian Court or Government Departments, but regarded by both parties as a Holy City under joint spiritual and municipal government, is stated only to be dismissed. The Italian State after ten years would not stand in a white sheet and cry *Pater peccavi*; indeed, were the King to leave Rome, he would as certainly leave his crown behind. The Austrian position with regard to overt support of a *modus vivendi* is next examined. The Minister, while approving the

principle, deprecates interference or departure from the neutral position taken up from 1870 onward in the Roman Question. Any step they might now take would open the door to unwarranted hopes; publicity, inevitable since it would lend weight to the Vatican case, would as obviously strangle any settlement at birth.

The guarantee of territorial integrity asked for by the Consulta to import something more tangible for Italy than fair words and, it was felt in Rome, a place below the salt at the board of the two Emperors, proved for Count Robilant "one of the things you know we never discuss." The Italian Ambassador was gifted with clearer insight than his Foreign Minister, as their letters show. The Ambassador writes, February 20 :

"It appeared to me untimely to stress this matter farther; the real reason why Vienna refuses to enter into an agreement to guarantee our territorial integrity was too clearly that very same which I had directly anticipated in my despatch of January 13. There was no purpose to be served in getting the t's crossed and the i's dotted. . . . I therefore kept silence, leaving it to Count Kalnoky to continue his remarks."

The purport of these, set forth in the despatch dated January 13, carries such double-edged logic as to deserve full quotation :

"For us to come forward with proposals for a special pact upon the basis of a reciprocal territorial guarantee of defence in the event of foreign aggression, could bring us only a refusal, indeed politely worded, but flat all the same. As a matter of fact, who threatens Austria, powerfully backed as she is by the German Alliance? At most Russia, supposing that her position at home, daily more fraught with danger, does not render her innocuous; moreover, we do not propose to enter into an alliance with Austria against her sole eventual adversary. What, therefore, can we give Austria in exchange for the immense support she would afford us against our enemies, France and the Papacy? Nothing, nothing whatever. Moreover, how can we believe that without any offset soever Austria, the only true Catholic Power, would choose to-day, in the face of Catholic Christendom which has once more taken up the question of the Papacy, to unite her colours with our flag, to guarantee us solemnly the possession of Rome, of which Catholic Christendom is so bitterly contesting our sovereignty?"

Count Robilant's *démarches* and the views deliberately kept from the Ambassador by Count Kalnoky are detailed with the frankness of the candid friend to Count Wimpffen in Rome. Signor Salata, for motives which can be guessed, gives only an excerpt from the confidential despatch dated March 3, 1882:

"I consider that the idea of a guarantee treaty is unacceptable, not alone for the reasons stressed by me in my conversation with Robilant, but also because the Italian cunning [*astuzia*], which thinks by this means to import implicitly through the back door [*di contrabando*] the guarantee of the Capital into the provisions, is but one more reason for non-adherence. I will not commit myself to a thoroughgoing discussion of the Roman Question. But were we to end by guaranteeing the Italians the possession of their Capital, it would behove them in any eventuality to offer us a price equivalent to the concession highly important for them."

The Austrian refusal produced a very painful impression at the Consulta. Baron Blanc made representations to Count Wimpffen, who reported the matter home. Weeks went by, and Berlin and Vienna remained adamant. Blanc, backing down, declared (March 27) that "the Roman Question was not on the agenda of the definite agreement under consideration." The Foreign Minister, Signor Mancini's, illusions are only dispelled by Count Robilant's opinion expressed March 29, that, "while Austria does not dream of restoring Rome to the Pope, the Emperor deems it his conscientious duty to reject any eventual, albeit only theoretical, commitments." The Consulta nevertheless continued to split hairs over *territorial integrity* and *neutrality guarantees*, and finally consented to subscribe the Triple Alliance, May 20, 1882, void of any such provisions.

The text of the Triple Alliance, renewed several times in the course of thirty-three years, was kept secret. The apprehensions of Pope Leo XIII with regard to the guarantee, restated in an autograph letter to the Emperor Francis Joseph, May 3, were dispelled by the Imperial reply dated June 3. The Pontiff and his successors were thus able to regard with equanimity the *suggestio falsi* of a guarantee implied so late as May, 1907, by the Minister

for Foreign Affairs, Signor Tittoni, in the fact of an Austrian Ambassador accredited to Italy! Brave words once more, remarks Signor Salata, but the truth lay elsewhere, and Count Kalnoky, addressing the Austrian Delegation, could truthfully affirm that Austro-Hungary had nothing to fear from the eventual publication of the Treaty in the shape of disagreeable representations from the Roman Curia. The diplomatic hazard, thus safely bridged through the clearer perception of the "imponderabilia" of the Roman Question displayed outside the Consulta, was the first milestone upon the way to the agreed settlement, foreseen by Bismarck and Kalnoky as the only true solution of the Roman Question.

M. MANSFIELD.

## ART. 8.—PETRARCH'S LAURA

### (QUI REGNA AMORE)

1. *Il Canzoniere di Francesco Petrarca cronologicamente riordinato.* Lorenzo Mascetta. (Lanciano, 1895.)
2. *The Secret of Petrarch.* By E. J. Mills. (London : Fisher Unwin, 1904.)
3. *Some Love Songs of Petrarch.* By W. D. Foulke, LL.D. (Humphrey Milford, 1915.)
4. *Francesco Petrarca: His Life and Correspondence.* (A Study of the Early Fourteenth Century.) Vol. I. By Edward H. R. Tatham, M.A., F.S.A., Canon and Prebendary of Lincoln Cathedral. (London : The Sheldon Press, 1925.)

When I read Petrarch, yet a boy, o'erbold,  
I too would climb where Fame's high laurel springs ;  
In him the poet loves, the lover sings ;  
He only knew how gods their passion told.  
His only was the charm transfused to hold  
A sigh, a tear, the heart's brief flutterings  
Rich in a smile, its semblance pure he brings  
Graven on diamond scroll with point of gold.

MUSSET (Trans. H. C.).

LOVERS who are also literary have one great advantage over those equally distinguished in other walks of life by being able not only to give their own account of the course of their attachments, but to adorn it with all the graces of consummate art. Occasionally this is not quite fair to the objects of these attachments, treated with scant impartiality. Fortunately, in the case before us, Petrarch has nothing but praise for the strange being who first attracted him in what we should call her childhood, and retained his almost religious devotion to the last day of his life, by which time his passion had passed through many phases, and the object of it become transformed into a protecting influence shining on him from on high. Such an experience, so discoursed upon, and necessarily with a certain vagueness and reserve, was sure to occasion controversy—and even the existence of its object has been questioned. Until recently the version put forward

by De Sade has, with some hesitation, been generally accepted. It was, however, always unsatisfactory, and may have owed its origin to personal vanity on the part of a writer eager to decorate his family tree. The subject is interesting in itself, and takes us back to one of the great periods in the history of European civilization when Pope and Emperor were struggling for leadership. It also brings vividly before us that most delightful beauty spot, the country round Avignon, at which it will now be convenient to take a hasty glance.

Many who read these pages must be familiar with at least the external aspect of the half-Italian city that supplanted Rome for so many generations ; with the old palace of the Popes, now fortunately freed like a decontrolled dwelling from its unwelcome occupants, and the broken bridge that half spans the Rhone. The Sorgue, once a very beautiful stream but now disfigured by an unsightly factory, falls into the great river a little above the town, and issuing from the side of a steep mountain follows the course of that closed valley (Vaucluse) near which dwelt—or is said to have dwelt—Madonna Laura, in whose honour were written the odes and sonnets on which Petrarch's fame now chiefly rests. They have all been frequently translated and discoursed upon, but every age requires its own version of these masterpieces of European literature—requires to be reminded by a contemporary voice of their surpassing excellence.

Let us begin with one of the odes—that of which De Sanctis says : “ With good reason has this *canzone* been pronounced the most beautiful that flowed from Petrarch's pen. It is a delightful fantasy, first-born among so many fair daughters of modern art inspired by solitude and sorrow. It contains the germ of all the new poetry that sprang from Laura's tomb.”

We need not, however, go beyond our own literature for educated appreciation of Petrarch and penetrative analysis of the various matters still in suspense that relate to his work and life. Among such aids to a better knowledge of the poet and his age a short essay entitled “ The Secret of Petrarch,” by E. J. Mills, deserves particular

attention. It is written to prove the inadmissibility of De Sade's contention that Laura was a married woman with eleven children, whose tomb is in the cathedral at Avignon ; and certainly an excellent case is made out in support of the writer's theory that she died unmarried, and, far from being an inhabitant of the courtly city of the Popes, lived all her days near the village of Caumont, some miles distant. Indeed, anyone who has carefully read the poems, either in the original or translated, will at once be aware of the ever-present influence of the open country, fresh fields, and blossoming trees, which, particularly in spring, fill this fruit-bearing land with fragrance—also of the delightful little rivers the local appellation of which gives its name to the town. It should also be remembered that both in prose and verse Petrarch speaks with unmeasured contempt of the papal city and all that it contained.

Following then the guidance of this attractive book, we there find it suggested that in one of these streams—and the incident relates to the ode about to be given—Laura occasionally bathed. At that time the habits of persons of moderate means were extremely primitive, and it is here suggested that on one occasion—which may have been that referred to in the ode—Petrarch was within sight of these ablutions. The terms in which he refers to himself as Actæon support this view, and, when considering it, the reader will at once be reminded of similar passages in *Paradise Lost* treated with equal delicacy and restraint—with that modesty of words which, as La Fontaine says, *peut tout dire*.

If then we accept this theory—in itself not at all improbable—the whole poetic edifice appears in a slightly different light. Laura remains in her unsullied purity on the pedestal of her lover's devotion, but he has made a material advance. "To see is to have" ; and he has now enshrined in his recollection this marvel of perfect loveliness freed from all conventional decoration. In the sister arts of painting and sculpture the treatment of the nude is the supreme test of excellence ; and similar conditions prevail in literature. Keats in his first considerable work has perhaps achieved only a half-success in this respect, but



in the *Eve of St. Agnes* he comes much nearer perfection ; and, as we have said, Milton issues triumphantly from the ordeal. So is it with Petrarch, to whom, in his own rather narrow sphere, the Muses had nothing to deny.

## VAUCLUSE

## CANZONE

(*Chiare, fresche e dolci acque.*)

Clear waters, cold and sweet,  
Where she her hands, her feet,  
Her delicate limbs refreshed  
    who sole seems woman to me ;  
Grass, that her dainty dress  
Did, oh ! so lightly, press,  
And bough whereon she leaned  
    when Love these sights did show me ;  
Airs, sacred and serene,  
Which to my sighs have been  
Witness, since her bright eyes  
    with beams of fire smote through me ;  
Together listen to my last complaining ;  
Listen, and hear the sound of my heart paining.

If 'tis indeed the will  
Of Heaven, these eyes that fill  
So oft with tears of love  
    should now be closed for ever ;  
Amidst you would I rest  
When from our earthly vest  
My naked spirit shall  
    the finer substance sever ;  
A place of parting this  
Fragrant of heavenly bliss,  
Earnest of pleasures shown  
    beneath earth's sunshine never !  
Here let my bones, my travailed flesh repose,  
Where grow these flowers, where this clear water flows.

Haply Time yet may grant  
That, to her chosen haunt,  
This wild, sweet creature will  
    in kinder mood return ;

And glancing t'ward this spot  
 Where she will find me not  
 (As on that day so blest)  
     a lowly mound discern ;  
 Then be such glory mine—  
 Hers pity so benign—  
 That she will sweetly sigh  
     and wish my grace to earn ;  
 With moistened veil in sight of Heaven appear,  
 And win my soul's contentment with a tear.

From boughs o'erladen fell—  
 Sweet thought and sweet to tell—  
 Into her lap that day  
     a shower of buds new-blown ;  
 And in this floral state  
 How modestly she sate,  
 About her amorous flowers  
     like queenly vesture thrown !  
 Some on her silken wear,  
 Some chanced upon her hair—  
 Gold over-wrought with pearls !—  
     some on the grass were strewn ;  
 Some on the stream ; some, thought I, from above  
 Cried, fluttering in the sunlight, "Here reigns Love."

Then in my heart I said,  
 Touched with a holy dread,  
 Surely this wondrous child  
     was born in Paradise !  
 Her smile so sweet, and face,  
 Words, mien, and gentle grace,  
 So wrought in me I lost  
     truth's image in surmise :  
 I knew not when, nor how  
 I came, but seemed to know  
 In sweet oblivion she  
     had drawn me to the skies !  
 Since then those flowers, that sunshine, and that air  
 So charm me, I can find no peace elsewhere.  
 Song, hadst thou merit as thou hast desire,  
 How bravely mightst thou go  
 Forth from these woods and thy perfection show !

We will now rapidly, but in some detail, examine the arguments used to throw doubt on De Sade's contention,

which, chiefly owing to the excellent work done by him in other matters connected with Petrarch, has obtained wide, one might almost say official, credence.

Firstly, in regard to Laura's birthplace, it seems pretty clear that she was born in the country, not, as De Sade contends, in a large town like Avignon, and probably in or near the village of Caumont, about eight miles distant in a south-easterly direction. Several quotations from the sonnets support this view; also a short reference in a contemporary poet, Fr. Galeota.

He next endeavours to show that, although she died during the plague, the symptoms mentioned by Petrarch are inconsistent with death from that cause; and the evidence that she was buried in the country near her probable home—not in the city church visited by tourists—seems fairly strong.

In another chapter several quotations from the sonnets are noted which could hardly have been addressed to a married woman, and certain rare phrases sometimes thought to indicate matrimony on her part are shown to have no such exclusive signification. Indeed, looked at broadly, it seems hardly possible to associate the intense purity of thought, and natural bias on Laura's part toward holy things, with a companionship that had anything about it of an adulterous nature.

Concerning her habitual place of abode, we find the following eloquent passage descriptive of the woods and waters, the hills and quiet valleys, among which a seasoned man of the world assumes the part of Thyrsis or Corydon :

The myth, initiated by De Sade, that Laura resided at Avignon is dying hard in the hands of some surviving authorities. Not only is the myth inconsistent with the above evidence, but it can readily be confuted by additional particulars, also from Petrarch himself. In *Apollò*, 13 we find her seated on the grass, over which (*Perch'al*, 4, 6) and through a wood he follows her. In *Benedetto*, 8 and elsewhere Laura lives in a beautiful countryside, which (*L'aer gravato*, 32) is between two rivers—*i.e.*, the Durance and the Sorga. In summer she would sit outside on a large stone (*Quella fen*, 4) or take a favourite seat under a large tree (*Chiare*, 40). Violets abounded in their season (*Mai non vo*, 64; *In quella parte*, 32), and there the roadside took verdure

(Nova ang., 3). Various passages assure us that the air there was habitually calm (Aventurose, 4; Lasso, 11, 15, etc.). The poet, on the other hand, in his "Epistle to Posterity," speaks of Avignon as situated on the bank of that "most windy river"—the Rhone.

Or vedi, 5 tells us how young Laura was in the habit of sitting down among the flowers and grass and removing her shoes—an act which in those days was sufficient to bare her feet; she seems to have reluctantly relinquished this practice. On one occasion, years after, Petrarch saw her bathing—naked, as was the custom of the time (Nel dolce, 151; Chiare, 3). When he was at Vacluse, Laura was near, yet far off (Di pensier, 61); and her residence was visible from high ground near Vacluse. She herself was like a flower as she sate in the grass (Amor ed io, 9); and she was wont to go about alone (*ib.*, 14). The neighbourhood was richly wooded (Liete fiori, 7), and altogether a very charming country. In the immediate vicinity was a river of very clear water (*ib.*, 9; Aura che, 13) where she would bathe her face and eyes or rinse her veil (Non al, 5). This *diletto fiume* (Mille piagge, 12) cannot be identified with the muddy waters of the Rhone or Durance and could only have been the Sorga. The site was between two rivers (Una candida, 3 and elsewhere), generally admitted by the best authorities to have been the pair just named. It was a retreat shaded by pleasant hills (Stiamo, 8). The district was on the left bank of the Rhone, in a spot where the grass is *piu verde* and the air more serene (Rapido, 8). There were pleasant hills (I dolci, 1), in a happy country with shaded flowery slopes (Passer, 12, 13), and a happy air where the vegetation smiled (La ver, 31). It was beneath a cool, shady, flowery and verdant hill that Laura would sit, and think, or sing (Fresco, 1, 2), or walk about—in short a paradise, not the Avignon inferno. After Laura's death the poet frequently repeats the above characteristics. He longs to see her again, her tresses loosened in the breeze (Amor, se, 59). In a vision she appears to him walking over the flowers and grass just as in life (Quante fiate, 12).

This long list of passages—the drift of which is absolutely unmodified by any others to be found in Petrarch—is sufficient to show that Laura could not have been a resident in the city of Avignon.

Like the persuasive advocate he is, the compiler—or translator—of this evidence seems to have established his main thesis that De Sade's contention is untrustworthy, in fact may have been invented by him from interested motives; and our sympathies are entirely in favour of his view, with its pastoral charm, that Laura—like the innamorata

of the Lord of Burleigh, though in a rather higher social environment—was a country-bred girl, a denizen of the flowering woodland near Caumont, combining a Diana-like purity of mind with the Christian grace of tenderness. On the other hand, the author of the next book on our list, with much hesitation, considers the De Sade theory not improbable, though certainly not established, and gives a fair account of the Italian work on which Mr. Mills' book is chiefly based, but without mentioning Mr. Mills. He dwells also on the fact that Petrarch continually surrounds his mistress with the natural beauties of the countryside, and concludes with a graceful rendering of the lines in the *Trionfo della Morte* which describe the symptoms and surroundings of Laura's passing away—quite inconsistent with those of the plague.

More recently, in an excellent and laborious study of the fourteenth century in Italy and France written round Petrarch somewhat after the manner of Masson's *Milton*, Canon Tatham takes a much stronger view in favour of De Sade, and speaks with great severity of Mr. Mills—who certainly carries his argument too far—accusing him of disingenuousness or bad scholarship. He states quite fairly—and it is well to remember this—that up to the latter half of the eighteenth century Laura was assumed to be unmarried, and admits that we do not know who she was; also that most of De Sade's "evidence" has disappeared. The controversy therefore narrows itself down to the question: Was Laura married? Strongly, with some heat and at considerable length, he maintains that she was, and bases his conclusions on Petrarch's prose works, particularly the *Secretum*, telling us "that he takes it as a settled canon that a single statement of his Latin prose should outweigh all the dubious inferences that have been drawn from the *Rime*."

Here we think he will hardly carry his reader with him even as a general rule in such discussions, especially, as in this case, when the poet had obviously made up his mind to give no precise indications—to awake curiosity but not to satisfy it. If, as one who knew them well said of poets in general, "They are such liars, and take all colours like

the hands of dyers," they rarely change their nature when writing prose. As Mr. Holloway-Calthrop, whom he very fairly quotes, says with much truth: "We do not know whether Laura was married or unmarried"; and certainly such a person as a husband would be strangely out of place in the delightful pleasance Petrarch has portrayed as the scene of his enchantment; while the eleven children would destroy it altogether. In fact the Rev. Canon seems to feel this, for a little later he suggests that Laura never visited Vaucluse, and passed her life in the city of Avignon; which means that she must have lived perilously near to the "other woman." Mr. Mills and his friends need not despair.

Regarded as a whole the book is a very valuable addition to Petrarchan studies, and brings the period, which is not too well known, before us with great distinctness; and the observations on Laura's personal appearance, though rather disturbing, are on the whole welcome. In opposition to Mr. Mills he allows no authority to the plaintive features which are such a decoration to his predecessor's work, and, like Sir John Harrington,\* who so much resented Ariosto's statement that Alcina had yellow hair and black eyes, he tries to free Laura from a similar reproach; in which certainly he has our sympathy.

The first volume, which contains the chapters that relate to our subject, has also many welcome translations of Petrarch's prose, often strangely modern in tone and always of high interest.

It is unfortunate, as he states in a note, that Canon Tatham has not read Signor Mascetta's work. Written by a fellow-countryman of the poet and an enthusiastic admirer, he is likely to come nearer to the true significance of doubtful lines than a foreigner, as, for instance, when he tells us that the kiss mentioned in Sonnet CLXXXIII might be delivered vicariously by the Sorgue as a tributary of the Rhone, too muddy and boisterous for such an act—a view that had not occurred to our countryman, who thinks the line evidence that Laura resided in Avignon.

\* The Elizabethan translator of Ariosto.

Passing now to the sonnets, none probably is more original in conception, forcible, or better expressed than that addressed to the great river he knew so well, whose impetuous vitality seemed a reflexion of his own. Like the Swallow in Tennyson's well-known lyric, it is asked to carry tidings of him to his beloved ; yet he hardly dares to hope that his absence is regretted. The resemblance to Byron's lines to the Po—probably suggested by it—is also very apparent. It is the only one which can here be given in the precise form of the original. That adopted in those which follow is in some sort an experiment, yet one which it is hoped may be found worthy of attention, though only adaptable to the later and graver compositions ; and among them it is evident that the introductory sonnet "*Voi ch' ascoltate*" must be placed. There is in it a truly Miltonic dignity and sadness such as we find in the lines on a crown beginning "*Golden in show is but a wreath of thorns*" in *Paradise Regained*—a passage which, in fact, comes very near to the sonnet form. It also suggests that in some cases blank verse is the best medium to preserve similar characteristics in our tongue. Something generally must be sacrificed, and in this case, also in the last sonnet of the second part, the least important characteristics of the original appear to be lost. Upon this point, however, it may interest those in search of further guidance to refer to a little work by J. E. Taylor, *Michael Angelo considered as a Philosophic Poet*, published by John Murray, 1852.

## SONNET CLXXXIII

## THE RHONE

(*Rapido fiume, che d' alpestra vena.*)

Swift surging river, that from Alpine source  
 Rending the ground around thee, whence thy name,  
 Com'st with me night and day, our path the same,  
 I led by Love, thou by thy onward force !  
 Before me haste : fatigue and sleep thy course  
 Restrain not ; and ere yet the sea shall claim  
 His due from thee, expect, where dwells this dame,  
 Soft airs and greener lawns to grace thy shores.



There shines our gentle and benignant sun,  
And flowers thy left bank in his garlands dight;  
There (dare I hope it) does she mourn my stay?  
Kiss then her foot, or hand so fair and white;  
Tell her, thy greeting has my words outrun;  
The spirit eager though the flesh delay.

This sonnet, which sheds such distinction on the poet, the river, and the age in which he lived, was probably composed on his return from a notable journey to Paris and the Netherlands in 1333, and probably refers to some time when he was travelling beside the river—not on it. He had paused in the cities of the Rhine, where, as he tells us, much festivity prevailed, traversed unarmed and in safety the dangerous forest of Ardennes, and ultimately reached Lyons, where he seems to have been detained. Here, looking upon the fleeting current, he envied the speed of those turgid waves, beginning to mingle with the purer waters of the Saone—as indeed his own troubled nature sought to blend with the clearer personality of the beloved. Although young, and the son of parents in a middling position in life, he had been entertained wherever he visited with high honour, which emphasizes the almost unexampled success (quite apart from his poetry) that had attended him, and which, in an age illustrated by Riensi and Savonarola, placed him in a position of pre-eminence to the end of his life forty years later. And even now, more than six hundred years after his birth, while his contemporary Chaucer—and indeed, two centuries later, Spenser, like his models Du Bellay and Ronsard—cannot be read without a glossary, he speaks directly to the mind and feeling of all true lovers.

We now come to our last examples, the Alpha and Omega of this collection of love poems, still unsurpassed, which Petrarch left for the enjoyment of his countrymen, and which perhaps a translator, whose work resembles that of an engraver in the sister art of painting, may reproduce in another medium without so great loss in any essential characteristic as to create a wrong impression of the author's qualities. Doubtless all translation, from the point of view of the purist, is unsatisfying, though

whether it deserve the ruthless condemnation pronounced upon it a year or so ago in a contemporary seems hardly to require confutation. Without it Shakespeare would have lacked his subjects and his models, Keats a source of inspiration, Pope his one abiding claim upon our gratitude, Fitzgerald and Rossetti their chief *literary* title to consideration, Fairfax his chance not only to emulate, so far as expression is concerned, the graceful style of Tasso, but to supply Milton with his "Heavenly Muse," and many other useful adaptations from the Italian.

Returning, however, to our subject, it is interesting to note, as evidence of the supreme importance attached to Petrarch's work in Italy, with what minute care the commentators have explained and elucidated every line of his poems, ever seeking to discover some hidden meaning, some riddle for posterity. One of the most ingenious and copious of these (he devotes fifteen pages to the first sonnet) is Signor Mascetta, who has rearranged the poems in a more probable order ; putting, for instance, the three sonnets addressed to the Rhone in their right sequence. To him we are also indebted for the evidence concerning Laura's identity of which Mr. Mills has made such effective use, but without acknowledgement.

### SONNET I

*"Voi ch'ascoltate in rime sparse il suono"*

Ye who in scattered numbers hear the sound  
Of those deep sighs whereon my heart I fed  
In the first season of my youthful error  
When I in part was other than I am,  
Who hear the varied strain in which I weep,  
My doubts, vain hopes, and unavailing sorrow,  
Where'er they be whom love has taught to love,  
Pity, I hoped to find, not pardon only.

But well I see now they who heard me made  
A sport and pastime of my griefs, that, often  
Even of my very self am I ashamed.  
And of my vain discourse shame is the fruit,  
Repentance, and clear knowledge ascertained  
That favour of this world is a short dream.

## SONNET CCCXVII

*"Vago uccelletto"*

Dear little bird that goest singing still,  
 Or rather weeping thy past happy time,  
 Seeing the night at hand and winter near,  
 Day and the pleasant months now left behind;

If, as thou knowest the anguish in thy heart,  
 My like unhappy state thou couldst discern,  
 Here in the breast of this disconsolate  
 Wouldst thou not come with his thy plaint to join?

I know not if an equal grief be ours  
 Since she for whom thou sorrowest haply lives,  
 Whilst death to me and heaven are more unkind.

But the late season and the darkening hour,  
 With memory of sweet and bitter years,  
 Lead me thus pitiful to speak with thee.

Apart from his prose studies in Latin, a long Latin poem, and various political activities, the odes, sonnets, and madrigals, composed with few exceptions in honour of Madonna Laura, represent the life work of a mind which for broad human sympathy, elevation, power, and general benevolence has rarely been surpassed. Of this verse production he has told us that every line was carefully weighed and balanced and where necessary corrected; so much so that, although the prose might benefit by revision, the verse could not be improved.

Concerning the identity of Laura, many will continue to believe that this "wild, sweet creature," who bathed in the streams and sat barefoot on the grass, was a great lady at the papal court, and mother of eleven children. Others prefer to think that it is in Petrarch's poetry, written when the impression was fresh upon him, not in scraps of Latin pedantically elaborated and possibly intended to mislead the scholars and exalted personages who alone could understand them, that we must seek a true conception of his ideal.

That is the view which commends itself to the translator of the examples of his work here given. Before

leaving the subject it may be convenient to remind readers that the sonnets cover a very long period in the author's life, of which they are the mirror. They are divided into two sections—those written while Laura yet lived ; and those during the twenty-five years that Petrarch survived her. The loss cast a shadow of intense gloom over all these later years of the great writer—1348-74—but added deeper feeling to his verse. Probably Ugo Foscolo was thinking of this later production when he said : “ It is in the expression of sorrow that Petrarch enters most surely into his readers' hearts, and they into his.”

HENRY CLORISTON.

The translations of Petrarch in this article are by Mr. H. Cloriston,—  
EDITOR, *D.R.*

## ART. 9.—THE CODEX AUREÆVALLENSIS

IN the year 1679 the learned Jesuit Père P. F. Chifflet published, at Paris, his *Opuscula Quatuor*, IV. *Excerpta singularia ex collectaneis de vita . . . S. Bernardi auctore Gaufrido Abbate*, etc. For the purpose in hand he made use of a MS. from Orval (*Aurea Vallis*), the second daughter of Troisfontaines, founded in Luxemburg in 1132. The late Abbé E. Vacandard, when he wrote his *Vie de saint Bernard*, believed this MS. to have been lost. This opinion was maintained in the fourth and last edition of his work (*op. cit.*, xxi sq., Paris, 1910). He was, of course, aware of the existence of two copies of the MS. One of these is in the Bibliothèque Nationale (fonds Latin 17639); the other is in the Collège St. Michel at Brussels (*Collect. Bolland.*, 130 [olim 30]). Both of them are of the seventeenth century, and are written on paper. Each tells something of its own story. In the Paris MS. we read after the title: "Omnia ex antiquis codicibus descripta manu Joannis Bouhier senatoris Divionensis"; this statement is endorsed over the page: "Hæc autem excerpta manu sua descripsit avus meus Joannes Bouhier senator Divionensis, ex antiquo codice qui fuit penes eundem Chiffletium." On the following page is written: "Gaufridi Abbatis Clarevallensis excerpta de vita et miraculis S. Bernardi abbatis ejusdem monasterii. Miracula S. Bernardi Clarevallensis abbatis. Ex mss. Abbatiae aureæ vallis in Lucemburgo." The plurals "codicibus" and "mss." probably indicate that, as will be seen, the volume copied is complex. The notes written upon the Brussels MS. are as follows. On page 1 we read: "Vita S. Bernardi Abbatis ex ms. monasterii aureæ vallis submisso à P. Alessandro Willheim Rectore Luxemburgensi"; and, on the back of this page: "Museum Bollandium ex dono Abbatiae Tongerlaensis." In passing we may identify the Abbatia Tongerlaensis as the Premonstratensian house of Tongerlo, not far from Antwerp, recently, alas! seriously

damaged by fire. Both these copies have been carefully examined by Professor Christiansen of Askov-Vejen, to whom the present writer is much indebted. Nothing more need be said as to the former copy. As regards the latter, having been made by the Jesuit Father Alexander Willheim, it formed the basis of the work of his *confrère* Jean Pien in the *Acta SS. Bolland.* (August. iv, *die* 20, 101 *sqq.*) and of the same writer's *Gloria Posthuma ac Suppl. ad Vit. S. Bern.* (*ap.* Migne, P.L. 185, col. 943 *sqq.*).

The Abbey of Orval in the diocese of Trèves owed its origin to some Benedictine monks of Calabria, who about the year 1070 came to Lorraine on an evangelistic mission. They at length settled in a valley in the Ardennes on land granted by Arnolf II, Count of Chiny, where they built an oratory to our Lady and some humble cells. In 1080 by the aid of Matilda, Duchess of Lower Lorraine, they built a monastery. One day when the Duchess was visiting them she dropped by accident her gold wedding-ring into a well; on its miraculous recovery she named the place *Aurea Vallis*. When in 1110 the Benedictines were recalled to Calabria they were succeeded by secular canons. This latter enterprise seems to have been not very successful, and Albert of Chiny, nephew of Arnolf II, on the advice of Alberon, Bishop of Verdun, approached St. Bernard, with the result that on March 9, 1132, the second daughter of Troisfontaines was founded at Orval, with Constantine, formerly a Clairvaux monk, as its first abbot (Janauschek, *Orig. Cisterc.*, i, p. 23; Joann. Bertelii *Historia Luxemb.*, p. 91).

In 1793 Orval, which from early days had been famous for its library (Joann. Bertelii, *op. cit.*, p. 95), was pillaged and burnt. The monks took refuge at Luxemburg, but were again dispersed. Their treasures, such as were salvaged, had been distributed amongst them. Dom Joseph Martin received the volume containing the *Excerpta*, which he afterwards gave to the Abbé Clesse, curé of Anlier. In 1830 the Trappists of Bellevaux, near Besançon, the first daughter of Morimond, were

exiled to Switzerland. About the year 1840 they returned, their numbers greatly depleted, and resettled in some farm-buildings in the Val-Sainte-Marie in the Doubs. Thence, being entirely without liturgical books, they despatched a monk on a voyage of discovery. In 1841 this monk found the volume in question in the hands of the Abbé Clesse, who at once surrendered it on learning that it was to go to Cistercians of the same observance as that of Orval.

The Bellevaux monk who executed this search gives us the story as an Appendix to his *Histoire des Trappistes du Val-Ste-Marie*, 3<sup>me</sup> ed., 1843. It should be observed, in passing, that not all the copies of the third edition contain this Appendix; it is, however, reproduced in Appendix II of the *Histoire de l'Abbaye d'Orval* by the Abbé Tillière, 3rd edition, revised and enlarged by a Belgian Cistercian in 1927. Before parting with the volume the curé of Anlier gave a certificate of its *provenance*, so far as known to him, to which reference will be made later.

In 1849 the Trappists of Val-Ste-Marie migrated to Grâce-Dieu in Franche-Comté, the sole daughter of La Charité, the third daughter of Bellevaux, and thus of the line of Morimond. Grâce-Dieu was at the time derelict. The Archbishop of Besançon had urged that the settlement in the Val-Ste-Marie lacked regularity, with the result that Grâce-Dieu was refounded from the Abbey of Sept-Fonds in Allier in the above-named year. In 1861 the monks of Grâce-Dieu repopled Tamié in Savoy. This monastery was originally founded in 1132 by the noble family of Cabredunum (*Chevron*) and by St. Pierre I de Tarentaise, as the third daughter of Bonneval, of the line of Cîteaux, in the diocese of Vienne. It was called Tamié—i.e., *Stamedium*—as lying between the four territories of Vienne, the Tarentaise, Geneva and Savoy. St. Pierre, the co-founder, had been Abbot of La Ferté, and was at the time of the foundation Archbishop of the Tarentaise with his see at Moûtiers. In 1909 the Trappists of Grâce-Dieu finally migrated to Tamié, but it was not until the year 1925 that the first abbot of the



restored house, Dom Alexis Presse, was elected, blessed and installed. The volume from Orval is now safe in the library at Tamié, where, by the courtesy of the abbot and with his sympathetic help, the present writer has had the privilege of studying it and its entrancing story.

The volume is bound in strong oak boards, about  $\frac{3}{16}$  inch in thickness, covered with brown leather of perhaps the late sixteenth or early seventeenth century. The label at the back bears the title *Vita S. Berna*: and is of one piece with the leather binding. The edges have been gilded. The size of the parchment pages is almost uniformly  $5\frac{5}{8} \times 4$  inches. The octavo sheets are numbered up to and including vii, but no farther; the number iv is found to be two pages too early, because two pages (53 and 54) of sheet iii have been cut out. At the foot of the first page we read the press-mark of the Orval inventory, N. 9, with (between the letter and the figure) some more letters, apparently retraced but so far undeciphered, and the note, "de exordio ordinis cisterciensis"; down the outside margin is written "Orval," probably in an early nineteenth century hand; the note is perhaps a little later. Upon these dates it is impossible to dogmatize; it would be interesting to know whether the two inscriptions were made during the period when the MS. was in the possession of the Abbé Clesse—namely, 1793 to 1841; but, as now we shall see, we have his handwriting in the latter year, and it does not appear to be that of either inscription. The sheet of paper which lines the inner side of the first binding-board gives us his autograph certificate. "Le soussigné avoit reçu de Dom Henri Joseph Martin, religieux de l'abbaye d'Orval, de l'ordre de Cîteaux, dans le duché de Luxembourg, le présent manuscrit qui contient la vie de saint Bernard et sur la fin le précis de celle de saint Hubert. Le soussigné désirant que ce précieux manuscrit retourne a un monastère de l'ordre de Cîteaux en fait présent au Monastère de la Trappe du Val Ste Marie, près Besançon, qui est de cet ordre. Anlier, le 10 Novembre, 1841.

fr. L. Clesse, curé d'Anlier."

In the left-hand corner above this certificate is the press-mark of the Val-Ste-Marie inventory, <sup>3407</sup><sub>16</sub>—found also in the same hand on a small paper label attached to the binding; and on the opposite page in blue ink the oval stamp of the Bibliotheca B.M. Gratiae Dei, decorated with two five-pointed stars, one at each end of the oval.

The entire volume consists of 142 pages. Of these the *Bernardina* cover 128 pages, and a cut page of  $\frac{3}{4}$  to 1 inch in depth containing three lines, on the verso of which cut page we read: "Fortis a leone rugiente et a dracone furiente," and some initials and groups of two letters, which have so far defied interpretation.

The *Vita Sti Hugberti* takes up ten pages and four and a half lines of an eleventh page. Underneath these four and a half lines we read in an early eighteenth century hand: "M. ss. 5. 8." On the final page is written: (a) "Ave Jesu Christe Verbum Patris Filius Virginis Salus Mundi" in a hand different from that of the MS., but approximately contemporary with it; (b) "Ave Jesu" in a larger and later hand; and (c) "Liber Sancte Marie Aureevallis" in a later hand still. The *Prefatio* of the *Vita* begins on p. 131 of the volume. The pages of this quite separate MS. are cut so closely at the top that the "f" and the capital letters of the rubricated title, *Prefatio In Vita Sci Hugberti*, are, with the exception of the "V," all mutilated. The opening words of the *Prefatio*—here given in more modernized form—are "Vitam et martirium beati Lamberti ecclesie Tungrensensis (sc. Tongres) episcopi describentes." The MS. ends on p. 141 of the volume with the words "hic aliquid retexere supersedi." This *Vita* may be regarded as part of a breviary; it is fully rubricated, and is divided into four lections. The script is perhaps a little later than that of the rest of the volume. It will thus be seen that there are really two MSS. concerned, namely, the *Bernardina* and the *Vita Sancti Hugberti*. Of the latter we need say no more. As regards the date of the entire volume the monk who found it at Anlier describes it as, in the opinion of "une personne fort versée dans l'anti-

quité," of the twelfth century, and this was the view taken by Léopold Delisle—a very high authority.

The *Excerpta* begin with the words "Interritorio Lingonis civitatis" and end with the words "potuit deinceps recordari," on p. 78. Under the title *Fragmenta ex tertia vita S. Bernardi* Mabillon, Migne and the *Acta SS. Bolland.* (20 Aug. *passim*) reproduce between them fifteen separately entitled sections containing about one quarter of these seventy-eight pages. The capitals of the MS., chiefly in black, divide it into forty-eight paragraphs. At the bottom of page 6 the second of these paragraphs has a rubricated title: "Incipit Vita vel Miracula Bernardi Abbatis"; the black initial "S" of the next word is faintly encircled in red. As has been observed, pp. 53 and 54 are lacking—*i.e.*, the words between "bibent potionem," on p. 52, and "et pueri," on p. 55, are not found. The capitals are in many instances quaintly tailed, the actual letters being in a slate-toned mauve and the tails in the same mauve and a dark red. Here and there minuscules on the bottom line are similarly tailed; for example, sheet iii has such a tail on every page; on sheet iv they appear four times; after that they disappear entirely. There is a vertical tear of about an inch and a half in pp. 69 and 70, which has been finely sutured in parchment lacing before the script was written; broken words are hyphenated across it in dark red ink. On p. 79 we read: "Incipit epistola in miraculis Bernardi abbatis," in red, immediately followed by "Dominis et amicis suis clericis ecclesie Coloniensis salutem dicunt fratres et amici eorum Everardus Gerardus . . .," ending on p. 105 with the words "hic et in omnia secula seculorum. amen." This is the covering letter which prefaces Part II of the *Liber Miraculorum* (vi, 21 *sqq.*), together with the whole of Part II to the end of ix, 33, as found in Mabillon, vol. ii, tom. vi, 547 *sqq.* The capital "D" in "Dominus" is in red. In lines 10 and 11 of p. 83 the words "Explicit epistola. Incipit proœmium libelli secundi" are deleted in red ink. On the same page there immediately follows, with a rubricated capital, one of the above-mentioned

forty-eight paragraphs: "Multi ex vobis curiose legerunt exemplar quem. . . ." And here a later hand, perhaps of the seventeenth century, has noted in the margin "libelli" as a word required between "exemplar" and "quem." Moreover, instead of "Henricum" of the printed editions we find in this context the German form "Heinricum." In lines 10, 11 and 12 of p. 85 the words "Explicit proœmium libelli secundi. Incipit liber secundus de signis quæ a Spira usque Leodium claruerunt" are deleted in red ink. In line 9 of p. 96 we read the German exclamation, "Christ uns gnade," to which Horstius, Mabillon and Migne add "die Heiligen alle helffen uns." The greater portion of p. 101 and all of pp. 102 and 103 are in a different and inferior hand. The former hand resumes on p. 104.

On p. 105, four lines from the bottom, we read: "Incipit epistola Gaufridi. In Miraculis Bernardi Abbatis. Domino dilectissimo et reverendissimo patri Hermannò Dei gratia Constanciensi episcopo puer sanctitatis ejus Gaufridus Clare Vallis monachus." The capital "D" on p. 105 is in mauve ink; the rest is all in black ink. The MS. ends on the fragmentary p. 129 with the words "felix manus gratia sanitatum et virtutum affluens signis. Explicit liber tercius." Immediately before this ending and after the words "efficax invenitur" the writing becomes larger at the words "Felix anima quam implevit"—a fact which illustrates the variety of script. This is Part III of the *Liber Miraculorum* from the beginning—i.e., x, 33 to xiii, 44 *ad fin.* The MS. thus ends before xiv, 45 of the printed editions.

Leaving out of consideration the *Vita Sti Hugberti*, which both in itself and for our purpose is an entirely separate work, the question arises as to the original *provenance* of the MS. The character of the hand or hands in which it is written, combined with the lack of ascription to St. Bernard of any such title as *Sanctus* or *Beatus*, fix the date as earlier than 1173, the year of his canonization. One is disposed to think that at least three hands may be detected, an opinion confirmed by Dom Alexis Presse, the Abbot of Tamié; but this does

not prove anything against the *provenance* of the MS. from one monastery. Reference has already been made to the German exclamation, "Christ uns gnade," and to the German form "Heinricum"; the former, of course, carries no weight as an indication of *provenance*, but the latter is suggestive of a German atmosphere. There was, not improbably, such an atmosphere at Orval in the diocese of Trèves; the abbey was known by the name of Guldenthal. Bertelius writes of its second abbot, a certain Theodoricus de Vitry: "Statim à regiminis sui exordio curæ fuit bibliothecam optimis libris instructam erigere, et in eam undequaque codices diversarum linguarum comportare" (*Historia Luxemburgensis*, p. 95). Theodoricus died in 1152, but, doubtless, the spirit of the book-lover lived on in his sons. Is it possible that the MS. was written by Orval monks and remained at Orval until the dispersion in 1793? There may have been either at Igny, where Geoffrey was abbot before he was promoted to Clairvaux in 1162, or at Clairvaux itself a MS., possibly Geoffrey's own autograph, which Orval monks were sent to copy for their own monastery. Alternatively, Geoffrey resigned the abbacy of Clairvaux in 1165, and there is no record of his movements until 1176—three years later than the canonization of St. Bernard—when he became Abbot of Fossanova. May it be conjectured that at some date between 1162 and 1173 the MS. was written under his supervision by Orval monks either at Clairvaux or at Orval itself when Geoffrey was a visitor there? It is not possible to deny that it may be the first complete record made of the events narrated. We can with some degree of certainty date the last of these events at Friday, February 21, 1147, the day of St. Bernard's return to Clairvaux from Etampes (Waitz, *ap. Mon. German. Hist.*, xxvi, pp. 135 sq.). But is it likely that Geoffrey would have waited until at least fifteen years had elapsed before making such a record? Certainly for the Rhineland journey he would have had his own *schedulæ* and those of his companions (*Vita Prima*, VI, v, 9); and the story of St. Bernard's early days would never fade from his memory. Again, would

he, an expert scribe, ever have allowed another hand than his own to make the standard record? Would he have consented to its being entrusted to any other monastery than Clairvaux? In the MS. we have more than one hand, and there is clear evidence of its early possession by Orval.

Once again, may the *Excerpta*, the script of which has a certain finish of its own, have been Geoffrey's own autograph? It is in them that there is to be found the most personal touch—namely, the reference to his conversion from the tenets of Abélard on the occasion of St. Bernard's delivery of the *De Conversione* at Paris in 1140 (MS., p. 63; *Fragmenta IX*, ap. Mabillon). But, if so, the difficulty of accounting for the presence of such an autograph at Orval has to be met. The problem does not appear to be easy of solution.

It has to be confessed that an interesting and gravely disputed question has been begged. It has been taken for granted that the Geoffrey who wrote these *Excerpts* and the rest of the *Bernadina* of the MS. is identical with Geoffrey of Auxerre, Geoffrey, fourth Abbot of Clairvaux, and Geoffrey who in 1176 became Abbot of Fossanova. The question was not raised by Vacandard in his *Vie de saint Bernard*, but it was hotly debated in the seventeenth century. Carolus de Visch contended that the more ancient authorities, such as Peter Helinandus, a Cistercian monk of Froimont, who had been a pupil of Geoffrey of Auxerre, distinguished this Geoffrey from the fourth Abbot of Cîteaux. Claude Maillet, Prior of Vauluisant, and Bertrand Tissier, Prior of Bonne-Fontaine, both of them Cistercians, the latter the author of the *Bibliotheca Patrum Cisterciensium*, identified all three Geoffreys. Apparently they founded their opinion upon the *Chronicon Claravallense*, printed at Dijon, under the supervision of Chifflet, in 1660 (*Auctarium D. Caroli de Visch ad Bibl. Script. S.O. Cisterc.* ed. Canivez, 1927, pp. 32 *sqq.*). On the other side was Philip Seguinus, Prior of the Cistercian Abbey of Charlieu, who held that Geoffrey of Auxerre wrote the story of the *Miracula in Germania Patrata*, but that

Geoffrey of Clairvaux wrote the last three Books of the *Vita Prima*; and, further, distinguished both these Geoffreys from the Abbot of Fossanova, who later became Abbot of Hautecombe (*De Scriptoribus*, *Littera G*, §§ 2, 4 and 13). The same view was taken by the Jesuit Antonius Possevinus (*Apparatus Sacer*). Mabillon held Geoffrey of Auxerre to have been St. Bernard's notary and the author of the last three Books of the *Vita Prima* (Mabillon, *Not. ad Libri Mirac. Partem III*). The whole problem will be found fully discussed in Carolus de Visch's work cited above. Amongst moderns Chevallier may be cited as identifying Geoffrey of Auxerre with St. Bernard's notary and with Geoffrey who was successively Abbot of Igny, of Clairvaux, of Fossanova and of Hautecombe (*Répertoire des Sources Historiques du Moyen Age*. *Bio-Bibliographie* I, col. 1701, Paris, 1905); and it is upon the basis of this hypothesis that the question of the *provenance* of the MS. has been discussed; but it is an hypothesis.

WATKIN WILLIAMS.



ART. 10.—INCIDENTAL GAINS FROM THE  
STUDY OF EPISCOPAL REGISTERS

*The Episcopal Registers of the Diocese of Exeter.* By the Rev. F. C. Hingeston-Randolph (1886 onwards).

*The Register of John de Drokenford, Bishop of Bath and Wells* (1309-1329). By the Right Rev. Edmund Hobhouse. (Somerset Record Society, vol. i; 1887.)

*The Register of Ralph of Shrewsbury, Bishop of Bath and Wells* (1329-1363). By the Rev. T. Scott Holmes. (*Ibid.*, vols. ix, x; 1896.)

*Registers Printed for the Canterbury and York Society* (established 1904).

**E**VEN the scholar, whether he be historian or archæologist, who turns the pages of the episcopal registers of a diocese with which he has no special familiarity, is apt to be impatient as he glances at lists of persons ordained to the various degrees of the Church's ministry, or at summaries of royal writs requiring the bishop to cite individual clergymen for debt or other minor offences. The names recorded, possibly here and nowhere else, have long passed into oblivion; is it worth the labour and cost to reproduce and index them? In view of the immense mass of material of all kinds still waiting to be calendared in the many ancient registers that happily have survived in our English dioceses, would it not be wise policy to take the speedier course of publishing a descriptive calendar of contents with exact transcripts of the more important items, merely indicating the presence of lists and writs which seem to be devoid of all human interest to-day?

Forty years ago the answer to such questions was hardly doubtful. In 1887 the Somerset Record Society was founded by a group of enthusiastic local archæologists, and the first document to be dealt with was the register of John de Drokenford, Bishop of Bath and Wells from 1309 to 1329. The editor was the aged and scholarly Bishop Edmund Hobhouse, who had retired from the see of Nelson, in New Zealand, to which he had been consecrated by Archbishop Sumner as its first bishop in 1858. He apologises for the shortcomings of his work, saying: "During its

progress the weakening of eyesight, and of other faculties, have often counselled him to give up an undertaking more fitted for the fifth than the eighth decade of life; but as the work could not be done save by a resident in Wells, he has persevered, but not without some retrenchment of labour. This retrenchment has been effected by omitting, after a certain date, the Royal writs for collection of clerical subsidies and the licenses for study"; and he adds in a footnote: "These entries may perhaps contain a few crumbs of interest, but they must be few." "Whatever the omissions," he goes on, "he is able to warrant that he has read through every entry (as far as legible) of which he offers an abstract, and that the abstract presents the pith of the entry to the best of his judgment." It was a remarkable piece of work, rare if not unique at the time, and it is of great service still even to those who have access to the original document. It is easier, at any rate, for the outsider to use than the great series of Exeter registers of which the first calendar had been published the year before. But yet its incompleteness in matters of detail makes the student of to-day long to see it done afresh on the fuller scale of the later calendars in the same series edited by the late Canon T. Scott Holmes, or, still better, after the model of the Canterbury and York Society to which so great debt of gratitude is now due.\*

The purpose of this article is to put forward out of the writer's own experience some of the reasons which justify this fuller scale of reproduction in spite of the increased labour and expense which are involved.

1. Far more interest is now being taken locally in the lists of incumbents of benefices and in parochial history generally. Somerset indeed is exceptionally well off in this matter, thanks to Archdeacon Archer, who in the early part of the eighteenth century constructed from the bishops' registers and other sources lists for nearly all the parishes, which have been printed by the Rev. F. W. Weaver under the title of "Somerset Incumbents." But the lists are now two hundred years in arrear; and for the earlier period

\* It is of interest to note that the late Cardinal Gasquet was a vice-president of this Society, and that Abbot Cuthbert Butler is a member of the Council.

they can be checked and added to from various printed calendars: but laborious search is required in originals which are still uncalendared, or where the calendar cannot be trusted for completeness. Preparations are being made for revision and completion; but the task is a heavy one, demanding much co-operation.

2. Everyone who has had to do with undated charters knows the necessity of recording in full in all mediæval calendars the names of witnesses. There are not many charters indeed with attestations in episcopal registers; but every name that occurs in any connexion should be recorded as being of possible value for the dating of charters of the particular period. Too often we are plagued with an "etc.," which may represent the *cum aliis* of a mediæval scribe, but may, on the other hand, be merely due to the misguided economy of the modern editor. We may regret the one, but we find it hard to speak patiently of the other.

3. The study of English place-names has at last been set on a scientific basis, thanks to the energy of Professor Mawer and his colleagues of the Place-Name Society. A bishop's register is necessarily full of place-names, and hence it is a treasure-house of mediæval forms. These forms may vary even on the same page of the register; and to neglect the variation, and still more to substitute the modernised form, means that the whole of the original document will have to be searched afresh for this one purpose.

Let me illustrate from Bishop Drokenesford's register. The village on the Mendips called to-day Stratton-on-the-Fosse gets its name from the great Roman Fosse-way from Ilchester to Lincoln. Its parish church is commonly regarded as dedicated to St. Vigor; but in the early part of the eighteenth century Browne Willis, in his *Parochiale Anglicanum*, assigned it to St. Laurence. Now Glastonbury documents show that in the thirteenth century the manor of Stratton was held by the family of St. Vigor: we have a Beatrice of St. Vigor in 1263, and also a Thomas of St. Vigor, who became sheriff of Somerset six years later. In 1308 a younger Thomas of St. Vigor sold "the manor of Stratton Seynt Vigor" to Thomas de Gurney.

But the place retained its name of Stratton St. Vigor or Stratton Vigour for some time after this. In Bishop Drokensford's register we have Stratton Vigour (f. 41 *b*), Stratton sancti Vigoris and Stratton de sancto Vigore (f. 56 *a*), even Stratton sancti Victoris (twice in error, f. 158 *a*)—the dates being 1312, 1313, 1318. But a reader of the printed calendar might easily infer that it was also called Stratton-on-the-Fosse. In our next register, that of Bishop Ralph of Shrewsbury, we find in 1331 and 1338 Stratton St. Vigor; but in 1347 it is Stratton super la Fosse, and this new name recurs in 1349 and 1351. Yet in 1389 a document of Bishop Ralph Ergum's time makes mention of a "rector de Stratton Vigor."

Doubtless the family name of St. Vigor has caused the displacement of St. Laurence in the dedication of the church. The fame of St. Vigor is connected with Bayeux. He was a disciple of St. Vedast of Arras in the sixth century. The family which held Stratton may well have come from St. Vigor-le-Grand, a village close to Bayeux.

4. The reader's patience must now be drawn upon for the consideration of a somewhat unique example of the value of the full and accurate representation of the contents not only of an episcopal register, but also of the parallel registers of the dean and chapter. In this latter class of documents we again are specially well served. The great registers of the dean and chapter of Wells, and also their long series of original charters, have been twice calendared for the Historical MSS. Commission. They were first calendared in one volume by Mr. Bennett, the Vicar of South Cadbury, with the help of his brother-in-law, Canon Church. This was published in 1885, and it shared the defects of its time of which we have already spoken. Yet the venture was so new, and its value to historians proved so great, that the whole edition became exhausted. It was wisely determined not to reprint it, but to calendar the whole matter afresh on the more scientific lines of the Public Record Office. Accordingly two volumes appeared, in 1907 and 1914, with complete indexes, by Mr. Bird and Mr. Baildon respectively. The work is so well done that reference to the originals is now practically superseded.

It is due to Mr. Bennett's earlier effort that this great mass of material is so easily accessible to every student to-day.

To come now to our particular point. The Lady Chapel at Wells is filled with early fourteenth-century glass, shattered in troublous times and afterwards repaired and made up with fragments gathered from other windows of the church. Its east window would seem to have suffered least, and was skilfully restored in 1843 by that excellent antiquary Thomas Willement, who, however, introduced much new glass, contrary to the strict canons of modern preservation. The four great windows at the sides remained a chaos of glittering fragments. In 1925 we were forced to undertake the releading of this glass, and used the opportunity to cleanse the whole and to rearrange certain portions which were obviously out of place. In the course of the work we were rewarded by the discovery of a number of hitherto illegible inscriptions in the beautiful Lombardic capitals of the time, containing personal names followed as a rule by the name of a saint. Some of the personal names were hopelessly incomplete, but all that could be deciphered proved upon investigation to be those of canons of the end of the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth century. It is the problem of their identification that concerns us here. We have no ancient list of our canons of the period, and it was important for the dating of the glass, and indeed of the chapel itself, that we should find out as nearly as possible when they came in and when they died: for it was not in accordance with the custom of that day to place memorials in glass to persons after their death.

The question thus raised is by no means one of idle curiosity or of merely local interest. It is not sufficiently recognised that the dating both of architecture and of glass is a matter of inference, especially for the earlier and most important periods—inference from the comparatively few examples in which the year, or even the decade, is absolutely beyond dispute. And to argue from north to south, or from south-east to south-west, is specially perilous in dealing with a time of such rapid movement in the arts

as was the passage of the thirteenth into the fourteenth century. Now the best authorities tell us that the Lady Chapel is the work of our strenuous Dean Godelee (1305-1333), and was completed not much sooner than 1325. As the glass is certainly not earlier than the windows which contain it, this too has been without question assigned to the same date. Frail as the documentary evidence was for this particular year the verdict has been accepted, and this as a dated example has been added to those from which general conclusions are commonly drawn.

We shall now turn to some facts. We found a line of lettered fragments which ran thus:

AGIS | : LOGOUERE | ſ̄ : GREGC | ER :  
WILLS | NG | RIUS | AGIST

It was plain that we had here parts of two names beginning with *Magister*, and that the patron saint of one of them was St. Gregory. How were we to distribute the remaining pieces? When we got them out we found that the first two were on a slight curve, whereas the rest ran straight. Moreover, in the same light, a little higher up, we found a curved piece with the letters THOS : DE, and a straight piece with ESCOTE.

We were now able to reconstruct

[M]AGIST[ER] : THOS : DE : LOGOUERE :

on a curve ; and

[M]AGISTER : WILLS : [DE : KI]NGESCOTE : ſ̄ :  
GREGORIUS :

Now of the latter we have no mention at all in our chapter records. But in the Calendar of Bishop Drokenesford's register (p. 51) we are told that on July 2, 1312, the bishop required the dean to induct John de Bruton "into the house late Kingscote's"; and when we turn to the register itself (f. 41) we find the full name Master William de Kingscote, and learn that the house was vacated by his death. But we have more to learn from two other episcopal registers, those of Exeter and Hereford. Bishop Stapeldon (pp. 150 f.) records that, after the death of Thomas de Lechlade in 1309, William de Kingscote



was elected dean of Exeter; but his election was disputed, and he died *pendente lite* at some date before the time of writing, June 3, 1311. From Bishop Swinfield's register we learn that he was collated to Westbury in the Forest in 1289, being in that year Chancellor of Oxford—an office in which he had succeeded Robert de Winchelsey, who within five years was to be Archbishop of Canterbury. In 1291 he was the bishop's official and in 1293 a canon of Hereford. A papal dispensation of September 26, 1309, allowed him as dean of Exeter to retain his prebends at Hereford, Wells and Exeter. His successor at Hereford was collated on April 18, 1311. This is perhaps as near as we shall get to the date of his death. How long he had been a canon of Wells before his dispensation of 1309 we cannot tell; but he may well have come in not long after he became a canon of Hereford in 1293. We could wish to know more of our interesting canon who has left his name inscribed as a benefactor in the glass of the Lady Chapel. What directly concerns us now is that his death in 1311 does not tally with the current belief that the chapel was not finished until 1325.

What, then, of Master Thomas de Logovere? Of him, as it happens, there is a great deal more to be told, though not much of his doings at Wells. We come across him first in the Patent Rolls, when in February, 1290, protection for one year is granted to Master Thomas de Loggore, going beyond seas on the king's service. In December, 1291, similar protection and also safe-conduct for a year is granted to Master Thomas Lugor, going to the court of Rome: at this point he is also called Luggovere, which comes nearer to our spelling of the name.

After prolonged negotiations for peace King Edward I renounced his homage to Philip the Fair in July, 1294. In May, 1295, Boniface VIII, the new pope, sent two cardinals to mediate, and Edward promised, if Philip were willing, a truce until All Saints' day. In August safe-conduct was granted to Master Thomas de Logovere and another, clerks of the king's household, to accompany the returning cardinals. Master Thomas de Logoure also received protection till the next Easter. The war with France was hindered by revolts, first in Wales and then



in Scotland. In November, 1296, Archbishop Winchelsey declared that the clergy were debarred from contributing to the war by the bull "Clericis laicos" issued that year by Boniface VIII. The king demanded a fifth, or he would withdraw his protection from the clergy. On January 30, 1297, the clergy were pronounced outlaws. Individuals among them at once began to make terms for themselves: many, of course, were indispensable for the king's service. In one of the earliest lists (February 22, 1297) of those who received protection until All Saints', as having made fine with the chancellor, is "Master Thomas de Logor, canon of the church of St. Andrew of Wells." This is our first notice of his connexion with Wells.\* Doubtless his canonry had been a reward for services rendered to the king. Bishop Swinfield's register contains a letter in which he excuses himself for not giving a canonry at Hereford to the king's nominee, Thomas de Lugonere—an error for Logouere in the Calendar (p. 286)—the number of canons being limited by unbroken usage. This was in October, 1292, and it may well be that it was about this date that he was made a canon at Wells. For Hereford he may have had to wait, but he got in there in time.

The next year he is still further prominent. On March 31, 1298, he is given a prebend in the king's free chapel of Hastings; and on April 6 he has protection for a year to go to the court of Rome on the king's business. In November he gets protection again to go overseas for the king, and also a prebend in the free chapel within the castle of Bruges (Bridgnorth). He was now being sent as one of three envoys to obtain redress from the envoys of the king of France for offences committed by French seamen since the truce.† Their embassy ended January 12, 1299, and five days later the peace of Montreuil was concluded.

Thus far we have been tracing the political activities of our wandering canon. In the next year he is mentioned

\* In a supplementary list of the same date he is further described as "parson of Melles" (*Cal. of Chancery Rolls—Various*, p. 49).

† This from *Foedera*, and borne out by a retrospective document in *Close Rolls*, 1303 (p. 105).

for the first time in the chapter records: on April 13, 1300, he is granted the farm of Whitechurch in Dorset for thirty marks, so long as he shall remain a canon.\* This is Whitechurch Canonicorum, which belonged partly to the church of Salisbury and partly to the church of Wells. But he is soon off again, and the Close Rolls show us an order of January 8, 1301, to permit him and another, whom the king is sending as his envoys overseas, to cross from Dover without search of their luggage. Next we learn from the Patent Rolls that on June 29, 1302, William de Cherleton, succentor, and Master Thos. de Luggoure, canon, are at Pontefract to get the royal license to elect a bishop after the death of William de Marchia. The new bishop was Walter de Haselshaw, who had for seven years previously been the dean.

We hear no more of him until 1306, when under January 18 the Calendar of Papal Letters tells us that Thomas de Logor, canon of Wells, was cited to the papal court with several others who had refused to make Antonio de Laveza, chaplain of Luke, cardinal of St. Mary's in the Via Lata, a canon on the claim of papal provision,† and had maltreated his brother Francis, who came as his proctor. It was not easy for papal nominees to get into stalls at Wells at this period. It was exceptionally difficult when, as on this occasion, the rival candidate was of high standing in the king's service; and such was Richard de Abingdon, a baron of the exchequer, much employed in financial and justiciary business. The story as it was told to the pope was a moving one. The bishop was asserted to have said that he could not believe the pope would make provision to anyone in his church. Two of the bishop's nephews, Robert de Haselshaw, who was then chancellor, and Thomas, his brother, had been concerned in the matter. The unfortunate proctor, Francis, and his companions had been kept in the bishop's prison; nine months and more they had been detained, and one of them had died of his wounds. It was perhaps as well for the bishop and others

\* R. i 132b.

† *Cal. of Pap. Letters*, I 612: 1304, 6 Feb., Benedict XI makes provision to Master Anthony de Laveça of a canonry and prebend of Wells.

that Master Thomas de Logor was one of the canons and had got mixed up in the affair: for he knew his way about the papal court.

On May 12, 1306, we have in the Patent Rolls a safe-conduct for Master Thos. de Logoure; now the chancellor of Wells, going to the court of Rome on the king's service. The next we know is that on July 25 papal provision is made to Thos. de Lugore, D.C.L., at the request of the king whose clerk and ambassador he is, of a canonry and prebend of Exeter; he being chancellor of Wells, and holding canonries and prebends there and in Hereford, Osmundlee in the diocese of York, and Hastings in the diocese of Chichester.

It was not the great pope Boniface VIII that Thos. de Logovere had to deal with. Nor did he go to Rome; for the new pope Clement V dared not enter Italy, and presently established himself at Avignon, where his successors were to remain for seventy years. Just now he was at Pessac outside Bordeaux, of which city he had been archbishop. He was as anxious to please the king of England, whose subject he had been, as the king of France, who had secured his election to the papacy. Indeed, he had earlier in this very year suspended Archbishop Winchelsey at King Edward's behest. We need not wonder that Wells was not, after all, burdened with its Italian canon, and that its chancellor was able to do a stroke of business on his own account. Of the scandal at Wells we hear no more; and Master Richard de Abingdon held the prebend of Yatton at his death in 1322.

King Edward died on July 7, 1307; but we shall find our canon still in the service of the royal court. In the next year Bishop Haselshaw died; and on Christmas day, 1308, Master Thos. de Luggore and William de Cherleton got license at Windsor for the election of a new bishop. The choice now fell on John de Drokensford, keeper of the wardrobe; and the king's assent to the election followed on February 23, 1309. On March 4 Thos. de Logore, the king's clerk, was granted a prebend at Salisbury; but this was revoked a year later, as its Neapolitan holder was found to be still alive. So far the Patent Rolls; the Close

Rolls tell us that on January 12, 1310, he with other king's clerks was ordered to attend the Parliament summoned to meet in London in February, there to give his counsel. In March the magnates appointed a council of lords ordainers to take over the royal power; and on December 18 our canon was ordered to attend on Henry de Lacy, earl of Lincoln, supplying the king's place in England, and others of his council; and a like order was made on May 1, 1311.

Meanwhile the chapter records tell us that on May 28, 1310, leave was granted to Master Thos. de Luggore, chancellor, to go to the king's court on the business of his dignity and the church of Wells.\* And on September 6 the Close Rolls show an order for him to be in London in the octave of Michaelmas, ready to set out for the papal court on the king's service.

Trouble awaited him at Wells. Bishop Drokensford's new zeal prompted him to visit the chapter on the morrow of Ash Wednesday, 1311. It was found that by the statutes the four dignities were sacerdotal offices. This was awkward for the chancellor; for it was further found that the chancellor was no priest. "Cite him," said the bishop two years later, when nothing had been done; and he appointed a commission to hear the cause against the so-called chancellor of the cathedral church. He was cited to appear before Palm Sunday, 1313.†

The sequel is pathetic. All we are told is that on November 24, 1313, the bishop made his nephew Richard de Drokensford chancellor, in place of Thomas de Loggor deceased.‡

The other bishops' registers take us back a little earlier for the date of his death. At Exeter his canonry was filled on November 5, 1313; at Hereford on November 3; at Salisbury—for he seems to have got in there after all—on September 5.

This then we have learned about the two names which we deciphered in the line of fragments in our Lady Chapel window. Both were men of distinction: one died early in 1311, having been a canon certainly since 1309, not

\* R. i. 119.

† Drok., f. 137.

‡ Drok., f. 140.

improbably since 1293; the other died in 1313, having been a canon certainly since 1297. These names do not stand alone. A like process of investigation enables us to identify other canons who died about the same time: as John de Berewyk in 1312, Jordan de Insula in 1315 (?), Walter de Pederton in 1316; and half a dozen more who died not long after, and who had held canonries for a considerable period.

But most striking of all is the name of Master Henry de Husee, who, after being for a long time canon, was made dean in 1302 and died in 1305.

This evidence, laboriously gathered from Rolls and Registers, throws an unexpected light on the architecture and the glass of the earliest years of the fourteenth century. The Lady Chapel itself, which had been dated in 1325, goes back twenty years for certain, and not improbably twenty-five; and some verdicts that have been passed on its beautiful glass must equally undergo revision. This instance alone should suffice to make it clear that the painful calendaring or reproduction of episcopal and other registers in accordance with the most exacting of modern standards—the standard of the Canterbury and York Society—is deserving of the encouragement of all serious students of mediæval history and monuments.

J. ARMITAGE ROBINSON.

## ART. II.—DROPPING THE HYPHEN

NOT long ago I was struck by a remark in an Anglican Church paper to the effect that Father Vernon's conversion evidently began with his heart, whatever part his head may have played in its later stages. The writer seemed to regard this order as intellectually discreditable, and I have been wondering ever since in what manner he expects a conversion to begin. Is it an intellectual process? Can it start with the head? Is it possible for a doubt or a conviction to drop suddenly into the mind without any emotional disturbance or desire preceding it? Both Scripture and psychology say No. Psychology insists on the emotional origins of even our most highly intellectualised conflicts, and in Scripture conversion appears entirely under the similitude of the new heart, the changed heart, the broken and contrite heart, ignoring any superior claims of the new head, the changed head, the broken and contrite head.

That being so, I shall not apologise for the fact that my conversion to Roman Catholicism began with an attraction, with an appeal, which was addressed primarily to my religious emotions rather than to my religious convictions. I had been an Anglo-Catholic for eleven years, for six of which I was very well satisfied with my religion. Then in the summer of 1925 an Anglican friend who was present at the canonisation rites of St. Thérèse of Lisieux brought me back a medal and a secondary relic, and from that day the course of my religious life was troubled.

It is difficult to describe the impression this young saint made upon me. It was not only the beauty of her life, the charm, wit and sweetness of her recorded words, or the lovely simplicities of her Little Way. It was rather the realisation of that sanctity, that heroic virtue, that sublime love, being offered to the modern world. Here was a saint who, if she had been alive to-day, would scarcely have been old . . . a saint of our times, whose features and expression have been given us not only by the painter and ecclesiastical image-maker, but by the photographer.

In Lisieux are still living men and women who knew her and spoke to her, including her own sisters; her canonisation miracles were not found in documents or in tradition, but on the lips of living witnesses. And when I looked at her I saw not merely herself, but the living, unfailing fountain of sanctity which is the Church that made her what she was.

Hitherto I had often glanced towards Rome, but had invariably brought myself to order with the words of a certain Anglican divine (I fear I have forgotten his name) to the effect that when Anglo-Catholics turn longingly to Rome it is nearly always a symptom of spiritual fatigue or coincident with a period of slackness. I had found this in my experience to be true. The Romeward glance had always been the result of some special disgust or impatience with the Church of England—it had looked for comfort, ease, efficiency, peace rather than for holiness. But now a change had come; when I found myself looking towards Rome, not because I disliked the sight of the Church of England, but because a light had shone suddenly from the seven hills and had compelled my eyes.

At this confession I can see certain Anglican lips beginning to curl (Anglicans recently have been told that the present time requires saints of a more highly intellectual order than St. Thérèse), and it may appear extraordinarily naïve even to Catholics. But these must imagine (if they cannot remember) what it is like to live in a religious community which has made no additions to its calendar of saints for over three hundred years. In the Church of England one is given the impression that sanctity as well as miracles came to an end with the early Church. The Anglican calendar is astonishingly poor and bare; it was drastically cleared after the Reformation, and no name has since been added to it (with the doubtful and disputed exception of King Charles I), till the Revised Prayer-Book cautiously inserted a few commemorations, the latest of which is some five hundred years old.

I shall naturally be told that sanctity is not an affair of the Calendar, and if the Church of England has no official saints later than the twelfth century, it does not follow



that she fails to encourage or to recognise holiness, but merely that she does not record and publish it. To which one simply retorts: Why not? Presumably a Church's greatest glory is her holiness, and her holiness is the holiness of her members. It seems strange that she should ignore and suppress her achievements in the only field where success is really worth while. One cannot imagine a country which should ignore its great men, its heroes, its poets, its philosophers and scientists. If one were, inconceivably, to hear of such a country, one would conclude either that it had no great men, or, worse still, that it was indifferent to their merits.

The Anglican Church certainly has its worthies. A score of names come at once into my mind—Andrewes, Herbert, Ken, Jeremy Taylor, Bishop King, Father Dolling, Father Stanton, and many others. These were all saintly men, who served God in their day, and whose memories are justly revered. But I would point out two or three facts about them: first, that the Church of England as a whole seems comparatively indifferent to their merits; they have no place in her Calendar, and indeed certain efforts to secure their commemoration have had to be dropped because of opposition; secondly, they are all in some sense Anglo-Catholics, and therefore not representative of the Church they illuminate, being centres of controversy rather than of devotion; thirdly, none would pass the canonisation tests of the Catholic Church, none is a saint in the full, supernatural meaning of the word.

A good and holy man is not necessarily a saint. Sanctity in the full sense implies heroic virtue, an abandonment, a holocaust of the whole life, something more than martyrdom, something which is completely and entirely not of this world, the consummation and triumph of supernatural grace.

This heroic sanctity is far beyond the sober standards of a good and pious life; it is genius as distinct from a pleasant talent for goodness; and if we compare the Anglican worthies with their contemporaries in the Catholic Church—Francis de Sales, Ignatius of Loyola, Theresa of Avila, John Vianney, Thérèse of Lisieux—it is as if we were

comparing Addison with Shakespeare, William Hayley with William Blake, George Macdonald with Charles Dickens. Addison, Hayley, and George Macdonald are all good men of letters, but if they were the highest that English literature had achieved, one would, I think, be right in holding that there was something in the climate, customs, society or mentality of England unfavourable to the literary art. In the same way I assert that if such good and pious men as Andrewes, Ken, Dolling, and the rest are the best that the Church of England can do in the way of saints, then her climate and mentality are unfavourable to the development of holiness. In other words, one of the Four Marks of the Church is lacking.

Hitherto I had held the "churchship" of the Church of England to be a technical matter of valid orders and sacraments. Anglo-Catholics lay great stress on this, and Roman Catholic controversy has only served to confirm them in their general belief that if it could be proved that, even by chance, the Church of England had preserved her Orders in the technical sense of the word, then they would also have proved their contention that she is a part of the one Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church. They have little or no idea of schism apart from the question of Orders. More than once it has been said to me, "You have the sacraments; don't trouble about anything else"; and my question, "But am I in schism?" has been dismissed as beside the argument.

At this point I came to ask myself whether it was likely that a merciful God would have left His children no means of recognising the truth without certain highly technical researches which the vast majority of them are incapable of performing. I knew myself to be incapable of deciding such a technical matter as the validity of Anglican Orders, and yet there was little use in appealing to authority, for authority was divided. The authorities of my own Church naturally taught one thing, the authorities of the Roman Church another—so I was pushed back to another question, the question of authority. Before, not after, I could hope to decide the question of Anglican Orders, I must decide on the authority of the Anglican Church. On what grounds

am I accepting the authority of the Church of England in this matter of her Orders? What are her claims to teach me a different doctrine from that of the Catholic Church in Rome? What are her claims to teach me at all? She claims to be the Catholic Church in this country, though Rome says that she is not. How does she make good these claims? Does she show the marks of the Church—is she One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic? Our Lord has said, "By their fruits ye shall know them. Do men gather grapes of thorns or figs of thistles?" Does the Church of England bear the marks of the true vine, which are not necessarily a luxuriant growth, a wide extension or a sturdy root, but grapes?

I set myself to examine the marks of the Church of England, having found, through the light shed from Lisieux, that one of them was missing. I had already been convinced that she is not holy in the sense that the Church of Rome is holy. It did not require the same supernatural light to show me that she is not one. There cannot be, surely, any religious body holding together a wilder assortment of religious opinions than the Church of England. She is the home of chaos, and for this chaos the Catholic revival within her is largely and directly responsible. Before the Tractarians the Church of England may have been inert, but she was comparatively homogeneous; whereas now she is a mass of whirling atoms, a veritable explosion, as if the invading force of Catholicism had been too strong for her, and instead of having, as its supporters claim, raised her from the dead, had blown her to pieces.

Surely her most uncritical friend could not see in the Church of England the mark of Unity. When it comes to the mark of Catholicism, the issues are not so clear. She might claim it in that very variety which some call chaos, asserting that she does not cater for one type only, but for all sorts and conditions of men, and pointing to the "rigid uniformity" of Rome as a definite mark of exclusiveness. But true Catholicism does not lie so much in outward variety as in a fundamental appeal which is common to all, and when we come to look for this in

Anglicanism we soon see that it is lacking. The varied doctrines, customs, and services of the Church of England do not appeal to anything resembling the variety of types that are attracted by the unity of Rome. On the contrary, the Anglican Church is very definitely the religion of a certain limited class and type.

The social limitations of her gospel had, indeed, always in some measure troubled my allegiance. She is so obviously the Church of the upper and upper middle classes. I do not mean that her clergy are not heroic workers among the poor—the work of certain Anglo-Catholics in the slums it would be impertinent to praise; but apart from the Anglo-Catholics, her attitude to the poor has always been a trifle condescending, and she has served them chiefly in the corporal works of mercy, ignoring their religious rights and aspirations. There is little of that cheerful mixture of rich and poor that one sees in Catholic churches; the poor “know their place,” and do not expect the same privileges as the rich.

The recent revision of the Prayer-Book will teach them their place still more thoroughly. It is difficult, indeed, to see how, under the new conditions, many of them can expect any form of sacramental religion. As a prominent Anglo-Catholic once said in exasperation: “The result will be to excommunicate our working-classes. It is all designed for the bishops’ wives and daughters who want to go to ‘the eight.’” Certainly the rubrics regulating Reservation will, if obeyed, effectually prevent any poor person receiving Holy Communion in sickness or in the hour of death.

The Anglo-Catholics have done their best to abolish these class-distinctions, but they have been successful only to a limited extent, as the whole weight and tradition of Anglicanism is against them. In dealing with other forms of exclusiveness, they have failed altogether, and in some cases actually drawn the line more strictly. Besides class-distinctions in the Church of England there are sex-distinctions, and the Anglo-Catholics have failed completely to win the men of the country. Here and there, through the personal efforts of some gifted clergyman, the

deficiency of men is not so apparent, but in the majority of Anglican congregations—High, Low, Broad and Moderate—it is glaring.

I used to think it was due to the fact that women are naturally more devout than men—and I dare say they are; at the foot of the Cross there were three women to one man. But that argument only brings another question—Why should the Church of England cater only for the devout? Why should she have so little to offer the ordinary man in the street, who is not particularly good or pious or holy, but has a soul to be saved like everyone else? If he goes to church at all, he is seldom a communicant. He regards Communion as a privilege for pious people only. Here the Anglo-Catholics have failed nearly as badly as the rest. They have done very well for the extremes, for the pious and for the outcast, but they only frighten away the plain man, who may be constitutionally incapable of any great heights of piety or devotion, and yet has his place in the Kingdom of God. It is not Catholicism that frightens him away, for in Roman Catholic congregations there is no undue preponderance of women. It is rather the feeling that he is excluded, that none of this is really meant for him. He has not the time to be continually in church; he has not the capacity, at least not yet, for much religious practice and experience. He feels stifled by the hothouse atmosphere of extreme piety and devotion (I am speaking here of Anglo-Catholic churches); it all seems rather humbug to him (or to her, for the plain woman is very much the same) and he stops outside.

In fact, the Church of England has narrowed her appeal almost entirely to the leisured, the well-dressed, the well-behaved, and the devout. Such an appeal scarcely bears the mark of Catholicism.

There remains the last mark of the Church—that by which she claims to be apostolic. I have already said that Anglo-Catholics have narrowed this down to the maintenance of an apostolic succession, but the term certainly stands for more than that—for apostolic truth and teaching. Has the Church of England taught apostolic truth? I suppose that Anglicans as a whole are the worst taught

community in the world. The average Anglican layman has only the sketchiest idea of his religion, and falls a victim to any stray wind of doctrine that may be blowing his way—hence the flourishing condition of theosophy, spiritualism, Christian science, and similar religions in this country. In addition to this, from a number of highly-placed Anglican pulpits flows a stream of raw pseudo-scientific, pseudo-theological talk, supposed by the talkers and their hearers to be Modernism, though Tyrrell and Loisy might well protest at the abuse of the word. This is reported in the newspapers and still further sensationalised, till the plain man loses his last shred of faith, under the impression that this is what his intellectual superiors have done long ago. In such sour fields do Anglican sheep find pasture. . . .

“The hungry sheep look up, and are not fed,  
But, swoln with wind, and the rank mists they draw,  
Rot inwardly, and foul contagion spread ;  
Besides what the grim wolf, with privy paw,  
Daily devours apace, and nothing said ;  
But that two-handed engine at the door  
Stands ready to smite once, and smite no more.”

Thus, when I came to examine the credentials of the Church of England in the light of plain reason, using the methods I should have used in any other test of genuineness, I became convinced that she was not what she claimed to be—the Church of this country. I had looked for her trade-mark, and it was missing—all four parts. She was not One, nor Holy, nor Catholic, nor Apostolic. The Catholic movement within her, to which for eleven years I had looked for her salvation, now seemed definitely to share her unchurching. Anglo-Catholics generally assume that they are exempt from the reproaches levelled at the Church of England as a whole; but, as a matter of fact, they cannot very well stand without her. If she is not a Church, then no amount of Catholic faith or practice will make them Catholics, and I cannot believe that, even if it could be proved beyond all reasonable doubt that Anglican Orders are technically valid, a Church which does not bear a single mark of a divine institution can yet be a Church



merely by virtue of an external rite. High Churchmen do not hold the doctrine of Intention in any Catholic sense of the word. They quite genuinely believe that if a form is susceptible of a Catholic interpretation, that form may be validly used by someone who does not in any sense put that interpretation upon it—in other words, that a bishop who has no intention of ordaining a sacrificing priest can nevertheless by means of the Anglican ordinal (which is, to put it mildly, reticent on the subject) confer a sacrificing priesthood on a man who has no intention of receiving it. Such a belief would be altogether too magical for most Roman Catholics.

But Anglo-Catholics are the most optimistic people in the world, for they think that Rome will change, or at least that she will re-explain herself. They think that the flowers of Catholicism will bloom in the sand of the Dead Sea of Anglicanism. They think that within a span of time they will convert the Anglican Church, or at least the greater part of it, and that then will come the day of corporate reunion, of a Uniate Church of England, keeping many of her local customs and privileges, but one again with that great Western Church towards which they have always looked with admiration and reverence.

It is the strength of these dreams which keeps Anglo-Catholicism alive. It is a movement made of dreams and unquenchable hope and the most disinterested loyalty. These men cling to a Church which has consistently maligned and ill-used them, from whom they have not a ha'porth of worldly expectation, whose one cry to them has been to get out. They endure misunderstanding and obloquy in the hope that they may one day be able to restore to her the "lost beauty of her Catholic inheritance." It is an attitude which no Catholic can refuse to admire, however much he may be irritated by the characteristically English failure to face facts.

Anglo-Catholics hold that they have already changed the face of the Church of England, and certainly they have enormously quickened her religious activity, and improved the order and beauty of her services. But looking back on the days when I thought even as they, it seems to me



now as if I had been one of a party of children planting flowers in the sand, by sticking in the stalks of flowers we had picked from somebody else's garden. These flowers have no root, and they cannot grow apart from the soil out of which they were taken; in the end the sea will come and wash them all away.

For in spite of these lovely decorations the Church of England is in many ways not better off, but worse off, than she was a hundred years ago. If in some respects she has grown more Catholic-minded, in others she is definitely more Protestant. The use of private judgement has never been so widely abused as to-day, and by the Anglo-Catholics as much as anybody. Every man picks and chooses just as much or as little as he likes to believe of the Catholic faith. There is not, as many Catholics think, a common standard of belief and worship among High Churchmen. Each man is a law unto himself. In the forefront of the movement are those who hold everything except the Catholic doctrine of the Church; at the back of it are those who, perhaps, hold only one or two specifically Catholic dogmas, such as the Real Presence or the duty of praying for the dead. But even among the leaders there are strange instances of Protestantism. One prominent Anglo-Catholic, who had renounced all hope of promotion or of peace because he would not obey his bishop by giving up Reservation of the Blessed Sacrament, told me quite frankly that he did not believe in hell. He did not seem to realise that the doctrine of hell stands on exactly the same ground as the doctrine of the Real Presence, and that to reject one while accepting the other is nothing but Protestantism.

Almost every parish clergyman in the Church of England is a Pope infallible in his own parish, whose services he regulates, and in whose pulpit he preaches just as much or as little of the faith as he chooses to believe. The three Anglo-Catholic churches with which I have been most closely associated each taught a different religion—different not only in the ordering of the services, but in teaching and outlook. The officials of the English Church are aware of this anarchy, but the only means they can think of to remedy it is to delegate the power of the parson to

his Parochial Church Council, which may consist entirely of uninstructed persons, with more prejudice than information on religious matters. It is all chaos, chaos, chaos, and not the fruitful chaos of which worlds are born, but the dismal chaos of disintegration and dissolution, the decomposition of a limb which has been cut off from the Body and is dead.

There are also the inroads of Modernism falsely so-called, which during the last thirty years or so has made as deep a penetration as Catholicism into the English Church, and, like the new Protestantism, has seriously affected the Anglo-Catholic party. The great cry of some of them now against Rome is "obscurantism"! They are no longer drawing the line between Rome and themselves at the Papacy or at Transubstantiation, but at the difference between an "enlightened" and a "reactionary" Catholicism. They imagine that Anglo-Catholicism is enlightened, free, and progressive, whereas Roman Catholicism is obscure, fettered, and reactionary. This is dangerous, because it is untrue. There is a difference between certain High Church presentations of the doctrine of the Real Presence and Transubstantiation, there is a difference between the Roman doctrine of the Papacy and the Anglo-Catholic theory of a primacy of honour. But it is not true that the Catholic Church is obscurantist, fettered, or reactionary; it is an idea existing entirely in the Protestant mind, and with that mind Anglo-Catholicism has once more identified itself.

It is not likely then that, even apart from other difficulties, the Anglo-Catholic dream of a corporate reunion with Rome will ever come true. Rome will never touch Protestantism or Modernism, and the growth of these has at least kept pace with the growth of Catholicism in the English Church. Besides, the idea is based on an unreality—the conception that the case of the Church of England is in any way parallel with that of the Eastern communions which have been admitted by Rome as Uniates. These Churches, besides being of unimpeachable orthodoxy, are historically as old as Rome; their traditions, customs, and liturgies were in existence long before the schism which cut them off. To ask them to abandon their Greek

liturgies and distinctive customs, such as a married clergy and Communion in both kinds, would be to ask them to make startling innovations in an unbroken tradition, and Rome has never been a violator of tradition or a despiser of antiquity.

It is quite useless to compare these Churches with the Church of England, whose separate liturgy, customs, and discipline originated with her separation from Rome, and indeed in protest against Rome and in support of certain Protestant heresies. Reunion could only be on a basis of complete reabsorption and submission, and a return to the position she occupied before the Reformation, when, except for certain local uses which had their counterparts in most countries, she was the same as the Church in France, in Spain, or in Italy, without any special practices or privileges.

What, then, is to be the future of this great movement, which has changed, in the sense that it has disintegrated, the Church of England? What are its future relations with the Church of Rome. It is difficult to say. It is much easier to say what almost certainly will *not* happen. Some Catholics seem to think that High Churchmen may in the end break away from Anglicanism and form a separate sect of their own. This is unlikely for two reasons: first, because Anglo-Catholics are not united among themselves; indeed, their chief point of union is on the hither side of the hyphen, and were that removed, and their connection with Anglicanism severed, far from cohering in a new sect, they would probably disrupt in chaos. Second, they are the most uncompromisingly loyal people on earth, and the bad treatment they continually receive only serves to make them more determined in their purpose to plant their garden in the sand. Catholics born in the Church may find this difficult to imagine, but some others remember.

I doubt, also, whether Anglo-Catholics will ever in large numbers make their submission to Rome, partly because of this same invincible loyalty, and partly because most of them are temperamentally less Catholic than their practices and beliefs. They like to go their own way, to pick and to choose, to fight with authority, to rule

parochially. They are in many ways, as I have already said, Protestant at heart.

But Catholics can, I think, remove many obstacles and misunderstandings which are keeping back certain Anglo-Catholics who are not fundamentally Protestant, who are not invincibly loyal or unreasonably illogical, but whose prejudices have been aroused by certain Roman Catholic methods of propaganda, and who consequently regard a change as in the nature of a leap from the frying-pan into the fire. Without cherishing any more the vain dream that Rome can change her methods or explain her teaching, I still believe that certain individual Catholics may change their methods and explain more courteously. I know by experience that the truths of the faith may fall on the non-Catholic either as a shower of stones or as a shower of roses. Violent attacks on Anglican Orders, as I said before, often do more harm than good. Attacks on Anglican good faith and good sense only serve to rouse irritation and antagonism. All that is required to win the allegiance of, I believe, a large number of Anglo-Catholics is an Epiphany—a showing of Christ to the Gentiles. That was what conquered the world when the pagan religions fell, and the Roman Church rose out of the ashes of the Roman Empire—an Epiphany of Divine Light, an Epiphany of Him who has promised that if lifted up He will draw all men unto Himself. Most spiritually-minded Anglicans are sick and weary of controversy, of worldliness, of modernistic marsh-lights that move hither and thither, but lead nowhere. They are looking for the Star, and when they see it they will follow it.

SHEILA KAYE-SMITH.

## SOME RECENT BOOKS

**The Benedictines**, by Dom David Knowles (Sheed and Ward, 2s. 6d.), is another volume in the aptly-named "Many Mansions" series, designed to give in small compass a comprehensive account of Benedictinism, its spirit and its work. The book consists of six chapters: (1) The Rule of St. Benedict; (2) Benedictine Developments; (3) Benedictine Organisations; (4) Benedictine Work; (5) Some Benedictine Characteristics; (6) The Benedictine Spiritual Life. Within this framework Dom David Knowles has given us an able and well-written account of his subject, and we believe that every reader of his interesting pages will be sorry when he comes to the book's end.

But a book on Benedictinism, and by an English Benedictine, is almost inevitably interesting. There is not only that marvellous history of some fourteen centuries with all its varied glories and varied achievements; nor only the glamour of an ancient tradition and the charm of romantic memories and associations; there is the thing itself, in all its breadth and variety, so difficult to define precisely, so hard to fix in one precise mould. With a Rule conceived in generous terms and generously interpreted, Benedictinism has been and is a various and variegated thing. And so a writer on this theme has something more to do than to set down a series of accepted facts, the precise laws and certain regulations of an accurately defined institution; he has to deal rather with disorder than with order, and it may even seem that it is his chief business to determine, as though it had never been determined before—for all the fourteen centuries—the essential nature of this protean entity.

There is, of course, precedent and tradition and age-old custom; but within the very structure of tradition there seems possible a latitude of observance that defies rigid theory and escapes exact logic. Dom David, however, is not daunted, but gets to work quickly on the business of discrimination and definition. With no more than a shy

glance at the history and glories of Benedictinism, and with a rebuke for the romantics, he asks in his first chapter what sort of life St. Benedict instituted and what sort of life is presupposed by his Rule. He concludes that it was a "life to be passed in the presence of God, with every action and activity directed towards Him. It was, therefore, to be a life without distractions, a life of prayer. In this life there were three chief instruments—liturgical prayer, reading, and work." That definition represents his considered judgement, and is the basis of the argument of his book. For the rest he is concerned to record the difficulties which confront this apparently simple programme, and the adjustments forced by awkward circumstances.

For there is the problem of Benedictinism and the problem of this little book. How can that programme, apparently so simple and obvious, be actually realised? Has it, indeed, ever been realised? Perhaps in early Benedictine days, when life was less complex. Perhaps here and there, when circumstances have been kind and men more fortunate. If the Benedictine cloister was intended to be just that, a citadel of the soul's peace, and its life a prayer and a contemplation, how many cloisters have realised that intention? And how many monks have achieved such a citadel and kept it secure, we do not say from external foes, but from that more insidious attack which comes from the very instruments of this life? For there is the worst of the trouble. Life is a nice balance and a delicate adjustment. If one organ upsets that balance, overgrows itself and becomes "malignant," then the life is threatened. So is it with the Benedictine life and its organs—liturgical prayer, reading, and work.

No danger much to be feared from liturgical prayer, one would think; yet even that may be exaggerated, swell out of all proportion to the rest and endanger the life. And reading too. St. Benedict, as Dom David points out, did not intend anything more than devotional reading, for man's own profit. But his provision has developed in the course of the centuries, and now we

have elaborate study and the teaching apostolate and the labours of research. We have passed into the third instrument, which is work. St. Benedict ordained work and encouraged it, and that not merely as a defence against idleness. He would have his monks welcome it when it comes as an economic necessity. But, after all, and in respect of their life proper, it is but an instrument. As such it has proved itself exceedingly hard to control. It gets out of hand, it absorbs time and energies, it invades the region of the soul's peace. And always with most excellent excuse! So has it happened to Benedictines in the past, and so, apparently, does it still happen.

Of the difficulties which arise out of this conflict between an ideal Benedictinism and its actual realisation, Dom David shirks none. He is an idealist, but he is also clear-sighted and candid. We have thought that we detected in his pages a trace of sadness, as he turns from the ideal to the real and explains to us why the ancient simplicity cannot be recaptured. There is this wistful air; but there is also a clear ideal and an undaunted hope.

(J. M.)

Fr. R. H. J. Steuart's **The Inward Vision** (Longmans, 5s.) is a very remarkable book, and a very personal one, though the author is perhaps not aware of this. We do not find in it theological truths thought out and presented emotionally or intellectually so much as the writer's own experiences; he has the gift of translating almost uncommunicable and interior knowledge into simple language. Probably no reader will accept it, except in so far as it expresses to him what he himself knows, consciously or unconsciously. Some will understand very little. But the little book is full of wisdom, philosophy, and devotion for those who are in tune to it, wholly or in part.

Criticism is not called for. It will be best to give a few short extracts rather at random from these very short essays. The first few speak of our relation to God by knowledge and love. Fr. Steuart suggests a way of realising God's presence:



"Look upon the Presence of God, then, as a *force* pressing upon us unremittingly, not from outside inwards only, but from inside outwards too : a force which no atom of our being can elude : a force whose pressure is a necessary condition of our existence : a force, moreover, and especially, which penetrates to the inmost of our moral and spiritual consciousness, subjecting them to constant and intimate contact with the Ideal for which we were created. This means that, day in and day out, all the length of our conscious life, God for Whom we were made, in Whom alone we can find what we want and understand what we mean, presents Himself to the apprehension of our soul, tempts our desire, pursues our will. To this pressure, we *must* react, either with it or against it" (p. 13).

Compare with this p. 42 : "It is less true to say that God created me once and now supports me, than that God even now creates me. It is as if at each instant my life came to an end and at each instant was renewed. My imagination finds itself altogether defeated when it tries to picture such a degree of dependence, or to find even approximate similes for it."

Often we find startling bits of argument. I give a sample : "Under the obsession of materialism it is, no doubt, easily possible to see in man no more than a fortuitous difference of degree above the rest of animated nature," etc., "but the conclusion will not stand the test even of its own proof, which, indeed, most uncomfortably turns out to be a demonstration of the exact contrary. For no other being than he has any curiosity about itself. . . . The moment that a being begins to wonder what he is and whether he is different from other beings, by that very fact he delivers a categorical assertion that he *is* different, incommensurably different, from all of them" (p. 48).

It must not be supposed that the book merely contains original sayings here and there ; it is unusual from beginning to end. One may instance the beautiful section on the Blessed Sacrament. How many excellent spiritual writers might tell us that "the Real Presence ought to engender

in us a real sense of itself : we ought in Communion, for instance, to be aware of something like a shock, a vibration, a repercussion in our very bodies of that almost unthinkable contact"? Whereas Fr. Steuart says : "One feels, indeed, that he has chosen to be among us in this humble and hidden way precisely because He does not *want* to be specially noticed or ceremoniously approached. . . ." "To thrill or catch our breath in the presence of the Blessed Sacrament—though well might we do so—is something like violating the careful incognito of a royal prince" (pp. 75, 77). "I see that His design in the Blessed Sacrament is not so much that He may give Himself to me as that He may take me to Himself : not so much that I may see Him on the Altar as that He may see me before the Altar : not so much that I may go up to the rails to receive Him as that He may come down to the rails to receive me" (p. 82). It would indeed be good if many pious souls would be less anxious about their own feelings of love, and think more of Christ's love for them.

Once more I quote : "It is only when at last we come to this, that we want God, and the things of God, not for themselves at all but for Him alone, that we begin to suspect the falsity of our own values and to get some comprehension of His" (p. 119). The reviewer is well aware that this is not a review ; but the book falls into no category : it is not a book of meditations nor an account of mystical experience. The quotations given may show that originality is not incompatible with orthodoxy. Those who are in need of sensible devotions will not like the book. But years later perhaps they will ; for we need different food at different ages. (H. J. C.)

What are we to call **Mount Zion**, by Gwendolen Greene (Dent, 7s. 6d.)? Personal, first of all : the personal record of a search for God in simple things, and in big and complicated things too, and of the finding of God in an ever-broadening experience of the beauty and mystery of nature, each new discovery of Him pointing the way to something closer and more intimate yet to be learnt about Him : the personal record of emergence, again and again,

from night into a false dawn, until the Dayspring from on High at last gave light in the darkness and guided the feet of the searcher into the way of peace.

Mrs. Greene has had throughout her journey the inestimable advantage of the counsel and direction of her uncle, Baron von Hügel, than whom perhaps no one, since Cardinal Newman, was better skilled in the way of Christ that does not break the bruised reed nor quench the smoking flax. He knew how to give its fullest value to all that is true, and therefore permanent, even in error : and how, with "deliberate speed, majestic instancy," to hunt, without seeming to hunt, the questing soul up into the pathway from which, as it speeds (or though it lags disconsolate), it looks out one day and sees before it, all unheralded, those "hid battlements of Eternity" which guard the City of God.

*Intrent ut astra febiles* : like stars they enter in, those who have sought the City weeping, mourning their own insufficiency, hungering and thirsting after justice : like stars, shining for a light to those others, fellow-pilgrims perhaps all unknown to themselves, those who go "always a little further."

The Christian *must* be an apostle, *must* share his treasure with others, with all the world. There is an urge upon him to cry out and tell what he has found, even if it must be to unhearing ears. He cannot contain himself : "See what I have found and how I have found it, thus and thus—do you not understand? Here is peace such as the world cannot give, joy that eye hath not seen nor ear heard nor heart of man conceived."

But, alas, even as he cries he learns how feeble his tongue is to utter the thoughts that arise in him. To him it is all so glorious, so golden, so new, so strange, so intoxicating : it explains, it swallows up, it covers and yet reveals as they are all things else : but to so many others, he learns incredulously, it means little or nothing. Then it must be his own fault : so he will leave nothing out, he will tear aside the veils that shroud his inmost thought, expose to the incurious light of the day what else he would have kept secret in the twilight of his own soul : it is a

violation, it is a sacrilege, but he will give his heart's blood if that is the price.

It is the Christ-life over again. Just as He who brought to the world the life-giving message that should, and would, have changed its face, came unto His own and His own received Him not, but went their way with laughter and contempt, and when He still would not be silent, turned and slaughtered Him : so all those who in His name have something of His own to say, must say it, like Him, at the risk of disbelief and mockery, and it may be even of death or the equivalent of death—anyway, of suffering, disillusionment, misunderstanding and neglect.

These seem gloomy forebodings for the success of Mrs. Greene's book ! But indeed to say less would mean that we appreciated it less—*capiat qui capere potest*. Into this work she has clearly poured her soul, but "How shall we sing the songs of the Lord in a strange land ?"—the text is on the title-page of her book. If fervour and vision and the love of Christ and of all things that Christ loved, joined with a truly Catholic taste for all things beautiful and tender and godly : if sympathy and understanding for the best and noblest that the thought of the world, even of the non-Christian world, has given us, fit one for that ministry which the quality of Catholic imposes indeed upon those who bear the name, then may she justly claim her place among those guides to the Mountain of the Lord, "the fair place and the joy of the whole earth," who each in their own office and manner as He Himself leads them and teaches them, go forth, as He has laid the command upon them all to do that love and follow Him, to the whole world messengers and prophets of His Kingdom.  
(R. H. J. S.)

Mr. Bonamy Dobrée's studies in Restoration drama have already demonstrated that there is at least one critic who has proceeded along the correct path, from appreciation to scholarship. His "six studies of modern authors," collected under the title **The Lamp and the Lute** (Oxford Press, 5s.), are infinitely more interesting even if they are less complete than his earlier books. They are not entirely satisfactory inasmuch as they are too obviously a

collection into a book of papers which were fitted to the limits either of the periodical in which they first appeared or of the audience to whom they were first addressed. The authors dealt with are Ibsen, Hardy, Kipling, E. M. Forster, D. H. Lawrence, and T. S. Eliot. From each of the essays there emerges at least one point of permanent value, and there underlies the whole book a definite feeling for the aim proper to literary criticism at the present day. At the beginning of his introduction, Mr. Dobrée makes a distinction between the criticism of "pure æsthetic" and that of "values." It may well be that this distinction has relations with two currents of contemporary thought. In the first place, with the arrival at maturity of those whose childhood was spent in the Great War, the modern voice, of which the Edwardian and early Georgian generations have long ceased to be the mouthpiece, is passing even from those who had reached maturity when the war broke out. The immediate predecessors of this generation seem to have failed in impressing upon their juniors the impatience with which they themselves faced the modern civilisation after the disillusionment of war; wherefore the creators of to-day and of to-morrow can stomach the most terrible of war novels without a grimace, and can look in the *Waste Land* not for despair, but only for hope. Such an attitude is consistent with Mr. Dobrée's effort to seek out the reality of a man's work apart from enquiring into the exact æsthetic category into which it is to be fitted. The patience of every sort of production which is tolerated and enjoyed without question so long as it is a spontaneous cause of delight is again, I believe, to be found in those of the younger generation who refuse to be saddled with the disillusionment of their elders. These should be sympathetic with Mr. Dobrée's method by reason of his second point of contact between their approach and his.

A similar example is supplied by Mr. T. S. Eliot's *Dante* (Faber and Faber, 3s. 6d.). The value of the book in itself is a little difficult to determine, and may not perhaps be of much moment; for this essay is definitely meant to *do* something or to *show* something rather than to *be* anything. The publishers have instituted a series

in which living poets may be seen revealing themselves in their appreciation of their own kind. In this case the result has certainly been peculiarly fruitful, as Mr. Eliot's essay is an exhibition of that pelican-like digestion which assimilates the beautiful and disgorges it again for the delight of his readers. So does he at once feed his own mind and produce poetry at the same time. This is what the book *shows* throughout, but particularly in one striking passage, where Mr. Eliot quotes and translates that passage from the *Purgatorio* ("Esce di mano a lui, che la vagheggia Prima die sia . . . L'anima semplicitta") which was presumably the inspiration of, and regurgitated in, his own *Animula*. Such points are the most exciting parts in his book, as they are a considerable aid to the appreciation of his poetry. The enormous sympathy and humanity of the last lines of *Animula*—

"Pray for Guiterriez, avid of speed and power,  
For Bondin blown to pieces,  
For this one who made a great fortune  
And that one who went his own way.  
Pray for Floret, by the boarhound slain between the yew trees,  
Pray for us now and in the hour of our birth"—

gain tremendously when they are read with appreciation of Mr. Eliot's assimilation of the *Divine Comedy*.

He speaks of Dante and Shakspeare sharing the modern world between them, the one exhibiting a depth and altitude which is compelled only by the other's comprehensive width. Bearing in mind Mr. Eliot's awareness of the organic unity of all literature, an idea of which he has treated in one of the essays in *The Sacred Wood*, and considering further his insistence on the importance of Dante as a master, "*the* master—for a poet writing to-day in any language," we can better understand what Mr. Dobrée means when he uses the word "traditional." Mr. Eliot goes on to speak of the importance of a knowledge of Dante for anyone who would read modern poetry. The *Animula* example quoted above is almost too obvious an instance, for large numbers of people have read that poem who were in complete ignorance as to the origin of "Issue from the hand of God the simple soul." It is nevertheless



true, one may believe, that *Animula* would not have been a good poem, even had it existed at all, had Mr. Eliot not enriched himself with the *Divine Comedy*. (R. H.)

A classic of foreign literature which had once the good fortune to be translated by Sir Roger L'Estrange is not likely to gain much by its conversion into twentieth-century English. If we can welcome the new edition of *The Letters of a Portuguese Nun* (Francis Walterston, 15s. 6d.) it is less for the sake of Mr. Allen Ashwin's translation, which is not distinguished, than for his very capable preface and for the fine and austere beautiful engraving by Miss Joanna Gill which serves as frontispiece to the book. The edition being limited to a very small number of copies, one might have expected a more thoughtful choice of type and a higher standard of press-work.

The pathetic letters of this convent *pensionnaire* to her betrayer can be compared only superficially to the correspondence of Abelard and Héloïse. Marianna and Chamilly were united only by the brief intrigue, and when it was over retained no spiritual fellowship. Nor was either a great and impressive figure. The Frenchman was a soldier and an aristocrat of ordinary virtues and ordinary vices, she a simple and too passionate girl. We have only her half of the correspondence, and can but guess at her emotional and spiritual history after the date of her last letter. But the attesting interest of her letters is in their vivid and intimate portrayal of unsophisticated human passion, cheated, indignant, but wistful and sometimes imploring still. "You will perhaps find greater beauty (although you used to tell me I was beautiful), but you will never find such love; and nothing else matters." "Good-bye. I could very well wish that I had never seen you. Oh, how keenly I feel what a lie that is; for I know that I would far rather be miserable in loving you than never have seen you." "Should I not have known that the pleasures of that love would come to an end, but that love itself would not?" "Why could you not leave me my love? You had only to keep from writing to me. I was not asking to be undeceived." "I know that I am still thinking a little too much of my reproaches and your



faithlessness; but remember that I have made up my mind to become reconciled to my fate. . . . I think I will not write to you again." And from the fact that nowhere does Marianna show any sense of guilt, any consciousness that vows other than of human love had been broken, it is plain that to the end of her last letter she loved Chamilly still.

Returned to France, the Marquis de Chamilly lived for more than fifty years, published Marianna's letters, married a wealthy wife, and died in 1715, a Marshal of France. In the convent at Beja, Marianna Alcoforado died eight years after in the peace of the Church—an old woman of exemplary piety, said the sisters, and of great charity, bearing patiently great bodily affliction and desiring to suffer more. (W. H. S.)

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